NA by Kenville, Michael J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2000-06-01
Devrimci sol: a study of Turkey's revolutionary left
and its impact on United States interests, 1968-1999
Kenville, Michael J.













A STUDY OF TURKEY'S REVOLUTIONARY LEFT AND








Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
H00L
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction,
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
1. AGENCY U.S.E ONLY (Leave blank) REPORT DATE
June 2000
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's Thesis
4. title and subtitle Devrimci Sol: A Study of Turkey's Revolutionary Left









9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING / MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
Using the evolution of Devrimci Sol, this thesis analyses leftist terrorism against U.S. interests in Turkey between 1968
and 1999. During this period, leftists committed 81 percent of the terrorism-related murders of U.S. citizens. In the
1970s, leftists began targeting U.S. interests, including military personnel. By 1980, the left had killed ten Americans.
Although severely crippled following Turkey's 1980 coup, Devrimci Sol—the most prominent group—re-emerged in
1990 and dramatically increased attacks against U.S. interests during the Gulf War, perpetrating 75 percent of all
terrorist-related U.S. deaths in 1991. Although devastating Turkish security operations and an internal group schism
following the Gulf War drastically reduced the organization's violent activities, the late 1990s witnessed Devrimci
Sol's renewed interest in targeting the U.S.
The thesis explains leftist development and violence against U.S. interests, suggesting Turkey's rapid
modernization and the resulting instability provided fertile ground for the extreme left's emergence. By the 1970s,
following periods of increased political liberalization, the rise of Marxist-Leninist ideology coupled with government
intolerance to opposition groups elevated terrorism to the sole perceived avenue of change. External support, political
amnesties, and reports of government oppression in Turkey support Devrimci Sol's continued survival. It remains a
threat.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
Cayan, Dev Gene, Dev Sol, Dev Yol, Devrimci Sol, DHKC, DHKP-C, Karatas, leftist, Marxist-








18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF
THIS PAGE
Unclassified






NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
11
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
DEVRIMCI SOL: A STUDY OF TURKEY'S REVOLUTIONARY LEFT AND ITS
IMPACT ON UNITED STATES INTERESTS, 1968-1999
Michael J.Xenville
Captain, United States Air Force
B.A., University of Maryland, 1989
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of








Using the evolution of Devrimci Sol, this thesis analyses leftist terrorism against
U.S. interests in Turkey between 1968 and 1999. During this period, leftists committed
81 percent of the terrorism-related murders of U.S. citizens. In the 1970s, leftists began
targeting U.S. interests, including military personnel. By 1980, the left had killed ten
Americans. Although severely crippled following Turkey's 1980 coup, Devrimci Sol—
the most prominent group—re-emerged in 1990 and dramatically increased attacks
against U.S. interests during the Gulf War, perpetrating 75 percent of all terrorist-related
U.S. deaths in 1991. Although devastating Turkish security operations and an internal
group schism following the Gulf War drastically reduced the organization's violent
activities, the late 1990s witnessed Devrimci Sol's renewed interest in targeting the U.S.
The thesis explains leftist development and violence against U.S. interests,
suggesting Turkey's rapid modernization and the resulting instability provided fertile
ground for the extreme left's emergence. By the 1970s, following periods of increased
political liberalization, the rise of Marxist-Leninist ideology coupled with government
intolerance to opposition groups elevated terrorism to the sole perceived avenue of
change. External support, political amnesties, and reports of government oppression in
Turkey support Devrimci Sol's continued survival. It remains a threat.




A. PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT 3
B. RELEVANCE AND SIGNIFICANCE 6
C. RESEARCH SHORTFALLS 7
D. THESIS OUTLINE 8
E. DEFINITIONS 11
F. NOTE ON TURKISH SPELLING 13
II. BACKGROUND: MODERNIZATION AND VIOLENCE IN TURKEY 15
A. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES AND OPPOSITION 18
1. Political Liberalization 18
2. Continuous Economic Difficulties 23
B. URBANIZATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT 27
III. EMERGENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT 33
A. STUDENT MOVEMENTS AND INITIAL ACTIONS 34
B. TERRORISM AS A MEANS OF OPPOSITION 39
C. IMPERIALISM: TARGETING THE UNITED STATES 41
D. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN TURKEY: 1968-71 44
IV. DEVRIMCI SOL: RE-EMERGENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT 49
A. MARTYRS, ESCAPE AND POLITICAL AMNESTY 50
B. DEVRIMCI SOL: THE SPLINTER OF 1978 54
C. TERRORISM AND THE 1980 MILITARY INTERVENTION 58
D. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN TURKEY: 1971-80 62
V. THE GULF WAR AND DEVRIMCI SOL 69
vii
A. THE 1980 COUP'S LEGACY OF REPRESSION AND TORTURE 70
B. EUROPE, POLITICAL RELAXATION AND PRISON BREAKS 74
C. DEVRIMCISOUS COME BACK AND THE GULF WAR 77
D. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN TURKEY: 1980-91 78
VI. AFTERMATH OF THE COLD WAR COLLAPSE 87
A. EUROPE AND AN IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE 88
B. TURKISH SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE NINETIES 90
C. THE SECOND REVOLUTIONARY LEFT SCHISM 91
D. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN TURKEY: 1992-99 93
VII. THE FUTURE THREAT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT 99






6. Security Environment 103
B. THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT'S THREAT AND FUTURE 104
APPENDICES 109
APPENDIX A - LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 1 1
1
APPENDIX B - RAND-ST. ANDREWS CHRONOLOGY SEQUENCE
NUMBER CODES 115
APPENDIX C - CHRONOLOGY SOURCES 1 19
APPENDDC D - CHRONOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST
INCIDENTS, 1968-99 123
APPENDIX E - INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN TURKEY,
1968-99 199
Vlll
APPENDIX F - LEFTIST TARGETING OF U.S. INTERESTS, 1968-99 201
APPENDIX G - LEFTIST TACTICS AGAINST U.S. TARGETS, 1968-99 ... 203
APPENDIX H - LOCATION OF LEFTIST INCIDENTS AGAINST U.S.
INCIDENTS, 1968-99 205
APPENDIX I- TURKIYE HALK KURTULU$ ORDUSU MANIFESTO 207
APPENDIX J - DEVRIMCI SOL 'NEWS BULLETIN' NO. 9 213
APPENDIX K - DEVRIMCI SOL COMMUNIQUE ON OPERATION DESERT
STORM 215
APPENDIX L - DEVRIMCI SOL 'NEWS BULLETIN' NO. 3 217
APPENDIX M-DHKC'S "PEOPLE'S PARTY" PROGRAM 221
BIBLIOGRAPHY 245
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 257
IX
Figure 5-4. MTMC Outpost Bombing in Istanbul, 21 January 1991 80
Figure 5-5. Leftist Targeting of U.S. Interests, 1980-91 81
Figure 5-6. Location of Leftist Incidents against U.S. Interests, 1980-91 82
Figure 5-7. Leftist Tactics against U.S. Interests, 1980-91 83
Figure 5-8. Photograph of U.S. Contractor Killing and Devrimci Sol Slogans 85
Figure 6-1. International Terrorist Incidents in Turkey, 1992-99 93
Figure 6-2. Leftist Targeting of U.S. Interests, 1992-99 95
Figure 6-3. Location of Leftist Incidents against U.S. Interests, 1992-99 96
Figure 6-4. Leftist Tactics Used against U.S. Interests, 1992-99 97
xn
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2-1. Turkish Urban Population Growth, 1935-70 28
Table 4-1. Profession Breakdown of Captured Terrorists, 12 Sep 80-1 1 Sep 82 61
Table 7-1. U.S. Casualties to Terrorism in Turkey, 1968-98 103
xin
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
xiv
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the 1960s, terrorist groups have threatened United States commercial,
diplomatic and military personnel and materiel in countries throughout the world.
Although faced with such a threat in many theaters, no threat was more problematic than
that faced in Europe. During the Cold War era, U.S. interests were especially at risk to
terrorism in European countries such as Germany, Greece, Italy and Turkey.
The most potent threat came from the extreme, violent European left—the
Fighting Communist Organizations (FCOs). Driven by a Marxist-Leninist ideology,
these often small, lethal, urban terrorist groups flourished during the Cold War aiming to
overthrow their country's democratic government and replace it with their "vision" of a
proletarian dictatorship.
1 As might be expected, such groups often opposed their
country's involvement with the U.S., perceiving U.S. interest in their country purely as
imperialistic in nature. Compounding this were U.S. policies and decisions, such as
weapons embargoes, which seemed to validate these claims. This meant European
terrorists often directed their attacks against U.S. interests in their country.
Although many have written on the particulars surrounding such infamous
terrorist organizations as former West Germany's Red Army Faction or Italy's Red
Brigades, discussions regarding Turkey's own FCO
—
Devrimci Sol—have mostly been
confined to government circles. This thesis aims to modify that. The thesis covers 1968
through 1999.
The thesis, through a case study of Devrimci Sol (and its past and present
derivatives), provides an understanding of the underlying causes for the emergence and
continuation of Turkey's revolutionary left. Specifically, the study analyses its origins in
Turkey's modernization endeavors and the political liberalization of the 1960s, the
group's cycle of declining and re-emerging violence against U.S. interests in Turkey, and
its overall capability to survive numerous assaults. Lastly, the thesis analyzes Devrimci
SoVs successor organization, Devrimci Halk Kurtulu§ Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C) or
1 Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky, eds., Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist
Organizations (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1992), 16.
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Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front, in order to illustrate the revolutionary
left's current and future threat to U.S. interests in Turkey.
This thesis achieves several purposes. This thesis argues that issues surrounding
Turkey's modernization process and initial attempt at a multi-party political system
provided the fertile environment for the emergence of leftist terrorism. It analyses
Devrimci Sol, one of Turkey's most lethal terrorist groups, especially for the United
States. Through a detailed analysis of the domestic and international environment in
1960s Turkey, the thesis explains and documents the initial emergence of Turkey's
revolutionary left—especially the path from the Tiirkiye Halkin Kurtulu§u Partisi-
Cephesi (THKP-C) or Turkish People's Liberation Party-Front to Devrimci Sol (Dev Sol)
or Revolutionary Left. Furthermore, it traces the emergence of the DHKP-C, the product
of a 1 994-split in Devrimci Sol.
Second, the thesis explains the revolutionary left's decision to violently oppose
the Ankara regime, as well as begin terrorist attacks against U.S. interests in Turkey. The
student movements of the 1960s and 1970s produced many of Turkey's leftist terrorists.
Turkey's leftist student population emerged and flourished during liberalization periods,
but when the ruling party answered its calls for continued liberalization with oppression,
certain elements of the left became radicalized and responded with an "armed struggle."
Using approaches advanced by leading political scientists and terrorism experts, the
thesis explains the revolutionary left's decision to engage in an "armed struggle" against
the Turkish Government. This is further discussed and supported within the context and
aftermath of the 1980 military intervention.
Third, this thesis explores the 1980 coup's lasting impact of widespread torture
and violations of human rights on surviving (as well as newly recruited) leftist militants.
This research suggest that the coup, coupled with early leftist martyrs, continues to fuel
Turkey's revolutionary leftist struggle against the "fascist" Ankara regime, and its
"puppet master" the United States. Even though Turkey's rapid modernization process
ultimately provided the environment from which terrorists emerged, it remains only one
element key to the revolutionary left's continuation.
Furthermore, successive Ankara regimes' continued repressive response against
the population directly caused the rise of militant leftists. In addition, the initial group,
xvi
Devrimci Sol, and its present replacement have managed to endure successive destructive
Turkish security operations against them. The movement's longevity is a result of an
extensive support base outside Turkey, a large prison network and the later attachment of
human rights issues to its cause in order to gain greater exposure and appeal in the
international arena. The repeated political amnesties granted shortly after each military
coup further facilitated the revolutionary left's ability to rebound.
Finally, applying a Department of Defense threat level assessment methodology,
analyzing the factors of existence, capability, intentions, history, targeting, and security
environment, this study offers an opinion on DHKP-C's threat to U.S. interests currently
in Turkey. Based upon a review of these factors, indicating the factors of existence,
capabilities, intentions, and history are present, the DHKP-C threat to U.S. interests in
Turkey is assessed as High. Thus, research demonstrates that Turkey's revolutionary
leftist terrorists remain a threat to U.S. interests in the region. Although beaten down in
the early 1990s, this group continues to exist and demonstrate lethal capabilities. In
addition, as recently as 1999, punctuated with a foiled attack against the U.S. Consulate
in Istanbul, DHKP-C reaffirmed its targeting of U.S. interests.
This element of Turkey's left has repeatedly demonstrated a lethal ability against
U.S. personnel, which continues to exist today. Therefore, understanding the nature of
this group, its strengths and capabilities, and potential threat are essential to the
protection of U.S. interests in Turkey. The decline in and apparent loss of appeal of
Marxism-Leninism throughout the terrorist world and the eclipsing Islamic extremist
paranoia of the 2 1 st century should not cloud eyes to an old and familiar threat—many
FCOs may be down, but they are not all out.
Finally, the author invites any comments pertaining to this thesis and the issues
addressed in it. All comments should be forwarded to the author at E-mail account:
kenvillethesis2000@ hotmail.com.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"The [Fighting Communist Organization] is an endangered species of terrorist
group that is currently running on the 'fumes' ofMarxism-Leninism. However, as a




On 7 February 1991, at approximately 0700, Bobbie Eugene Mozelle, a civilian
customs specialist with the United States firm Vinnel, Brown and Root (VBR) at Incirlik
Air Base (IAB), Turkey, walked with his morning cup of coffee to his green, late-model
1963 Mercedes in downtown Adana, Turkey. 3 As he reached his vehicle, a man
—
part of
a 3-person hit team—approached from the rear of the car and shot him five times (Figure
1-1). Within a matter of seconds, terrorists had handed the U.S. its first terrorist-related
Source: Andrew Corsun, "Dev-Sol Attacks on Americans," in U.S. Department of State, Office of
Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices: 1994 (Washington, D.C.:
Department of State, 1994), 26.
Figure 1-1. Crime Scene Photograph of Mozelle Assassination
2
Ibid., 48-9.
Andrew Corsun, "Dev-Sol Attacks on Americans," in U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence
and Threat Analysis, Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices: 1994 (Washington, D.C.: Department of
State, 1994), 25.
casualty of Operation DESERT STORM, as well as the first such death in Turkey in
almost ten years.
Shortly before noon that day, anonymous telephone callers to local newspapers
claimed the attack in the name of the Turkish revolutionary left: Devrimci Sol (Dev Sol)
or Revolutionary Left, and the Marksist-Leninist Silahh Propaganda Birligi (MLSPB) or
Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit.4 According to the Dev Sol caller, the group
had "punished a CIA agent in Adana, Turkey. The bases cannot be used for U.S.
imperialism. Turkish and Kurdish people are not the servants of American
imperialism."5 According to the MLSPB caller, the group had "punished a CIA
agent... Turkish lands are not an American base.... We want [the United States forces] to
leave immediately."6 Once again, violent Turkish leftist terrorists were attacking U.S.
and other Western targets to demonstrate their opposition to the Ankara regime, Turkish-
U.S. relations, and U.S. "imperialism" and U.S. -led military operations in the region.
This incident not only illustrated the extreme end of the revolutionary left's
spectrum of terrorist activity—assassination—but also highlighted characteristics and
methods of Turkey's revolutionary leftists 7 key to understanding their activities. This
assassination accurately displayed the capabilities, sophistication and thoroughness of the
organization. Three militants—two shooters and a lookout—conducted this operation
during daylight hours in Turkey's third largest city. The Turkish police investigation
indicated terrorists had surveilled both the location and the victim prior to the killing. In
addition, the rhetoric of both callers' messages illustrated the revolutionary left's
4
Although some experts suggest that in the early 1990s Devrimci Sol and MLSPB were the same
organization, imset states MLSPB was in fact a separate organization established in 1975. On MLSPB see:
Ismet G. Imset, The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey, 1973- 1992 (Ankara, Turkey: Turkish





' Throughout this thesis "revolutionary left" refers to the violent, Marxist-Leninist terrorists of the Turkish
left; i.e., Devrimci Sol, its predecessors of the 1970s, and its 1994 successor, DHKP-C. The term
"Revolutionary Left" is the English translation of Devrimci Sol.
continued vehement displeasure for U.S. influence in the region and the left's need to tie
the U.S. to Turkey's domestic issues.
From where did such an anti-U.S./Western terrorist organization come? What
accounts for the revolutionary left's opposition against Ankara and the United States?
What are the ideological foundations of this movement, especially Devrimci Soil What
led to Mozelle's death in 1991? Will more Americans suffer Mozelle's fate in the future?
What are the future implications of U.S. involvement in Turkey and the surrounding
region as it relates to terrorist threats in Turkey? This thesis aims to provide insight into
these questions and some tentative answers.
A. PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the emergence, development and
continuation of Turkey's extreme leftist movement—the revolutionary left—from the
1960s to the present. The vehicle for this is a case study of the history and present
circumstances of Turkey's most militant and anti-Western leftist terrorist organization
—
Devrimci Sol—and its associated lineage. This will serve as the foundation for an
analysis of certain elements of the movement opting to engage in violence as a method of
promoting political change. Specifically, the thesis addresses details of Turkey's
modernization, which by the late 1960s—after 25 years of one-party dominance—had
created a troubled political and economic environment. From this turbulent environment
Turkey's initial revolutionary leftists, the Tiirkiye Halkin Kurtulu§u Partisi-Cephesi
(THKP-C) or Turkish People's Liberation Party-Front, and the Tiirkiye Halk Kurtulu§
Ordusu (THKO) or Turkish People's Liberation Army emerged. Although Turkish
security forces destroyed both groups' senior leadership shortly after Turkey's second
coup (1971), by the late 1970s the revolutionary left had re-emerged in force. This time
nearly 60 separate leftist groups operated in Turkey, most stressing their connection to
the earlier THKP-C and THKO groups. Even so, Devrimci Sol and MLSPB emerged as
the most deadly of these groups. As violence dramatically increased in the late 1970s,
both groups frequently targeted U.S. interest in a "war" against the Turkish Government
and "struggle" against perceived U.S. "imperialism."
Specifically, the intent is to answer the following questions regarding the
organization: (1) What prompted the emergence and development of the revolutionary
left in Turkey? (2) What drove the "ancestors" of Devrimci Sol to engage in an "armed
struggle" as a method of demonstrating their opposition to the Ankara government? (3)
What events or situations prompted leftists to target U.S. interests and personnel in the
1970s, and continues to the present? (4) What historical impact has this organization had
on the U.S. and its personnel in Turkey? (5) Does the latest derivative of Devrimci Sol—
Devrimci Halk Kurtulu§ Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C) or Revolutionary People's Liberation
Party-Front
—
pose a continuing threat to U.S. interests in Turkey? If so, to what degree?
The four primary theses of this study are:
(1) The revolutionary left's initial emergence and development in Turkey can be
attributed to that country's rapid modernization. This process eventually led to the
turbulent political, economic and social environment that characterized the new Republic
during the 1950s and 1960s. After 25 years under a one-party dominant system (1923-
1950), in the late 1940s, the Turkish Government decided to experiment with a
multiparty political system and permitted an opposition party to form. In May 1950, this
led to an unprecedented event in Turkey—the peaceful and successful transfer of
government power between two parties. Although the incumbent party lost, its political
leaders willingly relinquished power to the new, more liberal party. The jubilation over
such an event was short lived. Without the benefit of an historical example of political
tolerance, the new party soon fell back on old methods of dealing with those critical of
government policies—increased government control. The resulting political and social
oppression the new government imposed drew the extreme left from the newly urbanized
population—specifically a growing and often unemployed student population. The
resulting unemployment and rapid urbanization of Turkey's larger cities between 1960
and 1980 provided fertile ground for rising, young, idealistic leftist leaders, as well as an
ample source of leftist militants. Attempts at moving away from a single-party
dominated system, eventually allowed opposition parties to drift to the left. This often
became too threatening for traditional Kemalists—especially the armed forces, the self-
appointed guardians of the constitution—often ending in military intervention. In
addition, the left's threat served to inflame the right, which ultimately turned to violence.
Leftist militants' ability to find haven in Europe or the Middle East following each
military intervention proved key to their survival. The government's eventual relaxation
of political activities and frequent release of jailed leftists following amnesties, often left
both militants and their leaders intact and available for reconstitution. This led to the re-
emergence and continuation of the revolutionary left movement.
(2) The revolutionary left initiated attacks on U.S. interests and personnel because
it perceived an undue U.S. influence in domestic Turkish politics and economic policies,
a belief Turkey's revolutionary left still maintains today. Militants often cite historical
foundations regarding U.S. "control" of Turkey through the U.S.-dominated North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For example, the United States threatened to not
intervene (nor would NATO) on Turkey's behalf in any conflict with Russia if Turkey
carried out an invasion of Cyprus in the early 1960s. The perceived U.S. imperialism in
Turkey and its impact on both the Turkish economy and foreign policy created an
environment conducive to leftist targeting of U.S. interests. Of course, the U.S.
represented opposition to leftist ideas, especially those found in Marxism-Leninism.
Furthermore, the U.S. stood in opposition to the Soviet Union, which some leftist
terrorists saw as the ideological pillar from which they fought their revolution.
(3) Turkey's continued economic and political instability explains the
revolutionary left's initial emergence and further supports its survival. Still, other factors
developed later in the 1970 and 1980s, which aid in the movement's longevity. The
continued existence of Devrimci Sol's follow-on group—DHKP-C—is an example of
Turkey's revolutionary left's ability to last in its fight against the State. Although more a
product of internal conflict and a power struggle for group leadership, DHKP-C (and its
public affairs/political element DHKC) is the product of the group's ability to change and
adapt, even in the face of devastating Turkish security operations and internal splintering.
Where its terrorist comrades in Germany and Italy succumbed to security operations
and/or the impact of the communist collapse, Devrimci Sol adapted and still survives.
Aiding in this survival was the group's assimilation of Turkey's human rights issues into
its supporting ideology and cause. With the collapse of the Soviet Union came Europe's
increasing view of a diminished importance of Turkey in protecting NATO's southern
flank. Such a situation has allowed Europe increased flexibility in opposition to Turkey's
desire to enter the European Union. Most notably, Europe has cited Turkey's continued
poor human rights record as an obstacle to its entrance into the Union. Such movements
as DHKP-C, who is well placed in Europe, utilized such a situation to their advantage.
(4) The current revolutionary left representative, DHKP-C, remains a real threat
to U.S. interests in Turkey. The organization and its leadership have an extensive and
sophisticated history of violence against its "enemies." An analysis of the situation
indicates the DHKP-C threat posed to U.S. interests in Turkey remains viable, yet
possibly lower than in the past. Even so, this could rapidly change depending on
international or regional affairs (such as military actions) and the perceived influence
Washington has in such matters. Such triggering events as the 1991 U.S. -led coalition
war against Iraq served as a warning of such changes. DHKP-C continues the
revolutionary left's vehement opposition to U.S. "imperialism" within Turkey in its
current organizational documents. Paralleling this, DHKP-C continues to demonstrate its
concerns through action—most recently noted in June 1999, when Turkish security
intervened in a planned rocket attack against the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul.
B. RELEVANCE AND SIGNIFICANCE
This thesis is important because terrorist attacks on U.S. property and personnel,
especially those assigned to regions such as Turkey, continue to pose real threats. More
specifically, the leftist terrorist threat in Turkey to both permanent party and temporarily
assigned personnel remains high. Because the positioning of U.S. Forces in Turkey
remains a reality for the foreseeable future, it is essential that military commanders,
security officials, and the military forces in Turkey fully understand the nature and threat
posed by such an organization.
Research on the extreme left in Turkey, especially Devrimci Sol is extremely
relevant to understanding such a threat. The importance lies in providing useful insights
into the organization, which U.S. security agencies in the region can use in efforts to
protect U.S. interests in Turkey. The thesis will provide an understanding of why this
group remains in "business." As one of the last surviving members of what Yonah
Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky refer to as the "Fighting Communist Organizations," it
behooves anyone operating in Turkey to better understand the reasons behind the
revolutionary left's sustainment and longevity and what that means.
In addition, in regards to general research on terrorism and militant groups, such
research as this contributes to the never ending need to understand the nature of
international terrorism. Especially important is understanding a group's decision to
engage in terrorism as a method of demonstrating opposition to a government and the
decision to possibly involve a third, external party. Finally, this thesis is relevant because
in searching out published research in English on Devrimci Sol, this author realized
quickly that specific research on the group was either severely dated (i.e., 1980s),
restricted, or very general to Turkish history. So, it is the author's wish that this thesis
will ultimately contribute to a better understanding of one of the most dangerous terrorist
groups to threaten U.S. interests outside its shores in the twentieth century.
C. RESEARCH SHORTFALLS
It is important to point out to the reader some thesis shortfalls. Although it
endeavors to provide the most comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of Turkey's
revolutionary left, to include the current group's (DHKP-C) threat, certain research
limitations have in some ways diminished the thoroughness of the analysis. First,
because this thesis was developed, compiled and produced in less than 10 months the
majority of source material is English-based and not original Turkish language
documents. Most of the material published in Turkish was not readily available outside
Turkey. Second, although general Turkish history is well documented within the public
domain, U.S. security agencies maintain the majority of current material tightly focused
on terrorism matters—especially those occurring in Turkey. The majority of it is either
difficult to track down or is restricted to "Government Use Only." Although an extensive
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request was submitted to the Department of Defense
within two months of the start of this research, the requested information never
materialized in time for inclusion in this document. Therefore, the reader will find this
thesis grounded extensively in non-Turkish sources, and focused almost exclusively on
leftist terrorists actions against Americans, with only minor references to the domestic
impact to Turkey.
D. THESIS OUTLINE
The following chapters analyze and chronicle the scope and level of leftist
violence—specifically that perpetrated by the line of Devrimci Sol—in Turkey from 1968
to 1999. The thesis is essentially divided in to four parts. The first part (Chapter II)
describes Turkey's economic, political and social background from approximately 1950
to the present. The purpose is to illustrate the environment in which the revolutionary left
developed, flourished, declined and then periodically re-emerged. The second part
(Chapters III through VI) provides periodized details related to the revolutionary left's
terrorist activities, focused primarily on the groups involved, their rise and fall, and their
impact on U.S. interests in Turkey. The chapters are periodized using Turkey's
successive military intervention as markers, with the exception of the last, which starts
with the end of the Gulf War. The third part (Chapter VII) discusses today's
revolutionary left's (DHKP-C) potential threat to the U.S. as a terrorist group. The last
part (Appendices) contains 12 reference documents.
Chapter II establishes the volatile environment created when Turkey continued its
rapid modernization after the 1950s, employing the views of Professor Samuel
Huntington to account for a situation, which spawned the violent manifestations of
political opposition to the Turkish Government. The primary purpose of this chapter is to
describe the environment in which Turkish leftists emerged, flourish, declined, re-
emerged, and remain today. This chapter analyses and describes the turbulent times of
the post single-party dominant system in Turkey. In explaining the political, economical
and social changes of this period—especially the liberalization, rapid urbanization and
increased unemployment—this chapter aims to illustrate the environment in which
certain sections of the Turkish population became politically mobilized and particular
elements of Turkey's left moved towards violence. The chapter covers the late 1950s
through to the late 1990s.
The middle chapters focus primarily on Turkey's revolutionary leftist groups and
their impact on U.S. interests in Turkey. Chapter III analyzes the emergence of terrorism
and covers the period from 1968 to the 12 March 1971 coup. It introduces the original
Turkish militant left, what is repeatedly referred to throughout the thesis as the
revolutionary left. This chapter focuses on the increased presence and organization of
movements within the country's student population and the eventual emergence of
militants. It chronicles the original organizations, which spawned Turkey's first
revolutionary leftist terrorists. The chapter discusses the original martyrs of the
movement and the initial operations directed against the United States. It includes a
discussion regarding the decision to engage in terrorism as a method of opposition. Also,
the chapter briefly reviews some historical events in Turkish history that supported a less
than favorable view of the U.S. in the eyes of some Turks. Finally, this chapter—as will
all remaining chapters
—
provides an analysis of the characteristics and level of
international terrorism in Turkey during the time period. Further breaking the data down,
it analyses tactics, targeting, and location of incidents as they related specifically to leftist
actions perpetrated against U.S. interests. This chapter aims to answer the questions:
• From where did the revolutionary left come?
• What early events and people shaped its future development?
• What facilitated the left's eventual targeting of U.S. interests in Turkey?
• What was the revolutionary lefts initial impact on U.S. interests in Turkey?
Chapter IV covers leftist activities following the 1971 coup to Turkey's third
military intervention on 12 September 1980. It focuses on the central organization of this
study
—
Devrimci Sol—the circumstances of its emergence in 1978, as well as its lethal
actions against U.S. targets. The chapter begins with a discussion of the demise of the
first organized elements of the revolutionary left—the martyrs of Kizildere—and their
importance to the continuation of the next movement. This includes early leftist
attempts, following the 1972 military intervention, to continue their cause outside
Turkey. This chapter provides insight into the reasons behind the emergence of Devrimci
Sol, as well as a look at what would become a key issue in the organization's ideological
platform—human rights. It is important to understand the rise of Dev Sol in the pre- 1980
coup period and the impact that Turkish security operations in the pre-coup years had on
the future of the organization. Key questions answered in this chapter are:
• What was the importance of the first martyrs?
• What events led to the rise of Devrimci Sol?
• What bearing did leftist terrorism have on the 1980 military intervention?
How did Devrimci Sol survive the Turkish military's stunning blow following the
1980 coup? What role did alleged human rights violations and torture have on this
recovery? What prompted Devrimci Sol in 1991 to engage in lethal acts of terrorism
against the West, ultimately resulting in the assassination of three foreign civilians and an
attempt on a USAF officer in Izmir? Chapter V covers the post- 1980 coup period
through to the end of 1991. The intent in this chapter is to explore this period and shed
light on the circumstances surrounding Dev SoVs actions. This is accomplished through
an analysis of the group's operations against Western targets during the 1991 Gulf War,
as well as the terrorist literature which surfaced during this period.
Chapter VI discusses events and issues from 1992 to 1999. The central issues in
this chapter surround yet another survival story and transformation of Devrimci Sol.
With the demise of the Soviet Union and the resulting ideological blow to Marxist-based
revolutionary leftist groups, the continued survival of any terrorist organization grounded
in such ideology warrants examination. Although potent Turkish security operations
following the Gulf War tremendously decreased Devrimci Sol activities—especially
those directed at U.S. targets—the group survived and continues to this day. This chapter
discusses the emergence of Devrimci SoFs follow-on organization—DHKP-C—and the
suggested reasons for its emergence and the continued existence of this line of Turkey's
revolutionary left. Central questions in this chapter are:
• What impact did the communist collapse have on Devrimci Soil
• What prompted 1 992 Turkish security operations against Devrimci SoP.
• What was the impact of these operations?
• What prompted the split of Devrimci Sol and the emergence of DHKP-C?
Chapter VII examines two issues. First, the chapter aims to review DHKP-C
ideology and recent activities using essentially the organizational documents publicly
available through DHKP-C s "public affairs" element, Devrimci Halk Kurtulu§ Cephesi
(DHKC) or Revolutionary People's Liberation Front. Such information provides a means
to analyze how DHKP-C perceives its "calling," what motivates its violent
"revolutionary" and terrorist activities. The resulting analysis suggests DHKP-C,
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especially following the 1980 coup, increasingly relies on continued Turkish Government
oppression (e.g., banning of certain opposition parties) and suspected human rights
violations (e.g., police torture and extrajudicial executions) to justify its existence. In
addition, DHKP-C has attached the Kurdish separatist issue to its ideological platform,
hoping to gain further international attention as a champion of Kurdish rights in such a
hostile and "fascist" Turkey. The chapter argues that DHKP-C increasing believes these
two issues are key in appealing to international audiences, and in the organization's
survival.
Does DHKP-C still pose a threat to the United States? That is the second
question approached in Chapter VII. The short answer is a qualified 'Yes'. This position
is supported through an analysis of the organization examining DHKP-C's historical
activities, as well as its present intentions and capabilities. Although DHKP-C activity
levels are nowhere near those of Devrimci Sol, it has demonstrated on at least two
occasions within the last half of the 1990s the intent to attack U.S. interests. This chapter
further offers some final comments regarding the future of Turkey's revolutionary left
and its relationship to U.S. interests in the region. This chapter serves to remind the
reader of the dangers of such groups, and that further examination is warranted.
Following Chapter VII, the reader will discover several appendices, which
provide additional information regarding the activities, impact, scope and views of
certain elements of Turkey's revolutionary left. This is accomplished, first, through a
chronology of international terrorist incidents in Turkey, from 1968 to 1999. Along with
this chronology are several English translations of organizational documents from the
groups (e.g., communiques, manifestos and bulletins) which provide further insight into
the movement's ideology.
E. DEFINITIONS
Before proceeding, a few terms used throughout this thesis require a brief
explanation in order to ensure the reader understands their intended use.
International Terrorism. In the thesis, the RAND Corporation definition referred
to in the RAND-St. Andrews University Chronology ofInternational Terrorism is used:
Incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, select victims
or targets that have connections with a foreign state (e.g., diplomats,
11
foreign businessmen, officers of foreign corporations), or create
international incidents by attacking airline passengers, personnel, and
equipment. It excludes violence carried out by terrorists within their own
country against their own nationals, and terrorism perpetrated by
governments against their own citizens. 8
Marxist-Leninists. The purpose and length of this thesis does not permit an in-
depth analysis of Turkey's revolutionary leftists' interpretations and reliance on Marxist-
Leninist ideology as a foundation for revolution. Yet, it is important that the reader
appreciate the basics of the term Marxist-Leninists when used here, therefore, the
following explanation is offered:
Marxist-Leninists conceive 'Leninism' to be the development of the
scientific understanding of society propounded by [Karl] Marx and
[Frederick] Engels. As such it is a science of the laws of development of
nature and society, which elucidates the causal relationships between man
and society and the advance to the classless society of communism. The
major components of Marxism-Leninism are dialectical and historical
materialism as a method of analysis, political economy as the study of the
class relationships to the means of production and the level of productive
forces, and the theory of scientific communism (the structure and process
of communist societies). More narrowly defined, Leninism is that
tendency within Marxist thought which accepts the major theoretical
contributions of Lenin to revolutionary Marxism. Specifically, it is an
approach to the seizure of power for and by the proletariat and the
building of socialist society, which legitimates revolutionary action by the
Party on behalf of the working class. . .Rather than relying on the
spontaneous development of consciousness in the working class, Leninists
see the party as a catalyst bringing revolutionary theory and political
organization to the exploited masses... For Marxist-Leninists, the seizure
of power is the result of revolutionary struggle and initially the
dictatorship of the proletariat is established under the hegemony of the
party.
9
Bruce Hoffman, "The Confluence of International and Domestic Trends in Terrorism," Columbia
International Affairs Online, Columbia University Press, January 1997, Available [Online]:
<https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/hob01/hob01.html> [27 October 1999].
9 Tom Bottomore, ed., A Dictionary of Marxist Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1983), 279-81.
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In the initial stages of an ideological development, the infamous leader and one of the
first extreme leftist martyrs in Turkey—Mahir £ayan—attempted to develop a two-stage
model of revolutionary tactics based upon Marxism-Leninism. First, he envisioned the
workers taking the lead, with the peasants playing a supporting role. Yet, in order for the
revolution to succeed, the rural population would eventually have to be drawn into a mass
popular movement, with "workers taking a back seat." 10
Devhmci Sol. In Turkish it means "Revolutionary Left," refers to the specific
terrorist group that emerged in 1978, eventually splitting in 1994 to form today's DHKP-
C. The U.S. Department of State describes this group, under "(DHKP/C)" as:
Originally formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction
of the Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front. Renamed in 1994 after
factional infighting, it espouses a Marxist ideology and is virulently anti-
U.S. and anti-NATO. Finances its activities chiefly through armed
robberies and extortion.
Terrorist Tactics. An aspect of international terrorism concerned with the ways
and means of which terrorists performed their actions. Specifically here, this refers to the
method of attacking (e.g., assassination, bombing, raking, etc.) the target and/or victim.
F. NOTE ON TURKISH SPELLING
Although Atatiirk patterned the modern Turkish alphabet after the Latin version, a
few modifications were required in order to account for several sounds fully represented
in the Latin alphabet. Most of the 29 letters sound the same as in English and most
Turkish words are pronounced exactly as written. The following, partial, key is provided
to help in properly pronouncing Turkish words (italicized in the text) used in this thesis.
c as in '/ail'
g as in 'church'
g as in 'get'
10
For details of Cayan's views see: Aydinlik (Istanbul), January 1970, 188-221, quoted in George S. Harris,
"The Left in Turkey," Problems of Communism 29, no. 4 (1980), 32.
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g as in y, or 'neighbor'; lengthens the preceding vowel
I as in 'dozen'
i as in pm
J as in 'pleasure'
o as in 'horde'
6 as in 'urge'
? as in 'shoe'
u as in 'pwt'
ii as in the French word 'rwe'
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II. BACKGROUND: MODERNIZATION AND VIOLENCE IN TURKEY
"With afew notable exceptions, the political environment of[modernizing countries]
after World War II was characterized by increasing ethnic and class conflict, recurring
rioting and mob violence, frequent military coups d'etat, the dominance of unstable
personalistic leaders who often pursued disastrous economic and social policies,
...arbitrary infringement of the rights and liberties of citizens, ...the pervasive alienation
of urban political groups, ...and at times complete disintegration ofbroadly based
political parties.
"
Samuel P. Huntington (1968) 12
There are many political science arguments and theories, which aid in explaining
political violence. Yet, following a review of the comparative literature on social
movements and revolutions, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly indicate that any analyses of this
phenomenon immediately faces several issues. 13 First, there are few "general" theories of
conflict and revolution. Most scholars focus on narrow elements of the phenomenon,
emphasizing different sets of concepts, theoretical issues and comparisons. 14 Second,
most scholars on political violence and revolution focus on the "Western democratic
experience," making their theory incompatible in non-Western situations. Finally, many
theories focus on the process, rather than the cause; this thesis aims to determine the
cause. Therefore, the author uses Samuel P. Huntington's argument and analysis
regarding modernization and the need for strong institutions 15 in explaining Turkey's
violence. Huntington's discussions regarding the modernization of developing countries
and the potential for violence provided support in explaining violence in Turkey in the
second half of the twentieth century.
12 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University
Press, 1968), 3.
13 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, "Toward an Integrated Perspective on Social
Movements and Revolution," in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, Mark I.
Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., 142-73 (Cambridge, United Kingdom: The Press Syndicate of the







Huntington's description, although not a direct or exact characterization of
Turkey's modernization process, highlights certain elements of chaos that begin in
Turkey during the middle of the twentieth century. Modernization is a multifaceted
endeavor, requiring changes in many areas of human activity and thought. 16 This was
certainly true for Turkey, which after World War I began the transition from the Islamic-
dominated society ofthe Ottoman Empire to the secular vision of Mustafa "Atatiirk"
Kemal—the Turkish Republic's founding leader. Rapid modernization has characterized
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since the end of World War I. Dramatic political, economic and social changes
associated with this process provided the fertile ground from which violent leftist
terrorism eventually germinated, flourished and expanded. The increased availability of
education to the general population and the increased number of college students, their
exposure to numerous (often radical) political and economic ideologies often put growing
student movements at odds with one another (e.g., leftist vs. rightist vs. Islamist) and the
government.
Accompanying political and social unrest and unemployment found in the rapidly
growing urban areas of Turkey's largest cities created a pool from which eager, yet
sometimes uninformed, militants were recruited; the universities provided the ideologues.
As greater numbers of people flooded the cities in search of employment or an education
during the 1960s and 1970s, they frequently were confronted with unemployment and a
myriad of political philosophies unfamiliar to them, yet which promised solutions to their
economic and political predicaments.
The purpose here is to briefly analyze these rapid political, economic, intellectual,
urban and employment changes and challenges, especially following the founding of the
Second Republic [1960], and explain their impact. In doing so, Huntington's views and
theories on the process of modernization and its impact on underdeveloped countries will
serve as a guide. As he points out, modernization involves a fundamental shift in a
society's values, attitudes and expectations; 17 this could be no truer than what Turkey
witnessed in its early history. In order to provide a background picture of these
conditions over time and during the particular periods of terrorist activity discussed, this
chapter covers 1968 to 1999. The chapters that follow this one will focus more on
revolutionary leftists' activities and changes, as well as specifically address their impact




A. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES AND OPPOSITION
Turkey's search for economic and political stability has often resulted in dashed
hopes and dreams, punctuated by periods of worker, student and political unrest, and on
at least four occasions (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997), military intervention in domestic
politics. Successive governments developed and initiated political and economic
liberalization strategies without sound political institutions, which often provided no
more than short term gains, ending in near bankruptcy and political violence. After 1950,
Turkey suffered economic disruptions approximately once per decade, with possibly the
most serious crisis occurring in the late 1970s. It is important to note that attempts at
economic advancement often did not occur in a stable political environment. Often the
embryonic political parties—following Turkey's move away from a one-party dominant
system in the late 1940s—used promised economic improvements to gain the upper hand
against rivals, not fully appreciating the impact unsound economic policies would later
have on the country. In addition, it is important to understand the attempts and
shortcomings of early economic initiatives in order to fully understand some of the
elements, which contributed to the rise of some of Europe's most violent and lethal
political activity in the last half of the twentieth century.
1. Political Liberalization
Political modernization involves the rationalization of authority, the replacement
of traditional, religious and ethnic political authorities by a single secular, national
political authority.
18 Such a situation occurred in the early days of the Republic. Since
the start of the nationalist movement in Anatolia in 1919, the Turkish polity has suffered
dramatic upheavals that have at times threatened to destroy its national being.
19 As with
other elements of the country, Turkey's political history has been anything but smooth
and tranquil. Coupled with Turkey's measures to establish a stable economy have been
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endeavors, politicians have sacrificed long-term stability for short-term political gains.
This has ultimately led to increased opposition to the party in power, increased chaos and
ultimately political violence. Violence during these periods (e.g., 1971 and 1980)
allowed a critical military—concerned with national security—to lose its confidence in
the civilian government, often ending in military interventions.
It might be stated that Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar's registering of the
Democrat Party (DP) in January 1946 initiated Turkey's troubled path toward political
liberalization and a multiparty system. Shortly after the DP's second successful election
[1954] against the Cumhurriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) or Republican People's Party (RPP),
Menderes took it as a mandate to make sweeping changes, including reforms of the civil
service and state-run enterprises. Yet, serious problems soon began to occur with the
new regime. Democrats failed to carry through their promise of greater political
liberalization. They remained suspicious of the RPP and determined to reduce its
continuing power and influence.
As the government began to come under attack in the late 1950s, Menderes took
measures to silence the opposition, including laws limiting the freedom of the Turkish
press. Tension increased as the government tightened the law and imposed further
restrictions on public assembly. To their critics it seemed the Democrats had moved into
the realm of more general repression and were intent upon silencing the opposition with a
view to retaining power. 20 Unfortunately, the DP and the opposition party (RPP) failed to
cooperate and ultimately brought the government to a screeching halt.
Following outbreaks of violent protests in central Anatolia during RPP leader
Ismet inonii's political tour and the 28 April 1960 violent student demonstration in
Istanbul, the country rapidly approached political chaos. The situation was inflamed one
week later when military cadets staged a protest march supporting the student
demonstrations; this signaled the eventual clash between the military and the civilian
government. An answer came to the situation on 27 May 1960, when the military, under
20
M.E. Yapp, The Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995, 2d ed. (New York: Addison
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General Cemal Giirsel, seized the government during modern Turkey's first coup. Thus
ended Turkey's first attempt at political liberalization.
In the two decades after the establishment of a more liberal constitution following
the 1960 coup, the government permitted the emergence of parties and movements which
moved more and more from the political center. In addition, the 1961 constitution
legalized the military's interference in political matters. The proliferation of parties
ultimately resulted in sharp differences in political opinions, eventually leading to an
escalation in politically based violence, especially as students increasingly debated their
differences at the end of a gun. Huntington seems to account for such a situation, stating
such "rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development
of political institutions" produces violence such as found during this period." Turkey
was not equipped to confront such a situation, since a single party had dominated its first
25 years of existence and its initial attempt otherwise (1950-1960) had failed.
Furthermore, Professor Metin Tamkoc states the adoption of a new "liberal constitution
in 1961, in theory, gave an end to dictatorial practices and facilitated greatly the
expression of 'socialist' or Marxist-Leninist-Maoist' views and ideas... that were totally
banned in previous decades... resulting in] political violence within and between the
ranks of the elite."""
Eventually, the economic and political instability leading up to 1971, drew a
"coup-by-memorandum" from the military on 12 March 1971. This time the military
pointed to the 1961 constitution to support its involvement in Turkish politics. Although
one of the results of this coup was the crackdown on violent groups in general, the
government predominately focused on leftist groups (versus rightists), as it viewed them
as the "real" threat to national security. This was nothing new. David Barchard





of the 16 February riots in Istanbul. He described a photograph depicting "a riot
policeman standing by impassive as a rightist... menaced the life of a leftist."23
By 1972, Turkish security forces had decimated most of the violent leftist groups,
resulting in many arrests and the fleeing of several influential leftists to Europe. The
actions of the military and security forces would not be lost on the revolutionary left. In
the decades that followed, leftist terrorists would seek their "revenge" when they focused
a great deal of energy on targeting police and military personnel associated with the
coups, especially those officials associated with torture in the 1980 coup.
As Turkey approached the 1980s, once again political disputes continued to ramp
up. The eventual return of many left-wing militants and continued disputes among those
in government contributed greatly to the rapid escalation of political violence in 1978 and
1979. In 1978 alone, there were more than 4,000 separate acts of political violence. By
the summer of 1980, experts attributed the loss of 183 lives, on average, per month to the
out-of-control violence.
24 As it became apparent to the military that the ruling civilian
government was unable to create an effective coalition, as well as affect the halting of the
devastating political violence, it moved to seize control. On 12 September 1980, the
Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Kenan Evren, informed the country the
military had seized control of the government. With that announcement, the military
arrested leading political figures and declared martial law throughout the country. Within
13 months, the military government directed all political parties to disband, confiscated
their property, and barred all persons previously holding leadership positions in parties
from politics for 10 years. The only exceptions were members of the Tiirkiye Biiyiik
Millet Meclisi (TBMM) or Turkish Grand National Assembly, who were barred for five
years.
According to McFadden, the political system the military dismantled had been
"liberal to a fault." The post- 1960 coup constitution facilitated broad access to the
23
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political process by newly mobilized social and economic groups, and proportional
representation of distributing seats in the TBMM encouraged a surfeit of political
parties.
25 Lowered restraints on the diversity of political philosophies produced a wide
spectrum of political opinions, some of which became represented at the national level.
The ultimate result was the paralysis of the polity through severe fragmentation and
polarization. This resulted in essentially two situations (not mutually exclusive): the
"legal" legislative process became ineffective, and the "illegal" militant organizations
turned to armed struggle to defend their ideas. It will later be discussed how, from the
different leftist camps that emerged during these turbulent times, sprang Turkey's future
terrorist leaders.
In 1983, following the gradual relaxation of military control, the government still
closely monitored political activity and restricted such activities to the limits outlined in
the 1982 constitution. On 6 November 1983, the military allowed the participation of
three parties" (out of an original 12 founded) in the first election since the 1980 coup.
The election ended with Turgut Ozal becoming Prime Minister. By March 1984, Ozal's
government began moving to more liberalization, with the lifting of the 1983 ban on
some of the outlawed political parties. Unfortunately, this was not a means to liberalize,
rather a stratagem to divide the opposition.
-7
This move would ultimately weaken Ozal's
party. Continued moves to liberalize the political process in Turkey as it faced (and went
through) the 1990s, brought the return of many of the "old guard." In addition, it allowed
for the re-emergence of some leftist organizations, as well as more Islamic parties, such
as the Refah Partisi (RP) or Welfare Party. The RP would later become of great concern
to the Turkish military and its perceived need to protect the secular path of the Republic.
By 1989, the revolutionary left was once again on the rise and by the Gulf War had
returned in full force.
25
Ibid., 69.
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2. Continuous Economic Difficulties
The Turkish economy's ongoing and turbulent reorientation has left the economy
a study in contrasts.
28 The country's development strategy in the 1950s and 1960s aimed
at fostering agricultural and industrial production, improving basic infrastructure, and
integrating the rural and urban sectors into a single-market economy. 29 The execution of
this plan, supported by International Monetary Fund (IMF) stand-by arrangements
throughout the 1960s, resulted in a period of steady and substantial growth for the
country. According to Yavuz Canevi, former Undersecretary of Treasury and Foreign
Trade (1986-89), Turkey maintained annual growth rates averaging 6 to 7 percent from
1965 through 1977. Yet, as he points out, this economic performance was not without
cost.
In order to achieve such economic growth, the government adopted an import
substitution strategy, making Turkey critically dependent on imports of capital and
intermediate inputs and on strong protection of its domestic markets. 30 This ultimately
neglected the country's export potential and fostered inefficiencies and distortions within
the domestic economy. Ultimately, the life of the plan became dependent on external
savings, as domestic savings were drained as a result of negative interest rates and
discretionary allocation of credit. Compounding this was the need to fill the resulting
foreign exchange gap created because of the excessive import dependence. 31
The first of several crises arrived in August 1958, when Turkey encountered a
balance of payments crisis, ending in a devaluation of the Turkish lira. Many economic
scholars have pointed out that devaluation was an error, as it only postponed eventual
economic collapse; the country should have opted for more comprehensive economic
reforms. Because this selected answer to the crisis lacked a sound macroeconomic basis
' Turkey: A Country Study, 5th ed., Department of the Army Area Handbook Series, Helen C. Metz, ed.
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 149.
! Yavuz Canevi, "Turkey," in The Political Economy ofPolicy Reform, John Williamson, ed.






and the populist government continued on a road of deficit financing, 32 the situation soon
emerged as a political crisis, which on 27 May 1960, coupled with the political weakness
of the regime ushered in the first of several military coups.
Unfortunately, the government took no macroeconomic lessons from this crisis.
When in 1970, the country faced a second foreign exchange situation, the only answer
was another devaluation of the lira. On 12 March 1971, the military made this situation
worse when it handed the government a written ultimatum threatening the army would
exercise its constitutional duty if a strong credible government was not formed, economic
stability regained, and measures undertaken to end political unrest.
Shortly after this, although the situation failed to improve, Turkey experienced a
short period of rapid improvement in its balance of payments, actually resulting in a
current account surplus. Supporting this were the remittances by Turkish workers who
had moved to Europe, which peaked in 1974 with a total of $1,462 million. 33 This would
soon be overshadowed by the oil crisis of 1973-74, which led to the quadrupling of oil
prices on the international market. Since Turkey was critically dependent on oil as a
source of energy, its import bill steeply increased. By the time the second oil crisis
arrived in 1979, two-thirds of Turkey's foreign currency earnings went to meeting its oil
needs.
34
Thus, Turkey faced the 1980s in a situation Canevi best describes:
During the years leading up to the crisis (1974-79), annual GNP [Gross
National Product] growth had declined to an average of 4.4 percent. The
public-sector deficit expanded rapidly from less than 2 percent of GNP in
1974 to more than 6 percent in 1979, averaging 4.5 percent from 1974 to
1979. Thus, Turkey faced the second round of oil price increases with an
extremely weak economy, a grossly overvalued currency, virtually no
foreign exchange reserves, strongly negative real interest rates, a very high
rate of inflation, widespread unemployment, stagnant output, political
turmoil, and an external debt in excess of $13.5 billion, more than a











Finally realizing the need for serious economic reforms, the new Suleyman
Demirel government initiated a major change in the orientation of Turkish economic
policy, introducing a major and comprehensive economic stabilization package. The job
was given to the under-secretary for economic affairs in charge of planning, Turgut Ozal,
a powerful technocrat. The program initiated in January 1980, aimed not only at
redressing the economic situation, but also at changing the development strategy Turkey
had followed for several decades. Even so, this did not prevent the military, in the face of
crippling political violence between the left and right (and other internal security
concerns), from leaving their barracks and assuming control on 12 September 1980.
Upon the establishment of a new government, the military appointed Ozal to continue the
implementation and further strengthening of the already-introduced reforms.
Although the economy improved following the 1980 coup, the rapid resurgence of
growth and the improvement in the balance of payments were insufficient to overcome
unemployment and inflation. Although, the official jobless rate fell from 15 percent in
1979 to 1 1 percent in 1980, it rose again to 13 percent in 1985. 37 This was partly
attributed to a dramatic increase in the labor force. In addition, the same pattern occurred
regarding inflation, with a steep increase to 40 percent by 1984 from a low of 25 percent
in 1981-82.
38 The next economic beating would come in 1991, during the Gulf War.
The United Nations (UN) embargo on Iraq required the ending of oil exports through the
Cayhan pipelines, causing the loss of pipeline fees. Compounding this was the estimated
loss of $3 billion in trade with Iraq. 39 Extreme leftist groups pointed to this as yet another
example of the imperialist west, especially the U.S., controlling Turkey's economy and
foreign policy.
In 1994, once again, Turkey found its economy in crisis. The government's
decision to increase civil servant salaries and to increase transfers to state enterprises two
36
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years earlier enlarged the public-sector borrowing requirement to a record 17 percent of
Gross National Product (GDP) in 1993. Although this boosted domestic demand, by
mid- 1993 inflation had increased to 73 percent. In addition, the resulting rise in the real
exchange rate increased imports, yet slowed expansion of exports. By 1993, the trade
deficit had risen to $14 billion and the current account deficit was at 6.3 billion.40 The
situation continued to get worse as domestic and international confidence in Turkey's
ability to manage its balance of payments problem weakened. By the beginning of 1994,
Turkey had lost two Central Bank governors as a result of sharp disagreements between
the bank and the government on how best to solve the country's economic crisis.
Turkey's economic difficulties (and poor decisions) compounded its ability to
establish sound political institutions, which were not matching social expectations. This
contributed to the violence-prone environment and instability implied. 41 A review of past
and recent left-wing terrorist communiques and Internet documents sharply illustrates
such groups' interest in the well being of the country, as well as their use of it to attract
support. In 1992, a Devrimci Sol communique issued following the assassinations of
several prominent Turkish security officials, specifically pointed out their displeasure
with the economic situation and unemployment by stating: "We must demand jobs and
housing. We have a right to a life with dignity. If we do not raise our voice, they [the
Turkish Government] will continue to deprive us of bread, jobs, and the lives of our
children."
42
In the 1999 edition of the DHKP-C's revolutionary program document,43 the
organization devotes a large section to criticizing the government's mishandling of the
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...the anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic revolution will put an end to the
economic hegemony of the oligarchy and imperialism because they hinder
the development of the productive forces and the economic growth of the
country. It will take action to ensure that all resources and products will
serve to increase the wealth of the people, and it will make possible the
free development of the productive forces.44
B. URBANIZATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT
Another result and measure of modernization is the growth of the city. 45 Turkey
eventually underwent a substantial redistribution of its population. By 1986, forty-six
percent of Turkey's population was concentrated in a few large cities. For example,
Istanbul's population rose from 1 million in 1950 to over 5 million by 1986. 46 Many
experts point to the explosive growth in and around Turkey's largest cities as it
modernized as a contributing factor to violence and the left-wing extremism witnessed
following the 1950s. According to a 1991 RAND study,
...the emergence and escalation of political terrorism in Turkey took place
just after the country's social scene had undergone rapid and far-reaching
changes... the most important... [being] the transformation of Turkey from
a predominantly rural society to an increasingly urban one. 47
Turkey's population increased from 21 million in 1950 to 52 million in 1986.
Rapid urbanization continued to drastically shift the Turkish population, resulting in the
urban population increasing from 19 percent in 1950 to over 40 percent in 1975; an
estimated 650,000 villagers and townspeople annually moved to the larger cities in the
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pattern began early in the Republic's history. As might be expected, urban populations
were much greater consumers of services such as health care and education than were
people living in the rural areas.
The movement of the population to cities not equipped to welcome them gave rise
to the term gecekondus—literally "set up overnight"—referring to the makeshift
structures self-assembled in the urban areas of cities to house the newly arrived
population. According to Sabri Sayari, the gecekondus population increased from 1.2
million to 7.5 million between 1960 and 1985. 50 The rapid shift in population was the
result of many things. First, there was an increase in fertility rates, leading to a larger
available work force. Second, the introduction of mechanized agricultural methods
meant a decreased need for the traditional agricultural laborers. These two factors
combined to form an extremely under utilized workforce. The ending result was the
migration of this "unneeded" population to Turkey's major cities (i.e., Ankara, Adana,
Izmir, and Istanbul; see Figure 2-2), where the "industrial and economical advancement"
of the cities promised much needed employment.
YEAR TOTAL POPULATION URBAN POPULATION









Source: Turkey: Prospects and Problems ofan Expanding Economy, The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank., 1975), Table 11.12, 465.












Unfortunately, the envisioned employment was unavailable, leaving many people
marginally employed or unemployed. Early labor surplus figures (Figure 2-3) provide an
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Source: "CIA Worldfact Book," Central Intelligence Agency Online, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999,
Available [Online]: <http://vvww.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> [29 February 2000].
Figure 2-2. Map of the Republic of Turkey
illustration ofthe steady increase in potential employment. In fact, by the time ofthe first
episode of violence and the 1971 military coup, total labor surplus rates exceeded 10
percent. This new group, without work, compounded the situation further as they were
unable to afford available housing, thus the establishment of the gecekondus. It is here
that many ofthe new problems arose for the administrators ofthese large cities, who
were not prepared to meet the demands for transportation, water and electricity of such a
rapid increase in population. The economic problems the Turkish government faced in
the late 1970s and early 1980s compounded this dilemma, resulting in little financial
relief to these areas. Unfortunately, the cities were unable to provide for this urban
population, which became a very restless mass and began to apply pressure on local
governments, demanding they be heard.
As will be discussed later, Turkish terrorism—especially the left—originated in
Turkey's two largest cities: Istanbul and Ankara; also the locations of most ofthe major
universities. Until the 1950's, the state-run universities were geared to educate a select
29

number of young people for recruitment into political and professional elite positions. 51




Source: Turkey: Prospects and Problems ofan Expanding Economy, The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank, 1975), Table 1.2, 334.
Figure 2-3. Total Labor Surplus as Percentage of Labor Supply, 1962-72
its previous elitist orientation. With the increase in rural student applications, the student
population began to change, bringing with it the openness to newly introduced ideas.
Coupled with this was the diminished guarantee of employment or upward social
mobility after university.
This concern over future employment steadily contributed to a volatile
atmosphere within Turkish universities. As Huntington suggests, increases in
education—among other things—often give rise to enhanced aspirations and






theories of Marx, Lenin and Mao—coupled with discussions of the "revolutions"
throughout the world during the 1970s—became hotly debated topics within the student
population, violence eventually exploded on the campuses. Turkish campuses became
arenas in which left-and-left, as well as left-and-right, battled over political and
ideological disagreements.
The combination of the poor and unemployed populations of the gecekondus and
the increased politicization of the university student population created a resourceful
situation for terrorist groups on both sides. The newly emerged revolutionary left groups
found a plentiful source of recruits in the unemployed and disenfranchised youth of the
gecekondus. In fact, many analysts point to the relationship between urbanization and
extremism in Turkey, particularly emphasizing the contribution of gecekondus to the
escalation of the armed movement. In addition, Kemal Karpat, an expert on the
gecekondu phenomenon in Turkey, argues that no other factor
...contributed as much to social and political change and, indirectly, to
political unrest in Turkey as the agglomeration of rural migrant
settlements around the major cities of Turkey.... Alienated youth in the
gecekondus and elsewhere in the cities provided a large recruitment pool
for every militant, radical, and terrorist group.
Needless to say, Turkey's modernization and the resulting (and continuing)
political and economic instability contributed to the emergence of terrorism. The
country's difficulty in establishing a sound democratic base and a toleration of opposition
parties during periods of increased liberalization, prohibited it from escaping potential
political violence. Compounding this is the ups-and-downs of the economy. Although
some economic experts indicate Turkey is slowly moving to a more sound economy such
a situation remained elusive to previous Ankara regimes. This led to increased
unemployment and unrest among the population, especially the students.
This chapter illustrated the turbulent and unpredictable political and economical
environment from which revolutionary leftist groups initially emerged. Turkey's
continued problems in these areas have made it difficult to find a solution to the problem
53
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of terrorism. Even so, these factors are not the sole reason for the left's existence. As
will be discussed later, Ankara's brutal attacks on the left and continued alleged human
rights violations served to provide reasons for leftist activities. The following chapters
focus on the terrorists and their attacks on U.S. interests in Turkey.
32
III. EMERGENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT
"The People's Liberation Army of Turkey believes that the liberation ofour people
and the independence ofour country will be achieved by armed struggle and that this
course is the only course.... Our aim is to liquidate American and allforeign enemies,
destroy the traitors and establish a fully independent Turkey cleared of the enemy. "
Turkiye Halk Kurtulus Ordusu Manifesto (1971) 54
It can be said that none of the armed left-wing terrorist organizations active in
Turkey today (or those operating in the recent past) are new. For the most part, their
origin extends back to Turkey's turbulent political and economic past discussed earlier.
The Turkish revolutionary left emerged out of the new political freedoms of the 1960s
and 1970s, when radical left-wing publications, organizations and parties were allowed to
flourish.
55
In fact, knset states "their roots go back to a special student's club, the Fikir
Kuliipleri Federasonu (FKF) or Federation of Idea Clubs active during the 1960s. 56 He
suggests, as does Andrew Corsun, a terrorist expert with the U.S. Department of State
(DOS), that radicalized student movements as the FKF gave birth to Turkey's first left-
wing terrorist groups.
In addition, these groups partly evolved in the late 1960s as a result of the radical
student protest movements common in Europe and the United States, where the
disaffected left rallied around such issues as U.S. imperialism, the Vietnam conflict,
nuclear weapons proliferation, the plight of the Palestinian people, and the need to
support third world revolutionary struggles. Once certain elements (and individuals) of
the FKF became mobilized and made the decision to engage in an "armed struggle," the
groundwork was founded for some of Turkey's most violent and lethal leftist
54
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organizations. In addition, leftists soon projected their hatred further, singling out the
U.S. as a key source of Turkey's problems. Soon after, revolutionary leftists began
targeting U.S. interests.
The focus here is on the initial emergence of the revolutionary left in Turkey,
specifically the period immediately leading up to the 12 March 1971 coup. This requires
an analysis of the key student organizations from which the left emerged, as well as key
radicalized student leaders. This discussion is accomplished though a detailed review of
specific acts and consequences of these groups, the leaders, and the terrorist groups that
emerged. Parallel to this is the decision by some student leaders to violently oppose the
government, rather than seek change through less violent and politically acceptable
methods. Finally, during this period the left decided to target U.S. interests. As will be
seen, U.S. actions and their perceived influence in Turkish domestic affairs "validated"
the left's worst "imperialistic" fears. This, coupled with Turkey's membership in NATO,
ultimately served to rationalize the decision to target U.S. interests.
A. STUDENT MOVEMENTS AND INITIAL ACTIONS
The 1960s saw the rise of new actors on the Turkish political stage, most notably
the extreme left. One of the unique characteristics separating the sixties movements from
past leftist activity was the organized and violent manner in which they pursued their
ends. In their new forms, the left was a product of the economic development of the
period since 1960, of the process of urbanization, of the expansion of education, in
particular of the considerable growth of universities, and of the growth of anti-Western
sentiments. 5 The first leaders of Turkish leftist terrorist groups were products of early
1960s student movements, especially the FKF.
During the late 1960s, as the student unrest of the West reached Turkey, the
FKF—termed a side-arm of the Tiirkiye I§gi Partisi (TIP) or Turkish Labor Party founded
in 1965—stood as a single and united entity representative of left-wing activities.




political objectives, the FKF emerged as Devrimci Geng {Dev Geng) or the Revolutionary
Youth Organization.59 According to imset, the influential Turkish leftist Mahir £ayan60
(and his followers) seized control of the Dev Geng Central Administrative Committee in
1970.
In November 1970, £ayan (Figure 3-1) and his followers decided to establish the
Turkiye Halk Kurtulu§ Partisi-Cephesi (THKP-C) or Turkish People's Liberation Party-
Front in Ankara. The new leaders would be Mahir £ayan, Ertugrul Kurkcii, Miinir










Source: THKP-C'nin Kurucusu ve Onderi Mahir Cayan (THKP-C's Founder and Leader, Mahir Cayan),
Kurtulu§ Cephesi: Anit-Emperyalist ve Anti-Oligarsik Miicadelede (Liberation Party: Anit-Imperialist and
Anti-Oligarchy Struggle), Available [Online]: <http://www.kurtuluscephesi.com/eris/mahir.html> [4
October 1999].
Figure 3-1. THKP-C Leader, Revolutionary Leftist and Martyr, Mahir £ayan
establishment of the THKP. According to their plan, THKP was to be the political leader
of the movement, while the THKP-C would conduct the armed activities of the
59
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organization. ' Upon the establishment of the group, THKP-C leaders quickly moved to
establish urban guerilla groups and decided to concentrate activities on the youth and
workers sectors in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana and the Black Sea region.
At the same time, another militant group emerged on the scene; radical students
essentially populated it as well. This group was the Turkiye Halk Kurtulu§ Ordusu
(THKO) or Turkish People's Liberation Army. It came to the world's attention when on
4 March 1971, THKO militants kidnapped four USAF airmen on their way back to
Ankara from an installation outside of the city. Later that day, someone delivered a
ransom note to the Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) organization, demanding
$400,000 ransom and that the THKO manifesto ~ be broadcast over TRT; the kidnappers
set a 36-hour deadline for their demands to be met or the hostages would be killed. At
1 600 that day, President Richard Nixon held a news conference and stated he would not
recommend the Turkish Government bargain with the kidnappers.63
Eventually, on 5 March, the Turkish Government searched the Orta Dogu Teknik
Universite or Middle East Technical University (METU), and a number of houses and
apartments in attempts to locate the hostages—none of their efforts located the four
airmen. The government's actions led to increased tension between it and the
universities. On 8 March, the Turkish National Police (TNP) responded to an unrelated
domestic incident at the apartment building where the THKO was holding the airmen.
After the police departed, the THKO terrorists became concerned the police were aware
of where they were and fled the area. By midnight that day, the airmen realized they
were alone and escaped. On 12 March 1971, the army, led by General Memduh Tagmac,
took action, forced the Demirel government to resign and installed a new government. 64
61
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As a result of the Turkish military's 12 March 1971 "coup-by-memorandum" the
THKP-C accelerated their activities before they completed the organizational process, as
to "remove the mask of the oligarchy" and prove that the coup was backed by the United
States.
6 On 17 May 1971, the group's first significant action was the abduction and
assassination of Ephraim Elrom, the Israeli Consul to Istanbul.66 This incident
established the presence of the THKP-C and spread the group's name throughout Turkey.
Although £ayan hoped to expose the "Western exploitation... [through] developing
markets in allied countries" with his armed propaganda, Turkish security forces captured
him (1 June 1971) and cut short his organization's activities.
Although on 29 November 1971, £ayan escaped from prison, Turkish security
forces later killed him and the majority of THKP-C leadership during a security forces'
operation on 30 May 1972. The government initiated the operation when eleven THKP-
C and THKO militants kidnapped a Canadian and two British NATO technicians,
commonly referred to as the "Kizildere Operation." The terrorists demanded the release
of three THKO leaders—Deniz Gezmi§, Yusuf Asian and Huseyin inan (Figure 3-2)
—
awaiting execution. When authorities refused this demand, the militants demanded safe
passage to the Syrian border.68 By 1400 on 30 May, the militants and the Turkish
Government forces surrounding the hideout began to exchange gunfire. At 1610,
government forces entered the hideout shooting after hearing "explosions" inside the
house, finding all three technicians dead. According to the self-appointed "spokes
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[were] punished [italics added] as had been threatened earlier," following the killing of
£ayan, who DHKC credits as the first member of the militants to "fall" in the incident. 69
£Rw«k
Source: Mehmet Ali Birand, Hikmet Bila, and Ridvan Akar, 12 Eyltil: Turkiye 'nin Miladi (12 September:
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Figure 3-2. THKO Leaders Gezmis, Gezmis Standing at His Trial, Asian and Inan
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During this operation, Turkish security killed ten THKP-C members. Following
the Kizildere operation, the government had technically crushed THKP-C and most of the
remaining members, including £ayan's spouse Gulten, left the country. 71 It would be
several years before the revolutionary left would return to Turkey to wage their armed
struggle. Yet, from the protection of central Europe—which became a significant safe
harbor for Turkish leftists—the remaining members of both THKO and THKP-C
pondered their loss and began formulating their return and the continuation of the
struggle.
69 Legend after Legend: An Epic ofRevolutionary Struggle (London: Revolutionary People's Liberation
Front Information Bureau, 1998), 17.
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B. TERRORISM AS A MEANS OF OPPOSITION
Following World War II, President ismet inonii announced that the time had
come to move towards democracy. A small group immediately broke ranks from the
ruling party and established the Democrat Party discussed earlier, which eventually
sought and came to power in the early 1950s. The DP victory was a remarkable and
devastating victory but in many ways its most interesting feature was that an authoritarian
regime should have permitted it. 72 For the first time in recent memory, an authoritarian
regime had freely competed with an opposition and lost, then allowed a peaceful transfer
of power. Many saw this as a significant evolution of Turkey's political system.
If Turkey was on the road to political evolution and democracy, what happened?
The specific questions are: Why did certain elements of the leftist movement in Turkey
select terrorism as their method of opposition to Ankara? Why did the U.S. become a
significant target of terrorism? In part, after the 1 950 election, the country would soon
realize their political evolution was nowhere near complete. For by the end of 1960, the
military would stage the first of many coups and execute the Democrat Party's founder.
The first question is answered in the student activities and government reactions to these
activities during Turkey's modernization process, as previously described. The second
question concerns Turkey's entry into NATO—which most saw as an extension of U.S.
policy—and the perceived role both NATO and the U.S. had within Turkey.
Terrorism is not just violence. It includes acts of violence, yet these acts are
intended to influence a wider audience, and to send that audience a message. Who is
the audience? In most cases it is the regime, the international stage, another country (e.g.,
the U.S.), and most importantly the population. Therefore, terrorism is often referred to
as a method of demonstrating opposition to a government outside customary channels
and processes of "peaceful" opposition. Within the context of this thesis the focus is on
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significant percentage of the terrorist acts were directed at international targets
—
primarily the United States.
According to Martha Crenshaw, a group's lack of opportunity for political
participation or available avenues of political opposition can motivate that group to
engage in terrorism. Furthermore, regimes that deny access to power and persecute
dissenters create dissatisfaction. Couple with this, if the regime's repression is
inefficient, revolutionary terrorists have a better chance of emerging.
4
As Turkey
modernized, its student population increased, and moves to political modernization
became apparent with the 1950 election, the volatile environment Crenshaw suggests
began taking shape.
In the liberalized atmosphere of the time just prior to the Democrat Party's rise,
people (and groups) soon openly expressed ideological attitudes ranging from racialism
to communism. In addition, segments of the population began criticizing specific actors
and policies, especially those of the RPP, quickly rose, both in quantity and intensity. 75
Around this same time, several student organizations emerged with distant connections to
political influence in Turkish history. As they emerged in the environment of increased
education and rising student population, actors connected to the newly liberalized
political parties began funding and using these organizations for their political agendas
—
as well as against their political opponents. As the members of an opposition-supported
student organization began expressing their dissent with the current regime's policies, the
regime responded closing that organization and making it illegal. In earlier actions, the
Ankara regime actually sponsored attacks on student organizations opposing them. For
example, in 1945, the RPP sponsored a violent demonstration against an opposition
organization in Istanbul, which ended with the destruction of the opposition's publishing
and distribution offices.
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When the DP came to power in 1950, a similar pattern began. Under the
increased liberalization of the time, opposition grew, especially that of the left. Lacking a
tradition of tolerance of dissent, the DP soon began retaliating against its opposition. It
accomplished this by moving to control the activities of the RPP, as well as student
organizations that supported it. By the end of the 1950s, the Democrat Party appeared to
be moving to quash the opposition, in an attempt to return to a one-party dominant
system.
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In 1960, the actions of the DP had created an environment prone to violence as
an expression of dissent. In reaction to this, the military stepped in and took control.
Thus ended the Second Republic.
Yet, this cycle of periodic repression would continue into the 1960s and 1970s,
reinforcing the belief within the student population—especially the left—that the only
means to opposition was through a revolution, as it appeared the government had closed
all doors of peaceful opposition. With the 1980 coup, this cycle of violence would take
on a new, more intense character with the severe and alleged brutal put down of leftist
terrorism. The regime's actions during this period would provide immense justification,
in the eyes of the revolutionary left, to battle the regime. The circumstances of the 1980
coup will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
C. IMPERIALISM: TARGETING THE UNITED STATES
Following the successful avoidance of World War II, Turkey began to enjoy
better relations with the West, specifically the United States. As one of the original aims
of the founders of Turkey was to modernize in the "Western" way—including its
military—it was only natural that Turkey would seek membership in the newly
established North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Once NATO was established,
first a RPP government and then a DP regime earnestly endeavored to gain admission. In
those days of cold war intensity, foreign policy was bipartisan in Turkey, and the U.S.
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and Turkey's strategic position on Europe's eastern flank and proximity to its historical
enemy of Russia, such a relationship seemed a positive situation for both Europe and
Turkey.
In 1952, NATO formally accepted Turkey as a member. Although welcomed by
many in the government, outside the government, some elements did not see the move as
positive, especially certain members within the Turkish left. Increasingly, such elements
came to perceive the West and its institutions, specifically the U.S. and NATO as
exercising too much influence in Turkish affairs. Within the revolutionary left, one
common theme began to appear and became constant: the need to combat U.S.
imperialism and its influence in Turkey. The eventual U.S. attitude towards Turkey's
role in Cyprus validated the revolutionary left's fears.
A discussion regarding violence and terrorism directed at U.S. interests in Turkey
would not be complete without first reviewing early Turkish-U.S. relations regarding
Turkey's role in Cyprus. In 1964, Turkey intended to occupy the Northern section of
Cyprus to protect the interests of the Turkish-speaking Cypriots. Before undertaking
such a move, Ankara informed the U.S. as a courtesy to an ally. The U.S. response was
less than welcomed. In June, before the Turks could dispatch forces, President Lyndon
Johnson sent Prime Minister inonii a harsh letter warning that NATO might not protect
Turkey from Soviet intervention if Turkey took military action on Cyprus. This
obvious threat was leaked to the Turkish media with devastating effects on Turkish-U.S.
relations. Turkey did not attack Cyprus, but many within the political establishment as
well as the general population felt a sense of overwhelming betrayal by a trusted friend.
Public resentment against the U.S. was intense; the incident marked the end of the
era of unquestioning diplomatic cooperation with Washington. 81 By 1970, student anti-
U.S. protests (Figure 3-3) began to occur and the left in general became more confident
in their opposition to the U.S. presence. Pressure from leftist elements—who now took
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up the cry of moving Turkey out ofNATO—forced the Ankara regime to review its
alliance. The result was a restriction of U.S. privileges and activities compared to times
Source: George S. Harris, "The Left in Turkey," Problems with Communism 29, no. 4 (1980), 31.
Figure 3-3. Anti-U.S. Student Demonstration in Ankara, April 1970
prior to the incident. In 1974, when a Greek-backed junta staged a coup in Cyprus,
Ankara invaded, eventually occupying 40 percent of the island. The U.S. Congress
condemned Turkey's military action. 82 In fact, the U.S. Congress levied an arms
embargo on the Republic lasting into the late 1970s. For many Turks, such acts
represented serious U.S. interference in matters of Turkish security—the U.S. had gone
too far.
A final example of the revolutionary left's fears of U.S. imperialism came in
Turkey's 1973 banning of opium fanning, following U.S. pressure. Although the U.S.
agreed to compensate the loss to the extent of $35 million, the Turkish government later
claimed the amount fell short and that and estimated 100,000 families had virtually lost
their livelihood.
83
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opium would resume on state farms, the U.S. involvement would not be lost on the
revolutionary left or the rural population.
These episodes of U.S. interference in Turkish affairs were not lost on the
emerging revolutionary left in the sixties and seventies, who viewed such acts as direct
imperialistic power threats to Turkish security. Leftist terrorists now viewed the U.S. and
NATO through the same eyes. A review of an early THKO manifesto published in 1971
illustrates this when it stated: "Use the weapon in your hands for the sake of the
liberation of our country. Oppose the commanders under orders to NATO and the
interest of the traitors fed by Americans."84 The U.S. (through NATO) now represented a
foreign invader who had to be fought.
D. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN TURKEY: 1968-71 85
Between 1968 and 1971, Turkey encountered its initial bout with leftist terrorism,
especially as it impacted non-Turkish interests like the United States. A review of
recorded incidents of international terrorism—especially those directed at U.S.
interests
—
provides insight into the characteristics of the revolutionary left, its tactics,
targets and impact on U.S. interests. The following figures illustrate this impact, the
variations in leftists' methods and the selection of U.S. targets, as well as the fluctuation
in violence and its link to the political conditions at the time. This section reviews data
recorded between 1968 through 12 March 1971, the day the Turkish military intervened.
During this period, Turkey witnessed 48 incidents of international terrorism. Of
these, the data indicates leftists or suspected leftists perpetrated 44 incidents (Figure 3-4);
43 of which concerned activities directed at or involving U.S. interests (Figure 3-5).
Predominantly, leftists targeted the U.S. military, presumably as it represented their new
enemy (NATO) and was easily identified. Supporting this, a review of individual
incidents during this period indicates several occurred at NATO sites where U.S. military
84
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were assigned. The level of incidents peaked in early 1971, and as might be expected,
dramatically fell following military intervention on 12 March 1971.
Year
71 (End- 12 Ma)
Sources: See Appendix C.
Figure 3-4. International Terrorist Incidents in Turkey, 1968-71
Revolutionary leftists confined the majority of their activities to Turkey's four
largest cities, especially Ankara and Istanbul. This coincides with the fact that university
students, who attended school in one of these large cities, established their movements in
these two cities and wished initially to appeal to the population ofthe city. In addition,
the majority of their targets—U.S. military and diplomatic interests—were located in or
near one ofthese four cities. Over 26 incidents alone occurred in Ankara (Figure 3-6),
the location where Gezmi§ allegedly established his group THKO.
In the early 1 970s, Turkish leftists were rather unsophisticated, conducting
operations (e.g., bombings, raking, and Molotov cocktail attacks) which required little
planning. A review of tactics recorded during this time appears to support this.
Bombings (and attempted bombings) accounted for over 65 percent (Figure 3-7) of all
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leftist acts against U.S. targets. This coincides with a similar pattern RAND researchers
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Sources: See Appendix C.
Figure 3-5. Leftist Targeting of U.S. Interests, 1968-71 *
1 980s. Bombs provided a dramatic, yet fairly easy and often risk-free, means for the
revolutionary left to draw attention to their cause. In this respect, bombings did not
require the same organizational expertise, logistics and knowledge required of more
complicated or sophisticated operations, such as kidnapping, assassination, and assaults
against defended targets.88 The use of unsophisticated methods supports the fact that the
!6
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revolutionary left in Turkey had little "terrorist" experience going into the 1970s, thus it
initiated less taxing
—
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Sources: See Appendix C.
Figure 3-6. Location of Leftist Incidents against U.S. Interests, 1968-71
Although terrorists caused nearly 50 deaths between 1970 and 1972, leftist
attacks claimed no U.S. lives during this period, inflicting mostly property damage. Even
so, following the 12 March 1971 military intervention, THKC-P and THKO militants did
kidnap and murder the Israeli Consul to Istanbul, and three NATO technicians (one
Canadian, two British) during the Kizildere operation. As previously mentioned, this
marked the end of the revolutionary left activity during this period.
The data collected for this time period indicates a relatively new terrorist group,
as their preferred use ofbombings illustrates. The fact most incidents occurred in the
80
Sabri Sayari, "Patterns of Political Terrorism in Turkey," TV1Journal 6, no. 1 (1985), 41.
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four largest cities parallels the claim that this initial movement was primarily one
involving restless students attending the university and the new urban youth.
Furthermore, leftist attacks on U.S. military and diplomatic establishments demonstrated
the revolutionary left's new found hatred for NATO and U.S. imperialism, not to mention
most of these targets were in close striking distance from the large cities.
Attempted Bombing
20%
Sources: See Appendix C.
Figure 3-7. Leftist Tactics against U.S. Interests, 1968-71
Although terrorist activities during this time were unsophisticated and Turkish
security forces halted them by 1 972, the revolutionary leftists who survived never forgot
Kizildere or the cause. As the period leading up to the 1 980 coup illustrates, they would
soon return, bringing the nation to the brink of civil war. In addition, evolution within
the revolutionary left soon spawned a most violent and sophisticated group Ankara (as






IV. DEVRIMCI SOL: RE-EMERGENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT
"We repudiate all agreements that strengthen imperialism. We stand against the
whole economic, political and military presence of imperialism in our country. We want
the U.S. and NATO bases to be closed and all the bilateral agreements to be annulled....
We will continue to target imperialist bases, U.S. installations, agents, and officials
unless the imperialist murderers take their hands offour country and leave.
"
Devrimci Sol 'News Bulletin' on Gandy assassination (1991)90
Although Turkish security forces delivered a crushing blow to the county's first
revolutionary leftist organizations—THKP-C and THKO—they did not destroy the
movement. In addition to Ankara's continued political and economic difficulties, three
other important factors significantly contributed to the movement's survival. They were
the establishment of revolutionary leftist martyrs (e.g., £ayan) at Kizildere, the escape of
some key leftist terrorists to Europe and Syria, and the new civilian government's
political amnesty in 1974. These events provided a psychological foundation and
productive environment in which the revolutionary left was able to evaluate "what went
wrong," regroup, and with the amnesty and accompanying increased political freedom
once again advertise their cause and practice their "armed struggle" against the "fascist"
Ankara regime and U.S. imperialism.
During the interim period between coups, the revolutionary left would surge and
£ayan's Marxist-Leninist ideology would spread through many sectors of the Turkish
population, not just the student groups. Such an ideology, hostile to a government unable
to provide a sufficient number ofjobs, began to appeal to those in economic dire straits in
Turkey's overcrowded urban centers. In addition, unlike before, Turkey would not only
witness the return of terrorism, but also a dramatic increase in intensity and the number of
groups involved. As some Turkish scholars have stated, Turkey faced an undeclared civil
war by 1980.
90
Alexander and Pluchinsky, 247-8. See Appendix J for translated bulletin.
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A. MARTYRS, ESCAPE AND POLITICAL AMNESTY
Kizildere and the resulting deaths of several founding leftist leaders provided a
key (psychological) element for the revolutionary left's survival into the mid-1970s and
beyond. Specifically, it was Kizildere where THKP-C's Mahir £ayan—a key Turkish
Marxist ideologue—became the militant left's first martyr and forever a symbol of its
revolutionary struggle in Turkey. For a great many radical leftists, £ayan represented
Turkey's "C/ze." 91 Parallel to this, and just as important for many revolutionary leftists,
were the 6 May 1972 executions (martyrdom) of THKO founder Gezmis. and his two
accomplices for their 1971 kidnapping of four USAF airmen. Many leftists viewed
Gezmi§, although considered more of a militant than an ideologue, as £ayan's
counterpart in the THKO. With one swift blow, Turkish security had not only killed the
key leadership of the early revolutionary left, but unknowingly contributed to the
movement's existence by handing them martyrs.
Although the government had killed or imprisoned the majority of THKP-C and
THKO leadership, many in the movement successfully escaped to Europe and the Middle
East, where they were safe and permitted to regroup. For example, the only immediate
remaining elements of the movement
—
£ayan's spouse Gulten and several of £ayan's
colleagues—had fled to Europe. Although some leftists escaped to Syria, the majority of
Turkish terrorists fleeing there were Kurdish separatists, especially members of the newly
founded Partlya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK) or Kurdish Worker's Party. Thus, the
remnants of the extreme left laid low for the most part and Turkey witnessed an inactive
militant left between 1972 and 1974. Even though leftist terrorism quieted following the
crackdown, those militants who had fled were busy continuing the "fight" outside
Turkey.
£ayan's spouse and a group of sympathizers attempted to establish a following in
Paris, referred to as the temporary "X-group". The group never really obtained a
significant following and was short lived, as it came up wanting in armed activities and
"Che" refers to Ernesto "Che" Guevara. Although considered a "hero" and revolutionary theorist of the
successful 1959 Fidel Castro Cuban revolution against the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, Guevara's
later attempt at launching a rural guerrilla campaign and revolution in Bolivia failed.
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was based outside Turkey. For Turkish revolutionary leftists the "X-group" represented a
false struggle, as the group was unable to match talk with action (i.e., armed struggle) and
was not active in Turkey. Even so, many Turkish leftists concentrated on evaluating
mistakes made during their initial challenge to the Ankara regime unmolested outside the
country. Of particular importance, these refugee leftists established support networks in
central Europe among the expatriates (Turkish immigrant workers) who had come to
Europe in search of employment in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, they found sources
of economic support in this community—voluntarily or through extortion.
One of the final factors contributing to the revolutionary left's successful return in
the late-seventies was a government amnesty. On 15 May 1974, the Turkish Parliament
passed a general amnesty ultimately leading to the release (or reduced sentences) of
nearly 50,000 political prisoners. 92 This paved the way for an infusion of old (as well as
new) terrorists, as many of those in jail had not renounced their fight against the
government. In fact, many leftists imprisoned mingled together in Turkey's barracks-
style facilities, able to fully evaluate their errors and plan further actions upon release.
Furthermore, many had mingled with other non-political prisoners who they (terrorists) in
some cases recruited.
According to imset, with the 1974 general amnesty, the first serious splinters also
began to appear, as many revolutionary leftists criticized Cayan's struggle as pacified
—
his followers were not engaging in an "armed struggle" in Turkey. As would be
expected, segments of the revolutionary left began to grow calling for a return to Turkey,
to return to fighting "the war."
93 From within this movement developed two of the more
prominent groups, and most familiar to U.S. security officials, as they claimed or were
credited with some of the most lethal attacks against U.S. personnel during the late
1970s. The groups were the Marksist-Leninist Silahh Propaganda Birligi (MLSPB) or







Following the left's defeat in 1972, the MLSPB emerged as one of the first—and
lethal to U.S. personnel
—
groups to re-establish violence in Turkey.
94
Citing the "X-
group" as a pacifist organization, it was founded in 1975, its members claiming they were
the true THKP-C.95 Although confining most of its activities to Istanbul, the MLSPB
sometimes cooperated with other "THKP" splinter groups that began to populate
Turkey's largest cities. The very secretive MLSPB soon stood out among others for its
staging of very spectacular operations. In 1979, Turkish security credited the group with
killing at least four U.S. persons, the El Al Airlines director in Istanbul, and a 15 million
Turkish lira robbery.
One of the group's most spectacular attacks against U.S. personnel occurred on 14
December 1979, in Istanbul. Four militants (including a female leader) successfully
ambushed and killed four Americans: three civilian contractors and one U.S. military
enlisted person. It appeared the 4-person team had waited in the area for over two hours
prior to their attack. Some experts familiar with the MLSPB suggest this demonstrated
the group's previous planning and knowledge of the "routines" of the area. The TNP's
follow-up investigation indicated the group had surveilled the area at least 3-4 days prior
to the incident. The group later stated they had "punished" the Americans because of
U.S. involvement in Iran and elsewhere in the world.
In addition to such spectacular acts, the MLSPB conducted several "popular
robberies" in which militants stole from the Turkish government and distributed the
stolen goods to the people of Istanbul's slum districts.9 In an attempt to gain support and
demonstrate the ineffectiveness of Ankara, the group attempted to assume the position of
a Turkish "Robin Hood." Even so, as the 1980 coup approached, several successful
security operations decimated the MLSPB. In February 1980, the TNP captured 60
MLSPB members in Istanbul. Most of the leadership Turkish authorities did not kill
94







during security operations, following the same pattern THKP-C and THKO survivors
established in 1972, fled to Europe; e.g., Germany, France and Sweden.
According to the U.S. State Department, one of the most important indigenous
leftist groups in Turkey during the 1 970s was Devrimci Yol. Although many of the early
leaders of the leftist movement prior to 1972 were either in prison or dead, the 1974
amnesty enabled less prominent "first generation" members to resume activities. As
such, the leadership ranks of Dev Yol included several of these radical activists.97 As
Sabri Sayari indicates, these "new" leaders had only played secondary roles during the
pre- 1971 coup period. Yet, with the execution or killing of most of the early key THKP-
C and THKO leaders, these secondary role players were able to move into leadership
positions upon the resurgence of the revolutionary left in the mid-1970s.
Most sources agree that by 1977, Devrimci Yol had become the most organized
movement—especially within the student population—and the largest terrorist
organization in Turkey. It concentrated a great deal of its efforts in Turkey's largest
cities, maintaining two powerful committees in Istanbul and Ankara. Experts on the
Turkish left during this time accept Dev Yol as a continuation of the earlier Devrimci
Geng movement. One of the important aspects of this movement was that it embarked on
creating a new mass organization, following the 1974 release of political and terrorist
prisoners. The group claimed to support £ayan's policies and views, but differed on
Cayan's position regarding the Soviet Union. According to imset, Devrimci Yol accused
the Soviet Union of deviating from socialism because of its revisionist leadership and of
actually assisting Turkey's ruling classes and not the 'liberation movement.' 95
The movement was most noted for its continuous battles with other leftist and
rightist groups, and attempts at spreading its form of Marxist-Leninist ideology and
controlling the student population. A major part of Dev YoVs efforts were concentrated
Sabri Sayari, Generational Changes in Terrorist Movements: The Turkish Case (Santa Monica,






in schools and were limited to marches, boycotts, workers strikes, and graffiti slogan
writing on the public walls. In fact, the movement was considered very effective in
running semi-legal student associations, including the Lise Der (secondary school
students association), which was quite influential in the larger cities. Important here is
that unlike the MLSPB, Devrimci Yol was not known for targeting U.S. interests.
Although initially concentrating its efforts on schools and limiting its activities to
less violent activities, by 1977 Devrimci Yol began advocating more violence in order to
obtain its objectives. By the end of 1977, the organization declared that 'the only way to
teach the fascists a lesson' was to use their own methods and destroy political parties'
regional offices—and clash with those parties' associated youth organizations." 100 Thus,
the organization's open conflicts with opposition student groups on campuses increased.
Unfortunately, Devrimci YoVs> less violent activities concerned some members
and soon elements within the organization began voicing displeasure with the direction of
the group. Ultimately, organizational infighting resulted in the more serious minded of
the militants breaking from the main group and forming Devrimci Sol. This group would
not only be associated with the pre- 1980 leftist violence in Turkey, but would usher in a
new wave of extremely violent attacks and assassinations during the first two years of the
1990s, becoming well known for its targeting of U.S. personnel during the Gulf War.
B. DEVRIMCI SOL: THE SPLINTER OF 1978
Since the early 1970s, there have been eight primary Marxist-Leninist (left-wing)
terrorist groups—commonly labeled the Fighting Communist Organizations (FCOs)
—
active throughout western Europe. 101 One of the most active of these groups emerged in




' Belgium's Cellules Communistes Combattantes (Communist Combatant Cells), 1984-85; France's
Action Directe (Direct Action), 1979-87; Germany's Rote Armee Faktion (Red Army Faction), 1970-
1990s; Greece's Epanastaiki Organosi 17 Noemvri (17 November), 1975-Present; Italy's Brigate Rosse
(Red Brigades), 1970-88; Portugal's Forces Populares 25 de Abril, (Popular Forces of 25 April), 1982-87;
Spain's Grupo de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre (First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance
Group), 1975-mid- 1990s; and Turkey's Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left), 1978-Present.
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the 1960s and 1970s, it was not until August 1978, that Dev YoVs Istanbul committee
formally renamed itself and split from its mother organization in Ankara.
Devrimci Yol drew a great deal of its success from the establishment of an
extensive and organized structure, with a central committee leadership responsible for
formulating and directing the organization's ideology and strategy. " Even so, the group
fell prey to a common conflict which often plagues such groups: in-fighting based upon
personality conflicts and difference in ideological direction and execution. Often the
dispute over mission execution, which was the case between Dev Yol and the soon-to-be
Dev Sol, develops out of a difference in targeting and the level of violence the
organization was willing to employ to conduct the "revolution."
In the case of Dev Yol, two factions—the central committee in Ankara, and
regional leaders in Istanbul—developed out of Istanbul's criticism of the central
committee's "pacifist policies...and [their] fail[ure] to serve the interest of the 'Turkish
Marxist struggle.'" 103 Essentially, Istanbul argued that Ankara concentrated attacks more
on Turkish right-wing groups, rather than against the representatives of oligarchy and
imperialism, including the United States. The dispute would never be resolved. In June
1978, the central committee attempted to rid itself of the Istanbul faction by renaming
itself the Turn (whole) Devrimci Yol. Soon after this, the Istanbul group met and
officially changed its name to Devrimci Solm and officially splintered in August 1978.
Unfortunately for Devrimci Yol, many of its members (including complete
regional and city cells) agreed with Dev Sol and promptly "defected" and joined ranks
with the new group. These defections illustrated the frustration many Dev Yol members
had with the less violent means of protest against a regime seen more and more as





Corsun states that Latin American terrorists' actions inspired the Istanbul faction when it moved to
change its name to Devrimci Sol. Imset echoes this stating that the initial leader of Devrimci Sol—who he
identifies as "B.U."—in visiting several provinces prior to the split, explained that Turkey needed a "Latin
American type" freedom organization which would base its struggle on political demands but give priority
to armed activities.
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paying lip service. Many members within Dev Yol believed the organization (as well as
most other THKP-C want-to-be groups) lacked any serious political background, some
even more criminals than revolutionaries. In addition, the secrecy surrounding the more
"attractive" and militant MLSPB prohibited the more energetic militants an avenue to
express their revolutionary cause
—
Dev Sol became their solution. An alleged repentant
Dev Sol militant quoted in 1991 provides some insight into this situation:
Only the Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (MLSPB) in
Istanbul was attractive for the youth but almost impossible to reach for it
gave great importance to secrecy. Just at that time something happened
which many believed would fill the gap. Dev-Yol' s Istanbul faction split
with a bang. Just like that. . .until then, there were indications of unease at
the top levels of the organization as well as among the grassroots but no
one really believed that a whole network of the organization could walk
out with only one step. 105
The new organization soon became one of the most important and well-organized
terrorist groups to emerge in Turkey, as well as Europe. Although many aspects of Dev
SoVs internal structure during this period are not publicly known, U.S. State Department
reports suggest its structure was well organized and very compartmentalized around a
central committee and a General Director. Figure 4-1 illustrates the suspected view of
the organization's structure. This diagram represents generally what the U.S. State
Department believed the organization to look like by the late 1980s, yet many terrorist
experts suspected it began to resemble this prior to the 1980 coup.
The Central Committee soon became known as the Merkez Yapi or Central
Structure, and it began establishing subcommittees, aimed at "concentrated armed
activities" and recruitment in high schools and universities. In a short time, Devrimci Sol
managed to become Turkey's most serious terrorist threat and the only group to integrate
"armed cell-struggle" with mass organizational activities. 106 The original leaders of the
organization were Bulent Uliier (Central Committee head), Abdullah Aksakal (General






Celalettin Can and Emin Ovat. Finally, there was Dursun Karatas, the general manager
for operations in Turkey, who would soon become the supreme leader of Devrimci Sol
into and past the 1 990s.
Crenshaw's cellular or pyramidal model best describes Devrimci SoVs
structure. As described, decisions were made at the top ofthe pyramid and





















































Sources: Andrew Corsun, "Dev-Sol Attacks on Americans," in U.S. Department of State, Office of
Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices: 1994 (Washington, D.C.
Department of State, 1994), 17; and ismet G. Imset, The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in
Turkey, 1973-1992 (Ankara, Turkey: Turkish Daily News, 1992), 407-35.
Figure 4-1. Diagram of Devrimci Sol Organizational Structure
having comprehensive knowledge of the organization and the identities and location of
subordinate leaders. This demonstrated a significant leap of sophistication from the
small-number and more ad hoc days ofTHKP-C and THKO. The tremendous increase
107




in members, with a major share of Dev YoFs recruit bounty transferred to Dev Sol,
enabled a greater scope and intensity in operations, as an increased support network took
shape. As this increased sophistication and size powered a more effective organization, it
would ultimately lead to organizational conflicts and vulnerabilities, especially during the
early 1990s. These issues will be discussed in the next chapter.
C. TERRORISM AND THE 1980 MILITARY INTERVENTION
As Turkey approached the 1980s, political disputes continued to ramp up. The
eventual return of many left-wing militants and continued disputes among those in
government contributed greatly to the rapid escalation of political violence in 1978 and
1979. Compounding this was the parallel emergence of Devrimci Sol and the MLSPB,
and the violence associated with them. According to one researcher, in 1978 alone there
were more than 4,000 separate acts of political violence. Terrorist violence became so
rampant in Turkey that by the summer of 1980, some reports state terrorist activities
claimed 183 lives on average each month. 108
In light of this situation, the Turkish military made moves to seize control when it
became apparent the ruling civilian government was unable to create an effective
coalition or halt the devastating political violence. Compounding the civilian
government's ineffectiveness was the obvious inability of the highly politicized police
force to assist in curbing violence or checking the upsurge of guerrilla activity in
Turkey's "Kurdish" regions and the threat of Islam. 109 The January 1979 Islamic
Revolution in Iran worsened the situation, both encouraging Turkish Islamists and
increasing concerns in the Kemalists military. The government's attempt to combine
regard for civil liberties with tough law-and-order measures satisfied no one, least of all
the military.
Many terrorist groups, especially the revolutionary left, increasingly and openly







supporting the revolutionary left increasingly defaced walls and buildings of Turkey's
largest cities (Istanbul and Ankara) with vehemently anti-government graffiti (Figure 4-
2). In addition, as Turkey moved closer to 1980, Turkish security increasingly captured
terrorists with large caches of weapons (Figure 4-3). For many military leaders, the
continued discovery of such caches increasingly signaled a growing terrorist threat to
national security. Partially as a result of such incidents, on 23 December 1978, the
ftEHCEUWM HEiABMl iO&CA&l




Source: Mehmet Ali Birand, Hikmet Bila, and Ridvan Akar, 12 Eylul: Turkiye 'nin Miladi (12 September:
Turkey's New Era) (Istanbul, Turkey: Dogan Kitapcihk AS, 1999); and 12 September in Turkey: Before
and After, Prepared by the General Secretariat of the National Security Council (Ankara, Turkey: Ongun
Kardesjer Printing House, 1982).
Figure 4-2. Revolutionary Leftist Graffiti Prior to 1980 Military Coupno
civilian government, under continued pressure from the military, proclaimed martial law
in 13 provinces. Although this measurably reduced violence, it was only temporary and
did not solve the problem. By the last half of 1980, the military had had enough.
On 12 September 1980, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Kenan Evren
(Figure 4-4), informed the country the military had seized control of the government.
With that announcement, the military arrested leading political figures and declared
martial law throughout the country. Within 13 months, the ruling military junta directed
all political parties to disband and confiscated their property. In addition, the military
barred all persons previously holding leadership positions in parties from politics for 10
110
Left photograph reads: "Death to Fascism", "Damn Fascism", "Social Fascism", and "People's
Liberation". Right photograph reads: "Fascist Governor; We will settle the score for the tortures you
ordered committed in Onye, Ayba§ti, and Ordu. [Signed] Revolutionary Left. Take Arms Comrades!'
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years. The only exceptions were those who had held positions in the Grand National
Assembly; the generals barred them from politics for five years.
Source: Mehmet Ali Birand, Hikmet Bila, and Ridvan Akar, 12 Eyliil: Turkiye 'nin Miladi (12 September:
Turkey's New Era) (Istanbul, Turkey: Dogan Kitapcilik AS, 1999); and George S. Harris, "The Left in
Turkey," Problems with Communism 29, no. 4 (1980), 27.
Figure 4-3. Example of Seized Caches of Terrorist Weapons
The level and spread of violence during the pre- 1980 coup period cannot be
overstated. According to Turkish government data provided in a 1983 report, the total
number of "ideologically-based" terrorist incidents 111 between 26 December 1978 and 1
1
September 1980 was 32,893. 112 The report further states that leftist groups accounted for
33 percent of these incidents.
113
According to the U.S. State Department, between May
1978 and the 12 September coup, Devrimci Sol alone committed 298 killings, 28
14
robberies, and 396 incidents of armed assault. The occupational data on terrorists in
111
Based upon the 1980 military junta's "definition" of such "terrorist" incidents, they included everything
from "student unrest" and political demonstrations to hanging "illegal political leaflets" and armed attacks.
In reference to "terrorist" ideologies, the military identified any ideology (e.g., Islamic, leftist, and
secessionist) openly or covertly opposed to the government or called for changes to the Kemalist state.
112
State ofAnarchy and Terror in Turkey, Presented to the U.S. Army by Lt. General Kaya Yazgan
(Ankara, Turkey, 1982(?)), Table 2, 46. Unfortunately the report does not differentiate between domestic




Rightist groups (6 percent), Secessionist (2 percent), and Unknown Political Persuasion (59 percent).
Corsun, 19.
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the Turkish Government report suggested the violence of this period extended beyond the
student populations of pre- 1972—terrorism no longer was an exclusively student
Source: Mehmet Ali Birand, Hikmet Bila, and Ridvan Akar, 12 Eylul: Tiirkiye 'nin Miladi (12 September:
Turkey's New Era) (Istanbul, Turkey: Dogan Kitapcilik AS, 1999).
Figure 4-4. General Kenan Evren, Leader of 1980 Military Intervention
phenomenon. According to data (Table 4-1) for the period between 12 September 1980
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Source: State ofAnarchy and Terror in Turkey, Presented to the U.S. Army by Lt. General Kaya Yazgan,
(Ankara, Turkey, 1982(?)), Table 20, 64.
Table 4-1. Profession Breakdown of Captured Terrorists, 12 Sep 80-11 Sep 82
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captured. Still, as Sayari points out, unlike the pre- 1972 terrorists, the majority of
students during this period were dropouts from the universities and tended to be less
educated than their predecessors. 115
Finally, the Turkish Government reported a "younger" terrorist captured during
this period. Data of those terrorists captured in the two years immediately following the
military takeover cites 56 percent of the terrorists were between the ages of 16 and 25
years (3 1 ,445). Those between the ages of 25 and 35 years accounted for 29 percent of
captured terrorists.
'
' A sizeable segment of the new recruits were young people whose
families had recently moved to the cities, 117 where they were thrown into an unfamiliar
environment, without traditional support networks, and without employment.
D. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN TURKEY: 1971-80
Some experts identified Devrimci Sol as just one of over 60 Marxist-Leninist
terrorist groups responsible for crippling security problems in Turkey during the late
1970s,
118
which eventually lead to the 1980 military intervention. The Turkish military
executed the coup in order to return political and social stability to the country. The coup
also enabled authorities to crack down on leftist terrorism. As illustrated in Figure 4-5,
the number of incidents of international terrorism between 1971 (13 March) and 1980 (12
September) dramatically increased—Turkey's second bout of political violence was quite
severe. A review of several international terrorist incident databases for these years
identified a total of 178 incidents of international terrorism in Turkey. Of these,
databases credited leftist (or suspected) groups with perpetrating 153 incidents—citing
127 of those as directed against U.S. interests.
The dramatic increase in violence—compared to the pre- 1971 coup period
—
paralleled the increase in the number of terrorist groups. Previously, only the groups
11
Sayari, Generational Changes in Terrorist Movements: The Turkish Case, 9.
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Those between 35 and 45 accounted for 1 1 percent, and those older than 45 accounted for 4 percent.
Sayari, Generational Changes in Terrorist Movements: The Turkish Case, 1 1.
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Alexander and Pluchinsky, 231.
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THKP-C and THKO represented the principal terrorists, both groups were quite small




illustrated in Chapter II, the Turkish Government did not take many useful lessons from
its experience with terrorism in the early 1970's. The government further compounded
this situation by not seriously attending to continued economic difficulties, opting instead
to battle the symptom (terrorism) rather than the potential cause (i.e., unemployment,
student grievances, and political oppression).
Yea-
Sources: See Appendix C.
Figure 4-5. International Terrorist Incidents in Turkey, 1971-80
By the end of the 1970s, some experts claim as many as 60 leftist groups were
engaged in terrorism, their numbers extending into the thousands of active members.
According to Turkish military data regarding apprehension of suspected terrorists in the
119
Sayari, Generational Changes in Terrorist Movements: The Turkish Case, 3.
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first two years following the military takeover, the security forces arrested over 56,000
suspected terrorists, identifying over 30,000 of these as suspected leftists. 120 In addition,
the civilian government's inability to curb violence prior to 1980 made matters worse.
After 1975, terrorist incidents began to feed upon one another. Furthermore, many
terrorists' perception that the civilian government lacked the will to impose order
signaled an open invitation to political terrorism.
1 " 1 The civilian government's decision
to declare martial law in December 1978 in several provinces resulted in a sharp decrease
in incidents. Even so, the decision to declare martial law arrived too late, only slowing,
not successfully checking the violence.
Specific leftist targeting (Figure 4-6) of U.S. interests during this period remained
predominantly directed at U.S. military and diplomatic personnel and materials,
representing 80 percent of the targets. As was the case prior to 1972, such targets
represented the focus of leftist displeasure—"imperialism" and NATO—both of which
the revolutionary left increasingly viewed as supporters of a "fascist" Ankara. In
addition, these targets remained in or near major urban populations, the preferred
environment of the revolutionary left. Different from the previous period of violence was
the terrorists' increased targeting of U.S. business, religious and cultural establishments.
This indicated the left's growing view that "all" U.S. interests represented an
"imperialistic" threat and U.S. businesses were identified with Turkey's continued
economic problems.
During this period, leftists confined the overwhelming majority of their activities
against the U.S. to Turkey's four largest cities (Figure 4-7). This coincided with the fact
that many of the militants during this period where not only students, but also people
from the over-crowded urban centers near the large cities. Also, as was the case earlier,
terrorists found the majority of their U.S. targets (e.g., diplomatic, military, and now
businesses) in or near one of these cities. Over 63 percent of the incidents against U.S.
120
State ofAnarchy and Terror in Turkey, Table 18, pg 62.
1-1 George S. Harris, Turkey: Coping with Crisis (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1985), 145.
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interests occurred in Istanbul or Izmir, a large number ofthem directed at U.S. military
personnel and establishments.
77 78 79 80(End-12
Sep)
Year
Sources: See Appendix C.
Figure 4-6. Leftist Targeting of U.S. Interests, 1971-80
During Turkey's second bout with terrorism, tactics became more sophisticated.
Bombings (and attempted bombings) continued to be the method of choice accounting for
over 55 percent (Figure 4-8) of all terrorist acts during this period. As an illustration of a
move to more sophisticated tactics and targets, during 1979 and 1980 revolutionary leftist
groups assassinated ten U.S. citizens. All but one incident appeared well planned and
executed. This type of activity coincided with the increased organizational sophistication
of the leftist groups, especially Devrimci Sol. It appeared the militant left had overcome
the moral dilemma of assassination, as appeared to be the case in 1971, when THKO
"abandoned" four kidnapped USAF airmen unharmed. Also, as some experts have
pointed out, many leftist militants that fled Turkey following the 1971-72 crackdown
sought safety in Europe and Middle Eastern countries hostile to the Ankara regime.
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While there, many Turkish terrorists met with other leftist terrorists (e.g., Germany's Red





Sources: See Appendix C.
Figure 4-7. Location of Leftist Incidents against U.S. Interests, 1971-80
Government, such groups, primarily the Palestinians, provided many Devrimci Sol
militants with weapons and sabotage training.
During this period, Turkey witnessed one of its most crippling bouts with
terrorism. The dramatic increase in international-related incidents witnessed paralleled
those in the domestic category. During this period, the revolutionary left recovered from
the government's 1971-72 crackdown, returning with a vengeance. Such groups did not
confine their vengeful attacks to Turkish targets alone. As the data demonstrates, as 1 980
approached, the groups that emerged out of the ashes ofTHKP-C and THKO
—
Devrimci
Sol and the MLSPM—increasingly sought out and attacked U.S. interests. Furthermore,
these groups broadened their targets, attacking more non-military and diplomatic
facilities and personnel than witnessed in the previous period of violence. Although these
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groups continued to bomb as a preferred method of attack, they became more organized,











Sources: See Appendix C.
Figure 4-8. Leftist Tactics against U.S. Interests, 1971-80
of Americans. Despite their increased sophistication and numbers, the revolutionary left
was no match for the Turkish military. In addition, although many Turkish citizens
welcomed the 1980 intervention and its halting of terrorism, the human rights legacy of
the time would become a rising concern. Furthermore, the military's action was only a
shot-term answer—the revolutionary left would once again return in the next decade.
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V. THE GULF WAR AND DEVRIMCI SOL
"This [Gulf] [W]ar is being waged in the interest of the oil monopolies and oil
sheikhs. Blood isflowingfor the sake of the imperialist thieves. Imperialism does not
accept anything that goes against its interests in this oil-rich region. The reason for the
oppression of the people in the Middle East is that the imperialists insist on playing a
dominant role.
"
Devrimci Sol Operation DESERT STORM Communique (Undated) 1 ""
The generals of the 1980 coup seized the reins of government, exercised firm
actions and restored order, including the mass arrest of terrorists and those sympathetic to
such causes. The swiftness and the often-cited brutality of the military's crushing
repression of violence ultimately came at a high social cost. During operations to squash
terrorism the issue of human rights and torture at the hands of the security forces began to
take center stage, especially as it impacted revolutionary leftists. As the government
released militants or they escaped from custody, many began disclosing the tortuous
nature of the country's return to order. Once again, Turkish military actions to halt terror
ultimately aided in the revolutionary left's continued survival, as the military's
ruthlessness worked to confirm the "fascist" nature of the Ankara regime that the
terrorists had preached about.
Although Turkish security operations severely incapacitated the organization,
many Devrimci Sol militants eluded capture and fled to Western Europe and the Middle
East. These escapes, the relaxation of martial law in 1985 and 1987, and numerous
Devrimci Sol prison breaks in the late 1980s benefited the group's reconstruction. For
example, on 25 October 1989, Devrimci SoTs eventual leader Dursun Karatas, and his
closest lieutenant (Bedri Yagan) successfully escaped from Sagmacilar Prison. " It was
soon after Karatas' escaped that Devrimci Sol began stepping up its attacks, especially
those directed at U.S. interests.
122




Following the initiation of U.S. -led military operations against Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait, Devrimci Sol launched one of its most intensive attacks on U.S. interests in
Turkey. The re-constituted Dev Sol demonstrated, like its ancestors, an ability to strike
both Turkish and international targets, especially U.S. interests. During 1991, leftist
attacks against U.S. targets dramatically increased, well past those seen in previous years.
Yet, during this period, Dev Sol rationalized its attacks against the U.S. in the name of
battling its imperialist oppression of the Middle East, not just fighting U.S. support of the
"fascist" regime. Also, as eluded to earlier, the group began attacking authorities
identified as torturers of the 1980 military intervention.
A. THE 1980 COUP'S LEGACY OF REPRESSION AND TORTURE
In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, the generals immediately set upon the terrorist
elements in Turkey. Although remaining strongly biased against leftists in general, the
military's anti-terrorism campaign was somewhat more equitable than that which
followed the 1971 coup. This time, security forces rounded up many more rightists, 124
especially the Grey Wolves. 125 Even so, the government still viewed the left as the
source of terrorism. Within the first six weeks following the military takeover the state
arrested over 1 1,500 people; by the end of 1980 the number increased to 30,000 and
exceeded 1 20,000 after one year. " The immediate and measurable impact was a drastic
reduction in the number of terrorist-related incidents. According to Turkish sources,
within one year following military intervention, Turkey witnessed over a 75 percent drop
124 Even so, according to the government, in the first two years following the coup, rightists only accounted
for 13 percent (7,571 persons) of those arrested on suspicion of terrorist activities. State ofAnarchy and
Terror in Turkey, Table 18, 62.
125 The Grey Wolves was the militant youth wing of Turkish Army Colonel Alpharslan Turkey' extreme
right-wing Milliyetqi Hareket Partisi or National Action Party. The Turkish Government credited Mehmet
Ali Agca, an admitted member of the Grey Wolves, with the 1 February 1979 assassination of Abdi
Ipeckci, editor of the influential daily Milliyet. On 13 May 1981, following his November 1979 escape




in terrorist related incidents. Specifically, the military government cited a 64 percent
decrease in leftist-attributed incidents.
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Even though the immediate impact of the military takeover was a restoration of
order and a significant reduction in terrorist actions, it was not without cost. As Ziircher
points out:
The negative side [of the coup] was that it was achieved at great
human and social cost. It was not only suspected terrorists who were
hunted down and arrested. Respectable trade unionists, legal politicians,
university professors, teachers, journalists and lawyers, in short, anyone
who had expressed even vaguely leftist... views before September 1980
was liable to get into trouble. The universities were put under tight
centralized control through the establishment of the Yuksek Ogretim
Kurulu (Higher Education Authority), which directly appointed all rectors
and deans. Late in 1982 over 300 academics were dismissed, followed by
a second wave of dismissals early in 1983. Many others resigned of their
own accord, because those fired also lost their pensions and the right ever
again to hold a job in the public sector. 128
Table 5-1 provides the military's data regarding the breakdown of non-terrorists
subjected to legal actions as of 1 September 1982. It quickly became apparent that the
military viewed everyone opposed to them as a terrorist. Such broad actions quickly
alienated the general population, especially those caught in the middle of difficult
economic times. As mentioned in Chapter II, Ankara's attempts at economic prosperity
remained temporary at best. The resulting unemployed found no comfort in the
government's attack on them just because they voiced a desire for a better life. Once
again, the regime's failure to recognize this served to draw some supporters to the left, as
they too were "victims" of the state.
Social disruption was not the only legacy of the 1980 coup. Numerous allegations
of torture surrounding the security officials charged with capturing and interrogating
suspected terrorists soon surfaced. Many human rights organizations reported that during
both interrogation and detention, Turkish security widely employed torture, often





applying it as a common practice of doing business. According to Zurcher, in the
aftermath of the 1980 coup, Amnesty International repeatedly drew attention to
widespread torture and its sometimes-fatal effects. In an attempt to defend against
such allegation, the military regime provided Us data regarding inquiries into such
allegations.
According to a Turkish Government report, as of4 October 1982, the Martial
Law legal authorities had conducted 540 inquiries into "allegations of torture and ill
13536
3067
I Lawyers Unionists Press Corp Trade Association
I Other Associations Leftist-Secessionists Parliament Members Rightists
Source: State ofAnarchy and Terror in Turkey, Presented to the U.S. Army by Lt. General Kaya Yazgan
(Ankara, Turkey, 1982(?)), Table 32, 76.
Figure 5-1. Number of Non-Terrorists Subjected to Legal Actions, 1 Sept 82
treatment." Of these, authorities directed court trials for only 142 of the accused persons.
Of those tried, only 15 defendants were convicted. 130 In addition to allegations of torture,




State ofAnarchy and Terror in Turkey, Table 34, 78.
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during the first two years following the coup. 131 To the disbelief of many, including
many leftist militants, the government's investigations concluded that only four of the
deaths related to torture-related injuries. The government's concluding remarks
regarding allegations and its investigations served to create an air of suspicion and cover-
up:
[T]he propaganda based on allegations of. . .systematic torture,
[was] to a great extent purposely originated. The result of investigations
show[ed] that the majority of the allegations [were] baseless, however
those which happened to have any truth in them, [were] immediately
subject to legal action. 132
Allegations of torture and the government's apparent reluctance to admit to or
rectify the situation increasingly damaged its international credibility. Following the
coup, member states of the European Union froze relations with Ankara. In addition, the
pan-European parliament, the Council of Europe, cited the military regime's record of
human right violations as justification for banning Turkish participation in 1982. 133
Furthermore, this situation provided leftists who had fled Turkey following martial law
with legitimacy in the eyes of some Europeans. In addition, Devrimci Sol (as well as its
successor, DHKP-C) increasingly pointed to such allegations as proof of the repressive
nature of the "fascist" Ankara government. In fact, during and soon after the 1980 coup,
the "struggle against state torture" emerged as a key element in the revolutionary left's
propaganda and call for revolution.
In addition to Europe's expressed displeasure with the military takeover in Turkey
and the treatment of political prisoners, Devrimci Sol began to cite torture and human
rights violations as their reason for opposing the Turkish regime. A review of
organizational documents discloses Dev Sol's opposition to Ankara concerning this issue.





Turkey: A Country Study, 256.
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Hakliyiz Kazanacagiz or We Are Right, We Will Win. The DHKC reports the document
to be 1,354 pages long, and on 27 October 1988, was read as a defense for the "1,243
revolutionaries" sentenced by the military tribunals. 134 The document cites torture many
times as the reason Dev Sol "struggled" against the regime and listed the names of 845
security officials (most connected to the 1980 coup) in a death list, citing torture as their
crime.
This "vengeful" tone continued into the 1990s. For example, a communique
dated 7 February 1992, claiming credit for the assassinations of several Turkish police
officers, cites the "punishment" of four officers "because they were torturers." It further
states the "punishment" of a chief prosecutor of the State Security Court was conducted
as he "was an enemy of the people and the revolutionaries, who during the coup d'etat of
12 March 1971 and 12 September 1980 worked as a prosecutor... [and] was present when
people were tortured,...demand [ing] the heads of revolutionaries during trials." 135 Thus,
in an over zealous attempt to stop terrorism, the military regime provided Dev Sol with a
psychological platform from which to justify its terrorist activities.
B. EUROPE, POLITICAL RELAXATION AND PRISON BREAKS
Following the beginning of martial law in December 1978, many terrorists,
especially those associated with Devrimci Sol, followed their leftist ancestors' and fled to
Europe and the Middle East. Devrimci Sol was able to regroup and reorganize in Europe
(primarily in Germany " and the Netherlands) and then systematically rebuild its terrorist
and propaganda structures in Turkey, as the government was once again handed back
over to civilian leadership and martial law gradually lifted. With the continued
encouragement from Turks in Central Europe— specifically those living in Germany—
134 We Are Right, We Will Win (London: Revolutionary People's Liberation Front Information Bureau,
1998), 7-8.
135
Alexander and Pluchinsky, 252.
6 The German Government did not formally ban Devrimci Sol until 1983, and then it was not until the
early 1990's—when group infighting resulted in the murders of several militants inside Germany—that
German law enforcement officials became seriously concerned with Devrimci Sol's activities.
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would-be terrorists persisted in plotting. 137 By the end of the seventies over 2.5 million
Turks lived in Western Europe. As was the case in the early 1970s, the movement was
able to reconstitute unmolested by Turkish authorities, as well as to raise (or extort)
financial support.
Following the gradual relaxation of military control starting in 1983, political
activity was still closely monitored and was restricted to limits outlined in the 1982
constitution. On 6 November 1983, the military allowed the participation of three parties
(out of an original 12) in the first election since the coup. The election ended with Turgut
Ozal becoming Prime Minister. By March 1984, Ozal's government began a
liberalization of the polity, with the lifting of the earlier ban on some of the outlawed
political parties. Unfortunately, this was not a means to liberalize, rather a stratagem to
divide the opposition.
139
This move would ultimately weaken Ozal's party. Many
Turkish experts cite Ozal's liberalization moves and relaxation of military-imposed
restrictions as a decision taken in an attempt to ease European condemnation of Turkey's
human rights violations.
Whatever the true reasons, the continued moves to liberalize the political process
in Turkey as it faced (and went through) the 1990s, allowed for the re-emergence of some
leftist organizations. The government's liberalization resulted in the relaxation of
restrictive measures first erected to eradicate terrorism following the 1980 coup, then
utilized to maintain order and prevent a resurgence of violence. On 19 November 1985,
two years after the return of civilian rule to Turkey, martial law ended in Istanbul and a
less restrictive State of Emergency was proclaimed.
This was followed in March 1986 with the reduction of prison sentences through
the Execution of Sentence Act, the end of martial law in Turkey on 19 July 1987, and
finally the end of the State of Emergency in Istanbul in November 1988. Although these
actions were positive signs of Turkey moving to a more democratized society, a side
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effect was terrorists were able to freely move about. In some cases, terrorists living
outside Turkey were now able to re-enter the country undetected. Lastly, the civilian
government's moves to re-establish normalcy in Turkish society led to either reduced
prison sentences or early release from prison for a great many terrorists, who had not
given up the Marxist-Leninist cause.
Compounding this problem and supporting the survival of Devrimci Sol (as well
as other leftist groups) were significant prison breaks in the late 1980s. According to the
U.S. State Department, between 1983 and 1994, some 7,900 men escaped from Turkish
prisons.
140 On 24 March 1988, twenty-nine leftist terrorists escaped from Metric
Maximum Security Prison and in September, eighteen more escaped from Kir§ehir
Maximum Security Prison. The most significant prison escape was that of Dev Sol leader
Dursun Karatas. (Figure 5-2) and Bedri Yagan (Dev Sol Central Committee member)
Source: "Yine Son Anda", (28 Ekim 199912% October 1999), Hurriyet Online, Available [Online]:
<http://hurweb01.hun-ivet.com.tr/hur/turk/99/10/28/turkive/02tur.htm> [8 February 2000].




from Sagmacilar Prison on 25 October 1989. I41 These two individuals would provide
key leadership to the reconstituted Dev Sol, and would organize and direct the increase in
leftist attacks on U.S. interests in the early 1990s.
Thus, during the six years of civilian rule in Turkey following the coup, Devrimci
Sol reconstituted itself. The safehaven of Europe provided a source of financial support
and a place to reorganize. The government's gradual relaxation of martial law permitted
increased freedom of movement. Successful prison escapes and releases provided
essential personnel, resources and leadership. So, by 1990, Dev Sol had sufficiently
recovered from the devastating blow of the 1980 coup and was able to re-initiate its
"armed propaganda" struggle against Ankara. In addition, it recovered just in time for
the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. This event "triggered" the group to re-engage U.S.
targets and dramatically increase its targeting of U.S. interests in Turkey.
C. DEVRIMCI SOL'S COME BACK AND THE GULF WAR
On 30 January 1990, Devrimci Sol militants assassinated Mehmet £akmakci, a
Turkish policeman. This was the first Dev Sol assassination of a Turkish official since
the 1983 return to civilian control. With this killing, the organization signaled it had not
succumbed to the "fascist" state and was back to continue its campaign of "armed
propaganda." Although initially confining its attacks to Turkish targets, with the arrival
of the Gulf War, Dev Sol began seriously targeting U.S. interests, including more
sophisticated operations such as assassination and rocket attacks.
In 1991, Devrimci Sol conducted approximately 146 terrorist operations against
various targets, including the assassination of two U.S. contractors and a British
businessman. 142 An analysis of Dev Sol operations and targets disclosed some group
objectives. First, the majority of the organization's assassination targets were Turkish
security officials. Of these officials, the majority was linked to anti-leftist security
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claimed targeted security officials were responsible for conducting, supervising or
allowing the torture of leftists arrested during the coups. For example, on 28 March
1991, Devrimci Sol militants killed former Turkish general Memduh Unluturk, who was
associated with the 1971 coup, in his house in the Uskudar district of Istanbul. The group
held Unluturk responsible for the Kizildere operation, which ended with the death of the
revolutionary left's idolized martyr, Mahir £ayan.
Lastly, although Dev Sol targeted U.S. interests prior to 1991, it was not until the
Gulf War that the group began committing serious assets to assassinating U.S. personnel
in opposition to the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq. From January 1990 until the initiation
of Operation DESERT STORM (17 January 1991), Dev Sol carried out 10 assassinations
and one attempted assassination against Turkish officials. 143 The targets included active
duty and retired military officers, police officials, and civilians allegedly associated with
death or torture of leftist terrorists following the 1980 coup. It appeared the group was
more interested in settling domestic scores with those responsible for earlier repression in
the 1970s and 1980s, rather than attacking typical imperialist targets.
With the advent of the U.S.-led war with Iraq, Devrimci Sol expanded its targeting
to U.S. interests, carrying out a wave of bombings and selected assassinations. It became
apparent the group was concentrating its attacks against the U.S. in response to specific
events, such as the war. Further examples included a plot (exposed by Turkish security)
against the U.S. Secretary of State and U.S. President's visits to Turkey, as well as the
assassination of a U.S. contractor on Ozal's visit to the United States. According to a 22
March 1991 Dev Sol "Bulletin," the organization assassinated the contractor so Ozal
would have "one of Bush's children" to "not go to America empty-handed." 144
D. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN TURKEY: 1980-91
Between the 1980 coup and the end of 1991, a total of 153 incidents of
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leftists with 91 incidents. Of these incidents, terrorists directed 82 attacks against U.S.
interests. The single greatest rise in leftist activity occurred during 1991, following the
80 (Begn - 81
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Sources: See Appendix C.
Figure 5-3. International Terrorist Incidents in Turkey, 1980-91
initiation of the Gulf War, with 50 incidents of international terrorism. During the U.S.-
led war period (from the start of Operation DESERT SHIELD on 15 August 1990
through the end of 1991), there were a total of47 leftist or suspected leftist perpetrated
incidents against U.S. interests in Turkey.
145
During this time, left-wing terrorists attacked U.S. interests with the intensity last
witnessed in the late 1970s. This increased violence caused two U.S. deaths, several
injuries, and extensive property damage. One of the first Dev Sol bombings occurred at
145
During this period the Islamic Jihad took credit for killing a USAF NCO using a carbomb in response to
U.S. involvement in the Gulf War.
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the Military Transportation Management Command (MTMC) outpost (Figure 5-4) in
Istanbul in January 1991. In a phone call to the Turkish daily newspaper Milliyet, an
Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Significant Incidents of
Political Violence Against Americans: 1991 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1992), 30.
Figure 5-4. MTMC Outpost Bombing in Istanbul, 21 January 1991
unidentified caller claimed credit for the bombing in the name of Dev Sol, stating it was
in "protest against the imperialist forces in the Gulf."
146
Although the bombing resulted
in no injuries, it caused significant property damage. It became apparent that Turkey's
revolutionary leftists viewed the U.S. as the "puppet master" behind the coalition forces
that militarily opposed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
During this period, there was a dramatic shift in the left's targeting of U.S.
interests (Figure 5-5). Unlike previous periods of violence where the left sought
predominately diplomatic and military targets, this period witnessed a dramatic increase
in the targeting of U.S.-related businesses. Although there was a slight increase
following the 1980 coup, in 1991 business-related incidents significantly increased.
146
U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Significant Incidents of Political
Violence Against Americans: 1991 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1992), 30.
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There are two reasons for this shift. First, terrorists easily identified such targets as
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Sources: See Appendix C.
Figure 5-5. Leftist Targeting of U.S. Interests, 1980-91
the late- 1980s and early 1990s, U.S. personnel had significantly hardened government
and military installations in Turkey against terrorist attacks, especially during the war.
This suggests Devrimci Sol was cognizant of security arrangements at such targets and
selected lower-risk targets. Such decisions maximized terrorist survival and success of
the attack; businesses typically were not protected with armed guards.
Revolutionary leftists continued to almost exclusively conduct attacks against
U.S. targets in Turkey's four largest cities during this period. The continuing reason for
this was that most U.S. interests remained located in these cities, especially U.S.-related
businesses. During 1991, the majority of incidents occurred in Istanbul (Figure 5-6),
suggesting Devrimci Sol found it a more conducive environment within which to operate.
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Sources: See Appendix C.
Figure 5-6. Location of Leftist Incidents against U.S. Interests, 1980-91
In addition to the high number of incidents in Istanbul, 1991 witnessed an increase in
terrorist activity in Adana. Although it too contained a significant portion of Turkey's
population—it is the fourth largest city—the left's interests centered on Adana most
likely because it hosted the most prominent U.S. military installation (Incirlik Air Base)
in the country. Furthermore, during the Gulf War, for the revolutionary left, Incirlik
represented U.S. imperialistic aggression against the Iraqi people.
147
Turkey: A Country Study, 86-8. According to Turkey's 1990 census, Istanbul contained 12 percent (6.6
million) of the country's population and its population density was 1,330 persons per square kilometer.
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Bombings and attempted bombings remained the tactic-of-choice for leftist
attacks against the U.S. during this period (Figure 5-7), accounting for over 75 percent of
all incidents. This supports the belief Turkish leftists wanted to maximize effect and
minimize both cost and risk. As mentioned earlier, bombings potentially provided all







Sources: See Appendix C.
Figure 5-7. Leftist Tactics against U.S. Interests, 1980-91
Even so, Devrimci Sol conducted two rather sophisticated assassinations of
Americans during this period. Both incidents demonstrated the increased skill of its
militants and cellular nature of the organization. The first incident (7 February 1991)
involved the assassination of a U.S. contract employee working at IAB in Adana. In the
early morning hours, a two-man hit team walked up to the victim, as he was approaching
his vehicle at home, and shot him five times. The Turkish police identified a witness that
suggested militants had surveilled the victim's home several days before, indicating the
incident was planned in advance. On 28 February 1991, a two-person Devrimci Sol hit
team attempted to assassinate a USAF officer in Izmir. A follow-on bulletin indicated
83

the attack was in response to U.S.-Ankara cooperation in the Gulf War. Additionally,
this incident demonstrated prior planning and the use of cells to execute an operation.
A third example of such planning and execution was the 22 March 1991 Devrimci
Sol assassination of the Vinnel, Brown, and Root (VBR) site manager in Istanbul. At
approximately noon on that day, three men arrived at the VBR office, one dressed in a
Turkish police uniform. The uniformed man asked to speak with the person in charge.
When the site manager showed up, the terrorists requested the secretary and a Turkish
worker join them in the Deputy's office. With everyone in the office, one of the terrorists
drew a handgun and directed everyone to kneel on the floor and indicated they were
members of Dev Sol. While the other three hostages were tied up, the site manger was
taken to his office (Figure 5-8) where he was bound, gagged, then shot twice in the head
and once in the chest.
Further analysis of the event disclosed the Devrimci Sol attackers used a sound
suppression device on their weapon. Also, it was evident the attack was conducted inside
the VBR office in order to demonstrate Dev SoFs ability to penetrate a "hardened"
facility and to further instill fear in both U.S. and foreign business personnel. 149 The
timing of the event coincided with the Islamic holy month of Ramazan, i5° which meant
some of the Turkish workers were away from both the VBR office and other surrounding
buildings at the local mosque for prayer.
Once again, as in the late seventies, the early 1990s witnessed the revolutionary
left's return. Although similar in many respects to its ancestors, the Devrimci Sol of this
era demonstrated some significant differences in their activities. First, the group's attacks
focused primarily on Turkish targets relating to their need to punish the torturers of the
previous coups. They were not only acting as revolutionaries, they assumed the role of
judge and executioner. It was not until the advent of the Gulf War that they shifted their
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Islamic month of fasting, observed during the ninth month of the Islamic calendar. During this month,




attention. In light of this, Dev Sol employed some of its resources against "imperialist"
targets more for international appeal than displeasure with U.S. involvement in Turkish
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Significant Incidents of
Political Violence Against Americans: 1991 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1992), 38.
Figure 5-8. Photograph of U.S. Contractor Killing and Devrimci Sol Slogans151
affairs. Thus, with the Gulf War, Dev Sol appeared to respond to trigger events in attacks
against the United States. This change appeared to be a result of the group's desire to
direct its primary efforts at punishing its domestic enemies—security officials. The
number and types of targets hit demonstrated the group's increased capacity and
sophistication in carrying out terrorism. Even though Dev Sol demonstrated great skill
and sophistication, its activities soon embarrassed the government and once again
—
although not through a coup—brought the full wrath of the Turkish security system upon
them with devastating affect.
151
Left wall: "We are determined and we shall win." [Signed] Dev Sol, Armed Revolutionary Unit." Right
wall: "The Middle East belongs to the Middle East... It cannot be divided." [Signed] "Dev Sol".
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VI. AFTERMATH OF THE COLD WAR COLLAPSE
"The movements which tied all their hopes to [the] balance [of the Soviet Union
against the imperialists] went into a phase ofsurrender and reconciliation after the
collapse [of socialism].
"
Devrimci Sol Member Alsan Tayfun Ozkok (1990s) 152
In the 1990s, Devrimci Sol stood out as the most active leftist terrorist group in
Turkey, especially in regards to a terrorist threat posed to U.S. interests. Yet, following
its surge of activity during the Gulf War, especially that directed at U.S. and western
interests, the Turkish Government reacted vigorously, conducting several successful safe
house raids and introducing new antiterrorist legislation. 153 As security forces continued
raids, many militants retreated back to the safehaven of Europe, especially to Germany
and the Netherlands. In addition, shortly after the Gulf War, the organization found itself
in the middle of an ideological dispute, pitting its two prominent leaders (Karatas. and
Yagan) against one another. The result was a violent split. The Karatas. faction emerged
as the ruling faction and the organization changed its name. During this same period, the
collapse of the communist regimes of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe dealt Dev Sol
an ideological blow, as it put Marxism-Leninism in question.
Although these events greatly reduced Dev Sol's capacity to wage its "armed
struggle" against the Turkish state, let alone attack the United States, the organization did
not fade away as was the case with several of its FCO counterparts in other European
countries. Its network in central Europe, coupled with its ideological adaptation—in part
supported through the group's attachment of human rights to its political program—aided
in sustaining the group. In addition to incorporating the fight against human rights
violations, Devrimci Sol (and later DHKP-C) relied on the martyrdom of its members as
"Let's Get Armed, Let There Be Revolution," Devrimci Hulk Kurtulus Cephesi Online, Available
[Online]: <http://www.ozgurluk.org/dhkc/pub/aslan 1 .html> [24 April 2000].
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sign of success—even in death at the hands of Turkish security was a battle considered
won. In this atmosphere, the group survived and continues today.
A. EUROPE AND AN IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE
As Turkish security forces continued their assault on leftists, primarily Devrimci
Sol, following the Gulf War, many terrorists once again sought refuge in Europe.
Devrimci Sol's well-established network in Europe provided support and funding outside
Turkey. Earlier leftists had first established the network following their exodus in the
early 1970s. In addition, the militants escaping the military junta of 1980 further
solidified this network, tapping even deeper into its many sympathizers among the
foreign Turkish population in Western Europe. Europe also provided Devrimci Sol with
a location to regroup far away from ruthless Turkish security raids.
Following the Gulf War, Devrimci Sol embarked on a public affairs campaign,
utilizing the power of the Internet. With the establishment of an Internet site and later
several "DHKC Information Bureaus" throughout Europe, including Greece, England,
the Netherlands, Austria, and Italy, 154 the organization "embraced" the world. With the
power of the Internet, the organization was able to take its cause and grievances against
Ankara to a broader audience. In addition, it was able to voice displeasure over "fascist"
and "imperialistic" activities in Turkey (and the world) at the stroke of a computer key.
The Internet also enabled DHKP-C to connect with a greater, global "revolutionary"
movement, gaining further ideological support.
Such activity, coupled with the fact that Turkish Marxist-Leninists had developed
their own "personalized" view of the ideology, assisted Devrimci Sol in weathering the
temporary ideological disruption following the Soviet collapse. Although it was assumed
that with the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
and the concurrent discrediting of the communist parties in those countries, the European
FCOs would encounter a serious ideological crisis leading to their demise, this did not
154
See complete list: "DHKC Informationbureaus," Devrimci Halk Kurtulu? Cephesi Online, Available
[Online]: <http://www.ozgurluk.org/dhkc/address.html> [1 December 1999].
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happen. 155 In commenting on the collapse of the Soviet Union, a prominent Devrimci Sol
member, Alsan Tayfun Ozkok, suggests reasons for the organization's continued
survival:
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the
socialist bloc is an important loss for the revolutionary movements of the
world. The balance which the Soviet Union established against
imperialism, although in a revisionist fashion and based on wrong policies,
created a space to live for many revolutionary and patriotic movements
and this was an advantageous position for those movements. The
movements which tied all their hopes to this balance went into a phase of
surrender and reconciliation after the collapse. . .. The only difference in
our interpretation of socialism is that we now believe that the process of
transition from socialism to communism will take longer than our
expectations.
156
Although over half of the FCOs are no longer together, at least three are still active, one
of which is Devrimci Sols successor, DHKP-C. It is important to point out that those
FCOs no longer active dissolved, not only because of the communist collapse, but also
due to aggressive and accurate counter-terrorist operations on behalf of their respective
countries' security services.
Still, unlike Turkey, other European countries plagued with FCOs did not suffer
from the same political and economic challenges still present in Turkey today. Because
of this, other European FCOs found it difficult to gather support within populations
having no reason to support their "revolution." These countries did not have the
crippling unemployment and inflation present in Turkey. Also, unlike other countries,
Turkey increasingly came under fire regarding pervasive human rights violations,
attaching an air of sympathy to the revolutionary left's cause and opposition to an
"oppressive" regime.
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B. TURKISH SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE NINETIES
Devrimci Sol was very successful and executed several spectacular operations
against both Turkish security and U.S. interests during the early 1990s. In fact, it was
reported that the Turkish police identified and stopped a Dev Sol plan to attack President
George Bush during his July 1991 visit to Istanbul. Prior to the President's arrival,
Turkish police arrested over 12 terrorists and uncovered eight safe houses. 1 7 Between
1992 and 1993, Devrimci Sol was credited with 26 lethal attacks against Turkish security
or governmental personnel. By the end of the first three years of the 1990s, the group
had killed 73 people, including two Americans, one Briton, eight Turkish military
officers, and 37 Turkish policemen. 1
Even with these successes, beginning in mid- 1991, the group began to sustain
enormous defeats at the hands of a determined Turkish security force. Turkish security
continued to press hard throughout the 1990s in their attempt to eradicate the
revolutionary left from Turkey. Some experts familiar with the situation immediately
following the Gulf War suggest Turkey's successes in combating Devrimci Sol are
directly related to Ankara calling out of retirement an ex-security official. Reportedly,
this official's effectiveness against terrorism was matched only by the brutality with
which he dealt with terrorists. Some claims suggest Ankara's embarrassment and fear of
a repeat of 1979-80 violence prompted the government to give him carte blanche in
dealing with its leftist problem. Whatever the case, by 1992, Turkish security operations
began to heavily impact the upper echelons of the group.
Between July 1991 and December 1993, Turkish police uncovered approximately
148 Devrimci Sol safe houses and killed over 90 terrorists and suspected terrorists. Most
damaging was that during these raids Turkish security killed several key group officials.
For example, in April 1992, Sinan Kukul (Central Committee member) and Sabahat
Karatas (Central Committee member and Dev Sol leaders Dursun Karatas' spouse) were
killed. In early March 1993, a dramatic safe house raid ended in the death of Bedri
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Yagan, a Central Committee member and the group's number two leader. Finally, on 24
March 1993, Turkish police killed two of Dev Sol 's key "regional" commanders:
Irbrahim Yalcin (Aegean region commander) and Avni Turan (Black Sea region
commander). 159
Although Turkish security never completely halted the left's domestic activities,
by the end of 1993, leftist attacks against U.S. interests essentially ceased. Operations to
identify and apprehend suspected revolutionary leftists continued throughout the 1990s,
with the Turkish press reporting almost monthly the captures of leftists throughout the
large cities of Turkey. One of the results of these stepped-up operations was the tactical
withdrawal of the left. This was especially the case, as the group entered its second
serious period of infighting, beginning in 1992. This event would distract the
organization from its primary aim of attacking the Turkish Government and force
members to focus on internal disputes, ultimately ending with Dursun Karatas coming
out as the undisputed leader of a "new" organization.
C. THE SECOND REVOLUTIONARY LEFT SCHISM
If Turkish security operations were not enough for Devrimci Sol in the early
1990s, in September 1992 the organization became its own worst enemy, as it faced a
debilitating split placing Karatas and Yagan against each other. According to DOS
reports, the schism occurred over a protest regarding a lack of leadership, financial
mismanagement, and apparent security breaches. 160 Allegedly, the dispute involved
ideological differences, Karatas' supreme control of organizational finances, as well as
his poor security safeguards over telephone lines. According to DOS, between March
and December of 1993, the group murdered eight of its own militants in this fight.
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estimated 1,200 Dev Sol militants and sympathizers resided—infighting began to cause
serious injuries and deaths. 161
On 30 March 1994, the faction behind Karatas announced its victory over the
"mutinous traitors" of the Yagan-based faction. With this the "new" group proclaimed its
name as Devrimci Halk Kurtulu§ Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C) or Revolutionary People's
Liberation Party-Front). Although many outsiders point to pure internal and financial
motives, a review of recent organizational publications available via the Internet provides
interesting insights into what might have been the cause. According to DHKP Bulletin
No. 8, many of the "traitors" were "Kurdish nationalists." The bulletin further
suggests Turkish security officials may have taken advantage of the infighting:
The left that supported these traitors [Kurdish nationalists] could
not even come up with a single sentence to explain their behaviour when
the time to draw up a balance sheet came, and they wrote their names in
history as movements which can even cooperate with imperialism and the
oligarchy to divide and destroy another movement. The [DHKP-C], on
the other hand, lives on.
163
The bulletin states the so-called "traitors" cooperated with Turkish security
officials (the "oligarchy") in attacks against Devrimci Sol. It further suggests security
officials possibly introduced provocateurs into the group, aiming to disrupt and make the
group vulnerable to security operations. Highly successful Turkish security operations
against Devrimci Sol safehouses during this time would seem to support such claims. Of
particular interest was the 1993 killing of Yagan, Karatas/ primary rival in the dispute.
This occurred just one year following a TNP raid ending in the death of Karatas' spouse.
Even though there is no public information to support it, such a situation suggests the
possible "cooperation with the oligarchy" may have existed within both factions, and the
Karatas faction may have pointed Turkish security in the direction of its rival. Whatever
161
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the case, the end result for U.S. interests in Turkey was a significant drop in leftist
attacks.
D. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN TURKEY: 1992-99
As a result of successful Turkish security operations starting in late 1991 through
1993, as well as Devrimci Sol's internal dispute between 1992 and 1994, revolutionary
left attacks decreased considerably against U.S. interests during the last seven years of
the twentieth century. Even with the transformation ofthe 1 978 Dev Sol organization in
1994 to the DHKP-C, levels of violence failed to significantly increase. As Figure 6-1
illustrates, consulted databases recorded 1 1 incidents of international terrorism during
Sources: See Appendix C.
Figure 6-1. International Terrorist Incidents in Turkey, 1992-99
the period. Of these, data credited the Kurdish group PKK with the majority of the 84
incidents of non-leftist violence perpetrated. By 1993, the PKK dominated the Turkish
terrorist scene, causing numerous Turkish military operations both in Southeastern
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Turkey, as well as cross-border operations into the "Kurdish protected" zone of Northern
Iraq. The left was essentially absent from the international terrorism scene in Turkey.
For the most part, the revolutionary left conducted few attacks against U.S.
interests after 1992. In fact, during this period leftist attacks accounted for 18 percent of
all incidents involving U.S. interests—a dramatic decrease from previous periods. As
mentioned, this was attributed to Turkish security operations and Devrimci SoFs internal
conflict. Even with the final resolution of the conflict in 1994 and the emergence of
DHKP-C, the revolutionary left did not significantly increase activities against U.S.
interests.
During 1998, aside from two peaceful demonstrations outside U.S. Consulates
protesting U.S. action against Iraq during Operation DESERT FOX, there were no
significant incidents involving U.S. personnel or property. After 1992, the revolutionary
left conducted only two significant, yet unsuccessful, operations against the United
States. The majority of DHKP-C attacks arrived in the form of verbal condemnations
and threats via its Internet site. In fact, in June 1999, DHKP-C turned its attention to
NATO-led air operations over Kosovo, albeit via the Internet. According to the group's
statement, "U.S.-imperialism" was involved in Kosovo as a greater conspiracy to "rule
everything and everybody in the world" through destruction. 164
Leftist targeting was almost exclusively confined to U.S. business and diplomatic
targets (Figure 6-2). In addition, over 50 percent of incidents for this period were carried
out during 1992. As was the case in the previous period, targeting was most likely a
result of attacking less protected targets, such as businesses. In addition, as noted in
Figure 6-3, leftist terrorists confined their 1992 activities almost exclusively to Istanbul.
Even during the less active remainder of the 1990s, the revolutionary left maintained this
pattern. Also contributing to this situation was Devrimci SoVs (and later DHKP-C)
propensity to target the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul. Leftist terrorists targeted the
consulate four times during this period.
"DHKP-C Statement 88 on Current Situation in Kosovo," Devrimci Halk Kurtulu$ Cephesi Online,
Ozgurluk.Org Press Office, 30 March 1997, Available [Online]:
<http://www.ozgurluk.org/dhkc/msgOOQ35.html> [24 April 2000].
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The only significant leftist threat against the U.S. military occurred on 4 January
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Sources: See Appendix C.
Figure 6-2. Leftist Targeting of U.S. Interests, 1992-99
According to the TNP, two militants (one male, one female) planned to attack both IAB
and a police station in nearby Osmaniye. 165 According to press reports, security officials
conducting a search of the militants' homes recovered numerous incriminating items: 2
hand grenades, 2 hand-made bombs, a sketch of their "act of terrorism" planned for IAB,
a cellular phone and DHKP-C organizational documents.
Bombings and attempted bombings remained a favorite tactic for leftist attacks
against the U.S. interests during this period, accounting for nearly 60 percent of all
165
'Turkish Reportedly Foil Airbase Bomb Plot," BBC News Online, 4 January 1998, Available [Online]:
<http://news2.mls.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid%5F44000/44597.stm/> [1 1 February 2000].
95

incidents (Figure 6—4). Such data continued to support the suggestion leftists wanted to







Sources: See Appendix C.
Figure 6-3. Location of Leftist Incidents against U.S. Interests, 1992-99
particular interest during this period was Devrimci Sol and DHKP-C's use of rockets or
Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs) in their attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul. In
1 992, Dev Sol militants used rockets twice—the first time unsuccessfully—against the
consulate. Most recently in June 1 999, TNP surprised and killed two DHKP-C militants
attempting to launch a Light Anti-tank Weapon (LAW) against the U.S. Consulate. The
use of such weapons, coupled with the "professional" 1996 assassination of prominent
Turkish industrialist Ozdemir Sabanci at his office in Istanbul, indicated a possible
sustained, if not increased level of sophistication in attacks. Both tactics required
technical knowledge, extensive planning and professional execution, unlike that required
during the average bombing.
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As the "new" DHKP-C moved to regain ground lost prior to 1994, it was unable
or unwilling to devote efforts to increased attacks inside Turkey. The most obvious
reason for this is found in successful personnel and leadership-robbing TNP operations in
Attempted Bombing
20%
Source: See Appendix C.
Figure 6-4. Leftist Tactics Used against U.S. Interests, 1992-99
the early 1 990s. In addition, TNP continued operations against the DHKP-C throughout
the decade, presenting a significant barrier to DHKP-C operations. According to Turkish
press reports, between mid- 1998 and May 2000 alone, Turkish security captured or killed
over 400 suspected DHKP-C militants. 166 Instead, DHKP-C mounted increased verbal
attacks against Ankara and U.S. imperialism through its Internet site operating out of
Europe. The site, operated by DHKP-C s front press organ DHKC, vigorously attacks
Turkey's poor human rights record and U.S. military operations in the Middle East and
the Balkans. With the end ofthe Cold War and Turkey's decreased importance as
NATO's barrier to possible Soviet aggression, DHKP-C moved to increase European
pressure on Ankara's poor human rights record. Although DHKP-C voiced its continued
faith in Marxism-Leninism, its increased focus on rhetoric as opposed to action
166
Foreign News Media Translations, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), reports collected for
April 1998 through May 2000, Available [Online]: <http://199.221.15.211 /> [1999-2000].
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demonstrates the organization's awareness that the rest of the world does not necessarily
share its confidence in such an ideology, or in violence as the avenue to political
legitimacy.
DHKP-C's decreased activities against U.S. interests reflects several important
things regarding the organization's possible direction. First , the disruptions of the early
1990s, reduced its capacity to operate against "secondary" targets like the United States.
Second, when DHKP-C did decide to mount an attack against the U.S., it selected high
profile targets; e.g., the U.S. Consulate and the most active U.S. air base in the region. In
the case of the consulate, the group possibly selected it because Dev Sol had launched
several attacks against the facility in the past and because it is an open target. Of course,
both recent attempts against the U.S. might signal independent decisions by DHKP-C
militants. If so, this possibly means Karatas did not completely regain control over
operations inside Turkey following the 1992-94 schism. Lastly, DHKP-C's increased
Internet activity demonstrates an organizational attempt to establish a legitimate place for
it as a political party. As Turkish security continues to close avenues for working from
inside the country, DHKP-C leadership (Karatas) seems to have decided a more prudent
attack lies outside, especially from inside an unthreatened, Turkey-hostile Europe.
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VII. THE FUTURE THREAT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT
"Thefounding date ofour Party is March 30, 1994. But our Party is not 'new' in the
political arena. It is the continuation of the struggle and thefollow up to the tradition of
16 years ofDevrimci Sol [italics added]. In it, the traditions and experiences of
Devrimci Sol are carried to a new level. "
Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Cephesi (1998) 167
In 1994, following a two-year period of infighting and constant police operations,
the Karatas faction ofDev Sol renamed itself. The group continued to target U.S.
interests in Turkey, but not on the scale of attacks conducted in earlier periods. Although
DHKP-C mounted only two significant, "unsuccessful" operations against U.S. targets
since 1992, these recent activities reaffirm the group's continued virulently anti-U.S. and
anti-NATO position. Even so, what level of threat does DHKP-C pose to U.S. interests
in Turkey? What is the potential future of Turkey's revolutionary left? In this final
chapter, a DoD threat factor system is employed to determine DHKP-C s potential threat
to U.S. interests. Finally, in light of increased human rights disputes between Turkey and
Europe, what does this mean for DHKP-C and its continued existence?
A. REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE THREAT FACTORS
Following the devastating terrorist attacks against U.S. interests during the mid-
1990s, the Department of Defense (DoD) developed a "common" method to assess the
terrorist threat to U.S. and DoD personnel, facilities, material, and interests overseas.
This method is based upon a careful analysis of six "threat analysis factors"
—
existence,
capability, intentions, history, targeting and security environment. The determination
1
Political Development in Turkey: The People on the Road to Power (London: Revolutionary People's
Liberation Front Information Bureau, 1998), 181.
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Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Proceduresfor
Antiterrorism, 2d ed. 17 March 1998, Available [Online]:
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/iel/operations.htm> [22 April 2000], Chapter V.
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of each factor's presence (or absence) in a particular location enables DoD to establish a
specific "threat level" for that area.
169
The threat levels are: critical, high, medium, low and negligible. These threat
levels are based on the presence of a combination of the threat factors. The following
descriptions establish the requirements for each particular threat level. 170
• CRITICAL . Factors of existence, capability, and targeting must be present.
History and intentions may or may not be present. CRITICAL is differentiated
from all other terrorist threat levels because it is the only one in which credible
information identifiying specific DoD personnel, facilities, assets, or interests as
potential targets of attack is present.
• HIGH . Factors of existence, capability, history, and intentions must be present,
but analysts lack specific targeting information.
• MEDIUM . Factors of existence, capability, and history must be present.
Intentions may or may not be present. Threat level MEDIUM and threat level
HIGH are similar in that data for the factors existence, history, and capability
exist.
• LOW . Existence and capability must be present. History may or may not be
present.
• NEGLIGIBLE . Existence and/or capability may or may not be present.
It is important to note that a threat level based upon this particular method only applies to
the terrorist threat to U.S. and/or DoD interests in the particular area. It does not apply to
the indigenous population or another "third" country present in a given area.
A review of each individual threat factor, as it relates to the revolutionary left
today in Turkey, will provide us with both an understanding of the possible threat DHKP-
C presents, as well as the level of concern the U.S. should place regarding the group's
threat.
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This factor is present. The factor of existence is based upon the fact that a
terrorist group is present, assessed to be present, or able to gain access to a given country
or locale. The revolutionary leftist group DHKP-C exists in Turkey, as demonstrated in
both documented attacks and attempted attacks against both U.S. and domestic Turkish
targets. In addition, according to Turkish press reports, Turkish authorities have captured
or killed nearly 100 suspected DHKP-C member in 2000.m
2. Capability
This factor is present. The factor of capability is based upon the acquired,
assessed, or demonstrated level of capability to conduct terrorist attacks. In the last half
of the 1990s, DHKP-C militants have demonstrated a sophisticated capability to carry out
armed attacks against targets inside Turkey. The following three events illustrate DHKP-
C continued capability:
• 9 January 1996 - DHKP-C gunmen breached security at the twin towers of
Sabanci Center in Istanbul. Once inside they shot and killed three people:
Ozdemir Sabanci, a Turkish industrialist and head of a Toyota car joint venture
with Japan; Haluk Gorgun, the firm's general manager; and a company secretary.
That the gunmen were able to gain access to a secure facility, commit three
murders, then escape demostrated high level of sophistication and capability.
• 4 January 1998 - Adana TNP captured two DHKP-C militants planning to attack
IAB, which is the United States' most significant air base in the region. Although
TNP twarted their plans, materials seized during a search of their residence
disclosed a measure of sophistication and capability. Items seized revealed the
militants had successfully conducted surveillance of the base. They also
possessed a computer, bomb making equipment, and small arms.
• 4 June 1999 - Istanbul TNP stumble on two DHKP-C militants preparing to fire a
rocket at the U.S. Consulate. Again, although unsuccessful, this incident
illustrated DHKP-C is potentially capable of fielding weapons more sophisticated
than small arms or home-made explosives.
1
' Foreign News Media Translations, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), reports collected for
January through May 2000, Available [Online]: <http://199.221.15.211 /> [2000].
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3. Intentions
This factor is present. This factor of intention is based upon recent demonstrated
anit-U.S. terrorist activity, or stated or assessed intent to conduct such activity. As
illustrated above, as recent as June 1999, DHKP-C has demostated a willingness and
capabity to mount terrorist attacks against U.S. targets inside Turkey. In addition, DHKC
continued to publish anti-U.S. statements. In the organization's "Party Program"
(Appendix M), DHKP-C declares, under the heading of "The Enemies in This War," that
"first of all, U.S. imperialism and all imperialist forces, together with their military,
economic and political bases, their offices, and their secret service bases set up under the
guise of providing 'aid'" continue to be enemies.
172
In light of such written declarations,
the group's intentions must be taken seriously.
4. History
This factor is present. This factor of history is based upon demonstrated terrorist
activity over time. As pointed out in this thesis, the Turkish revolutionary left—from
THKP-C to DHKP-C—has targeted U.S. interests in Turkey since 1968. In particular,
the revolutionary left is credited with 13 of 15 terrorist-related deaths (Table 7-1) of U.S.
citizens in Turkey between 1976 and 1991. According to DOS reports, the majority of
these attacks appeared well executed, illustrating previous planning and surveillance of
the intended target or targets. In addition, DHKP-C demonstrated activity as early as
June 1999, when militants targeted the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul.
5. Targeting
This factor is unknown. The factor of targeting is based upon current credible
information on activity indicative of preparations for specific terrorist operation. There
exists no open source information indicating DHKP-C is preparing to execute a terrorist
operation against a U.S. target inside Turkey.
1 2
"Revolutionary People's Liberation Party's Program," Available [Online]
<http://www.ozgurluk.org/dhkc/pub/program.html/> [2 January 2000].
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6. Security Environment
This factor is present. The factor of security environment is based upon the
internal political and security considerations that impact on the capability of terrorist
elements to carry out their intentions. Several examples exist illustrating Turkish security
DATE CITY PLACE VICTIM
(Status - Number)
TACTIC GROUP 2
ll-Aug-76 Istanbul Airport Civilian - 1 Shot PFLP
12-Apr-79 Izmir Residence USAF-2 Shot THKP-C
ll-May-79 Istanbul Hotel USA-1 Shot MLSPB
2-Jun-79 Adana Residence Civilian - 1 Shot THKP-C
14-Dec-79 Istanbul Vehicle USA/DoD - 1/3 Shot MLSPB
16-Apr-80 Istanbul Street USN-1 Shot MLSPB
15-Nov-80 Adana Vehicle USAF-1 Shot MLSPB
7-Aug-82 Ankara Airport Civilian - 1 Shot/Bomb ASALA
7-Feb-91 Adana Vehicle Contractor - 1 Shot Dev Sol
22-Mar-91 Istanbul Office Contractor - 1 Shot Dev Sol
19-Aug-91 Istanbul Office UKPersonb -l Shot Dev Sol
28-Oct-91 Ankara Vehicle USAF - 1 Bomb Islamic Jihad
a Only three terrorist-related U.S. fatalities were credited to non-leftist terrorists: the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, and an Ankara-base
Islamic Jihad cell.
b Some sources state Devrimci Sol believed this victim was a U.S. person.
Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Political Violence Against
Americans: 1997, (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1998).
Table 7-1. U.S. Casualties to Terrorism in Turkey, 1968-98
is capable of countering most DHKP-C operations, but not all. According to a
government report quoted in the Turkish press, between 1988 and April 1998, Turkish
authorities mounted 2,208 operations against DHKP-C alone. As a result of these
1 7^
operations, authorities reported killing 239 militants, while capturing 8,627. In
addition, as pointed out earlier, TNP pre-empted two planned DHKP-C operations
"Operations against Turkish Underground Group Detailed," Cumhuriyet, Foreign News Media
Translation FTS 19980422000368, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 28 April 1998,
Available [Online]: <http://199.221.15.211 /> [27 September 1999].
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against U.S. interests in 1997 and 1999. Even so, authorities have been unable to prevent
all DHKP-C attacks. In addition to the 1996 Sabanci murders, DHKP-C terrorist have
targeted and assassinated at least 10 police and military officers, as well as judicial civil
servants.
Based upon the above review, it is assessed that the factors of existence,
capabilities, intentions, and history are present. This indicates that the appropriate threat
level regarding the DHKP-C terrorist threat is High .
B. THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT'S THREAT AND FUTURE
The analysis has shown that the revolutionary left, especially groups such as
Devrimci Sol, owe their existence to Turkey's economic, political and social instability.
In particular the political liberalization of the late 1950s and 1960s, which provided the
fertile soil for such groups and their ideologies to germinate and take root. Later
liberalization (without developed institutions) following the many military coups allowed
for the re-emergence and further development of these groups, as well as their arguments
and conflicts. The liberalization of the universities during these periods, coupled with the
increased (and mixed rural and metropolitan) student populations provided the expansion
of movements and their emergence at the extreme of the political spectrum. In addition,
the campuses, and the gecekondus phenomenon created as a result of rapid urbanization,
became ample sources of manpower for the eventual armed movements.
Closely tied to the development of these violent groups were the effects of
continuous attempts at economic reform and stability. As was discussed, the Turkish
Government's mismanagement of the economy and the resulting crises led to
unacceptable inflation and unemployment, not to mention uncertainty. This was
magnified more when moves to mechanize agriculture aided in stimulating the
urbanization phenomenon of the 1960s and 1970s. Coupled with this was the failure of
economic reforms and policies to provide adequate employment for the growing
population. The overall effect was a shift in population from the rural areas to the larger
cities. For many, the hopes of employment in the large cities never materialized. In lieu
of adequate employment, many of those unemployed workers became contributors to the
political violence witnessed in the 1970s and 1980s.
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During this research, no evidence was discovered that pointed to any serious
impact by leftist terrorism, no matter the severity, on Turkish-U.S. relations. Although
armed leftist organizations made living in Turkey quite dangerous for U.S. citizens
—
specifically prior to the 1980 coup and during the 1991 Gulf War—U.S. policy towards
Turkey did not appear to be significantly effected. Other, internationally watched issues,
such as the Cyprus issue between Turkey and Greece, and the United States
government's reaction to it, had more impact than leftist terrorism did. As terrorism
issues go, Turkey's Kurdish insurgency with the PKK has had a more observable impact
between the two nations, especially with the fall of the former Soviet Union. Issues
regarding Turkey's use of U.S. military aid in its fight with the PKK, as well as human
rights issues in Turkey have gained greater, longer lasting attention.
While Marxism-Leninism as a ruling ideology was seriously discredited with the
fall of the Soviet Union, it remains attractive for some terrorist organizations as a
revolutionary ideology. This is especially true with extreme leftist groups, such as the
DHKP-C in Turkey. Therefore, partially based upon U.S. demonstrated opposition to
such an ideology, groups like DHKP-C remain a potential threat to U.S. interests in
Turkey. DHKP-C, although so far not as active or deadly as its ancestor Dev Sol, still
espouses hatred for the imperialist U.S., as well as much of the perceived western
influence in Turkey; e.g., NATO, the European Community, and the European Union.
An organization's level of institutionalization is measured in part by its
adaptability and complexity. 114 This analysis of Turkey's revolutionary left strongly
suggests—based on such measures—a highly institutionalized organization. First, the
revolutionary left has proven very adaptable to environmental challenges and age: it has
weathered several military interventions survived the ideological blow of the Soviet
collapse, and DHKP-C sits atop a 30-year organizational history. Next, DHKP-C is a
very complex organization, as its cellular structure illustrates. It is no longer a small, 20
to 30 militant operation like THKP; some sources estimate DHKP-C (and DHKC)




support structure both in Turkey, and in several European countries. Turkey's
revolutionary left is a survivor. Thus, the revolutionary left's durability and longevity
warrants continued research and watching.
It goes without saying that the preservation of key militant leaders outside of
Turkey contributed (and continues to contribute) to the revolutionary left's longevity and
ability to re-emerge. This also supported the institutionalization of the organization.
Coupled with this, the continued economic difficulties and political turmoil, compound
the problem of solving such terrorism. For, until the Turkish population as a whole
obtain confidence in employment and a stable living standard, and gain more confidence
in a truly "democratic" government, such groups as DHKP-C will appeal to certain
sectors of Turkey's population.
Finally, the issue of Ankara's human rights record plays to DHKP-C's favor. The
DHKP-C s establishment of the DHKC offices in Europe and connecting to the Internet
has allowed it to take this issue before both European and international audiences.
European (and even U.S.) pressure on Turkey during the Cold War regarding such issues
was often overshadowed by NATO's need to have a strong obstacle to possible Soviet
aggression in the Middle East. With the Soviet collapse and Turkey's diminished
security importance to many European NATO members, this is not the case. A case in
point is Europe's "oversight" in the case of the February 1999 capture of PKK terrorist
leader Abdullah Ocalan. Several European countries voiced their concern over the
possibility that Turkey might execute Ocalan. In fact, the European Human Rights Court
demanded Turkey allow Ocalan to freely consult with his foreign and Turkish lawyers
and that an independent court try him. 175 Although Turkey did not agree to such a
demand, Ankara must weigh the possible impact of its internal affairs on its relationship
to Europe, which Turkey's leaders have attempted to emulate for over 200 years.
Possibly supporting Ankara's concern is its self-imposed moratorium on state-sanctioned
175
Martin van Bruinessen, "Turkey, Europe and the Kurds after the Capture of Abdullah Ocalan," Kurdish
Observer Online, Kurdish Observer, Available [Online]:
<http://www.asrinhukuk.com/english/intproc/doc 6.html> [7 May 2000].
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executions. Turkey has not carried out an Assembly approved execution since 1984.
Ironically, the last person executed was a revolutionary leftist.
In light of this, what will possibly keep such movements as DHKP-C alive or
ultimately signal their end? In addition to issues surrounding human rights, one of the
greatest possible assets for the extreme left has been, and will continue to be, the health
of the Turkish economy, and the government's ability to meet the needs of its population.
As earlier discussed, the Turkish economy has had anything but easy times. With the
European Union's decision in 1997 to turn down Turkey's application for permanent
membership in the EU came the crashing down of a decades' old dream. Although this
decision was reversed in 1999, such an event might have been a blessing in disguise for
Turkey.
The EU refusal may be one of the strong motivating forces for further economic
development and integration in the newly independent Central Asia states. Although
Turkey has had some significant crises with its economy, it still has great potential as a
model for the development of democracy and a market economy in this predominantly
Islamic region. If Turkey is able to move closer to a more stable economy and
integration with Central Asia, and deliver a sounder more predictable economic
environment, a great deal of support (both real and potential) for extreme leftist
organizations will diminish.
Such developments, coupled with the ideological uncertainties following the fall
of the Soviet Union will potentially erode the attractiveness of such groups as DHKP-C.
An economically satisfied population will be unlikely to challenge and disrupt the status
quo, as advocated by such extreme organizations as the DHKP-C. Running parallel to
this would be a diminished terrorist risk to U.S. interests in Turkey.
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APPENDICES
The attached appendices provide additional support to this thesis. Appendix A
provides a list of abbreviations and acronyms frequently used in the thesis. Appendix B
provides the key to the RAND-St. Andrews Chronology ofInternational Terrorism
Incidents codes used in individual incident sequence numbers listed in Appendix D.
Appendix C provides a list of the sources used in construction of the chronology.
Appendix D contains a comprehensive chronology of international terrorist
incidents in Turkey from 1968 to 1999. It chronicles leftist (and suspected leftist) attacks
in Turkey, specifically those directed at U.S. interests. It also illustrates specifics of
Turkey's revolutionary leftists' terrorist acts, providing additional insight into the scope
of revolutionary leftists' activities during specific periods, such as THKO and THKP-C
operations between 1971 and 1972, or Devrimci Sol actions during the 1991 Gulf War.
Appendices E through H provide graphical representation over time, 1968 through 1999.
These four graphs depict the terrorist incident data provided in the thesis' main body in
complete form from 1968 to 1999.
In addition, Appendices I through M provide translations or "original" English
versions of primary THKP-C, Devrimci Sol, DHKC, and DHKP-C organizational
documents. Most are group manifestos, event or issue bulletins, or ransom notes. These
documents provide additional insight into original and current "aims" and issues of the
revolutionary left's movement. Of note in these documents is that these groups have
continuously voiced their concern and displeasure regarding U.S. presence in Turkey.
Finally, a note on editing. Most of the information and documents contained in
these appendices was either taken from already translated sources or directly extracted
from the DHKC's Internet website. Therefore, the author edited these documents very
little in an attempt to maintain their original state. Only obvious spelling mistakes were
corrected so as not to distract from the documents' content. Otherwise, documents are
provided as discovered.
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APPENDIX A - LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ASALA Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
(Republican People's Party or RPP)
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
DCM Deputy Chief of Mission
DEV GEN£ Devrimci Geng
(Revolutionary Youth), or
Tiirkiye Devrimci Genglik Federasyonu
(Federation of Revolutionary Turkish Youth)
DEV SOL Devrimci Sol
(Revolutionary Left), or TH¥iP-C-Devrimci Sol
DEV YOL Devrimci Yol
(Revolutionary Path)
DHKC Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Cephesi
(Revolutionary People's Liberation Front)
DHKP-C Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi
(Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front)
DoD Department of Defense
DOS Department of State
DP Demokrat Parti
(Democrat Party)
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCO Fighting Communist Organization
FKF Fikir Kuliipleri Federasyonu
(Federation of Idea Clubs or Association of Ideas Clubs)
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GDP Gross National Product
IAB Incirlik Air Base
IBC Ilkesiz Birlik Cephesi
(Unprincipled Unity Front)
IBDA-C Islami Biiyiik Dogu Akincilar-Cephesi
(Islamic Great Eastern Raiders-Front)
IMF International Monetary Fund
METU Middle East Technical University
(Orta Dogu Teknik Universite)
MGK Milli Giivenlik Kurulu
(National Security Council)
MLAPU Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit, see MLSPB
MLSPB Marksist-Leninist Silahh Propaganda Birligi
(Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit), or THKP-C/MLSPB
MTMC United States Military Traffic Management Command
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO Non-Commissioned Officer
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PKK Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan
(Kurdistan Workers' Party)
RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade (or rocket)
RPP Republican People's Party (see CHP)




TBMM Turkiye Biiyuk Millet Meclisi
(Turkish Grand National Assembly)
112
THKC Tiirkiye Halk Kurtulus Cephesi
(Turkish People's Liberation Front)
THKO Tiirkiye Halk Kurtulus Ordusu
(Turkish People's Liberation Army)
THKP Tiirkiye Halk Kurtulus Partisi
(Turkish People's Liberation Party)
THKP-C Tiirkiye Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi
(Turkish People's Liberation Party-Front)
THY Tiirk Hava Yollari
(Turkish Airlines)
TIKKO Tiirkiye l§gi Koylii Kurtulus Ordusu
(Workers' Peasants Liberation Army of Turkey)
TIP Tiirkiye Isci Partisi
(Turkish Labor Party)
TKEP/L Tiirkiye Komiinist Emek Partisi/Leninist
(Turkish Communist Laborers' Party/Leninist or
Communist Labor Party of Turkey/Leninist)
TNP Turkish National Police
TPLA Turkish People's Liberation Army, see THKO
TPLF Turkish People's Liberation Front, see THKC
TPLP Turkish People's Liberation Party, see THKP
TRT Tiirkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu
(Turkish Radio and Television Corporation)
TUSLOG The United States Logistics Group
U.S. United States of America
USA United States Army
USAF United States Air Force
USAID United States Agency for International Development
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USCIA United States International Communications Agency
USIS United States Information Service
USN United States Navy
VBR Vinnel, Brown and Root, Inc.
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APPENDIX B - RAND-ST. ANDREWS CHRONOLOGY SEQUENCE NUMBER
CODES 176
This appendix provides the key to the RAND-St. Andrews Chronology ofInternational
Terrorism Incidents codes used in individual incident sequence numbers listed in
Appendix D. This list is not inclusive, as it only provides the key to codes used in the
incident numbers associated with this thesis. In addition, not all incidents have a RAND-
St. Andrews sequence number, as the author constructed this chronology using several
different terrorism chronologies. Use the following example as an initial guide:
EXAMPLE:
19680810 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410
Two firebombs were thrown at the USIS office in Izmir, causing slight damage. A
Turkish communist suspect was arrested.
CHRONOLOGY INDICATORS: The following symbols indicate the type of event
and inclusion in what specific chronology.
Al - International terrorist incidents
A4 - Non-nuclear, energy-related incidents
A2 - Indigenous Group Chronologies
A7 - Maritime incidents
ACTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
B01 - Kidnapping
B03 - Hijackings
B05 - Barricade and hostage
B07 - Significant threats, conspiracies,
serious protests, others
B02 - Attacks on installations, including




B06 - Assassinations, shootings
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FOOO (none, or none reported)
INJURIES










T06 - Private citizens, communities
T07 - Utilities - energy (T07a for oil, T07b
for electric), communications
facilities
T09 - Exiles, immigrants
Til- Other, and nonspecific multiple
T14 -Towns
T16 - Terrorists, activists as targets
TO 1 - Diplomatic
T03 - Military
T5b - AIRLINE OFFICES
T5d - AIRLINE PERSONNEL
T08 - Government, including
politicians in and out of office,
government buildings, all of the
host country
T10 - Religious, ethnic
T12- Maritime
T 1 5 - Transportation (other than air,
sea)
T17- Media
NATIONALITY OF TARGETS and COUNTRY LOCATION OF INCIDENT
Nationality = N0000
Country Codes (Numerical Order)
State = S0000 ['N' or 'S' preceding - ]
002-- United States 155-- Chile 200-- United Kingdom
210-- Netherlands 220-- France 225-- Switzerland
230-- Spain 235-- Portugal 255-- Germany, West
305-- Austria 325-- Italy 328-- Vatican
350-- Greece 360-- Romania 365--USSR
375-- Finland 396--NATO 616-- Tunisia
630-- Iran 640-- Turkey 645-- Iraq
651-
- Egypt 663-- Jordan 666-- Israel
667-- Palestine Inter Arab 670-- Saudi Arabia 699-- United Arab
Emirates
700-- Afghanistan 710-- China, People's Republic of 740--Japan
765-- Bangladesh 770-- Pakistan 900-- Australia
920-- New Zealand 994-- Transnational Corps. (U.S.* )995-- Jewish, non-
Israeli
996-- International, multilateral 997-- Unspecific frgn.
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GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
REU - Europe RAS - Asia RME - Middle East/North
Africa/Persian Gulf
PERPETRATORS
0000 - Unknown or claims that are not credible
01 10 - Palestine Liberation Organization, general, indeterminate, or unknown
0120 - Black June, Al-Assifa (includes early PLO dissidents) (Abu Nidal, Fatah
Revolutionary Council, rg. of Socialist Muslims, Arab Revolutionary Cells, Arab
Revolutionary Brigades)
0121 - May 15 Organization for the Liberation of Palestine
0122 - Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution
1210 - Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)
1216 - Armenian Revolutionary Army
1220 - Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide
1221 - 28 May Armenian Organization
1300 - Libyan, general, indeterminate, or unknown
1400 - Middle East, North African, other than Palestinians, general, indeterminate,
unknown
1401 - Palestinian/Shiia collaboration, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine,
Islamic Jihad-Jerusalem
1410 - Turkish, general, indeterminate, or unknown
1411-DevSol
1412-DevYol
1413 - Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU)
1420 - Lebanese, Jordanian, general, indeterminate, or unknown
1422 - Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF)
1430 - Iranian, Iraqi, Syrian, general, indeterminate, unknown
1432 - Amal, Movement of Hope (Imam Musa Sadr) (Shiites in general)
1433 - Kurdish separatists
1434 - Jihad (Struggle) (Islamic Holy War, Hezbollah, Revolutionary Justice
Organization)
1545 - USSR Republics (Ukraine, etc.), general, indeterminate, unknown




2200 - Asylum-seekers, homesick Cubans, etc.
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APPENDIX C - CHRONOLOGY SOURCES
The following sources were used to construct Appendix D, a chronology of international
terrorist incidents in Turkey between 1968 and 1999. These sources also provided the
data used in the graphs in Appendices E through H. Sources are grouped by organization
or author, then by date.
RAND-St. Andrews Chonologies
Brain M. Jenkins and Janera Johnson, International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968-
1974 (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1975).
Brain M. Jenkins and Janera Johnson, International Terrorism: A Chronology (1974
Supplement) (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1976).
Margaret Krahenbuhl, Political Kidnappings in Turkey, 1971-1972, RAND Report: R-
2105-DOS/ARPA (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1977).
Karen Gardela and Bruce Hoffman, The RAND Chronology ofInternational Terrorism
for 1986 (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1990).
Karen Gardela and Bruce Hoffman, The RAND Chronology ofInternational Terrorism
for 1987 (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1991).
Karen Gardela and Bruce Hoffman, The RAND Chronology ofInternational Terrorism
for 1988 (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1992).
Bruce Hoffman and Donna Kim Hoffman, The RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of
International Terrorism, 1994 (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1997).
Bruce Hoffman and Donna Kim Hoffman, The RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of
International Terrorism, 1995 (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1998).
Karen G. Treverton, <krent@rand.org>, Incidents ofInternational Terrorism in Turkey
from RAND-St. Andrews Chronology ofInternational Terrorism (1968-1999) Database,
[E-mail to Michael J. Kenville <mikenvil@nps.navv.mil>l [17 December 1999].
Edward F. Mickolus Chronologies
Edward F. Mickolus, Todd Sandler, and Jean M. Murdock, International Terrorism in the
1980s: A Chronology ofEvents, Volume 1: 1980-1983 (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State
University Press, 1989).
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Edward F. Mickolus, Todd Sandler, and Jean M. Murdock, International Terrorism in the
1980s: A Chronology ofEvents, Volume II: 1984-1987, (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State
University Press, 1989).
Edward F. Mickolus, Terrorism, 1988-1991: A Chronology of Events and a Selectively
Annotated, Bibliography, Bibliographies and Indexes in Military Studies: Number 6
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993).
Edward F. Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism, 1992-1995: A Chronology of
Events and a Selectively Annotated, Bibliography, Bibliographies and Indexes in Military
Studies: Number 9 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1997).
U.S. Department of State
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, Volumes 1983-86, (Washington
D.C.: Department of State, 1984-87).
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Secretary of State, Ambassador-at-Large for
Counter-Terrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism, Volumes 1987-88 (Washington D.C.:
Department of State, 1988-89).
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for
Counter-Terrorism. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989 (Washington D.C.: Department
of State, 1990).
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990, Volumes 1990-99, (Washington
D.C.: Department of State, 1991-2000).
U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans,
Volumes 1987-96 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1988-97).
U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, Political Violence Against Americans: 1997. 10th Anniversary Issue
(Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1998).
U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, Political Violence Against Americans: 1998 (Washington D.C.:
Department of State, 1999).
U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices: 1994 (Washington D.C.:
Department of State, 1994).
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U.S. Department of Transportation
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Criminal Acts
Against Civil Aviation, Volumes 1986-98 (Washington D.C.: Office of Civil Aviation
Security, 1987-99).
Foreign Broadcast Information Service Media Translations
Foreign News Media Translations, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 1995-
2000, Available [Online]: <http://199.221.15.211/> [1999-2000].
Other
International Terrorism, July 1968-July 1986 (Tel Aviv, Israel: Israel Defense Forces
Spokesman, 1986).
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(19680810 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410) 178
Two firebombs were thrown at the USIS office in Izmir,












The car of U.S. Ambassador Robert Commer, who was visiting
METU in Ankara, was burned by a group of students. Fourteen
students were arrested for their part in the incident.
Leftist students threw a bomb at the U.S. military headquarters
causing minor damage and no injures.
Firebombs damaged the TUSLOG Headquarters facility and six
vehicles. No group claimed credit for the attacks.
(19690825 Al B04 F001 1001 Tl 1 N666 S640 RME P1420)
Two Jordanians attempted to bomb the Israeli Commercial Fair
in Izmir but were injured when the bomb prematurely
exploded. One died from his injuries.
(19690916 Al B03 F000 1000 T5a N640 S640 RME P2200) A
27-year-old Turkish law student hijacked a THY Viscount
airliner with 63 persons aboard, forcing the pilot to land in
Sofia, Bulgaria. The student, Sadi Toker, 27, had a history of
mental illness. Bulgarian police released the plane with its six-
177
Prior to the systematic record keeping of international terrorist incidents—the RAND-St. Andrews
Chronology being one of the first—only six international incidents of terrorism in Turkey were recorded.
Of those six, three were directed at U.S. interests in Turkey, specifically USIS offices in Ankara and
Istanbul.
178
The RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism index/sequence number will be giving
in parenthesis prior to incident description text, if applicable.
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man crew four hours later. (Note - Additional sources stated
Toker was involved in the 1967 stabbing of a U.S. seaman
during a U.S. Sixth Fleet visit to Turkey. At the time, Toker
was declared mentally ill and escaped punishment.)
December Izmir Thirteen Americans were injured in Izmir, as militant students
protested a port call by five USN ships.
20 December Ankara ( 1 969 1 220 A 1 B04 F000 1000 TO 1 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
small bomb exploded behind the USIS building in Ankara,
breaking six windows. There were no injuries. No one claimed
responsibility for the attack.
1970
1 January Istanbul ( 1 9700 1 1 A 1 B04 F000 1000 TO 1 N002 S640 RME P0000)
An explosion of undetermined origin occurred at the entrance
of the U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul. Damage was limited
to broken windows.
6 March Ankara At about 1815, approximately 50 students, with 150 more
observing outside, invaded the USIS building in Ankara.
Damage was limited to three broken windows and several
broken door locks, as well as the destruction of two U.S. flags.
No U.S. citizens were injured, but two TNP guards outside








Turkish students threw three Molotov cocktails at three foreign-
owned buildings, causing slight damage.
Turkish police apprehended four students carrying dynamite
and gasoline in the U.S. Consulate and Turkish-American
Association area in Adana. Two of the students admitted
intending to bomb the Turkish-American Association and
implicated the other two, who were later arrested.
(19700428 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
small group of young men attacked a USAID warehouse on the
outskirts of Ankara by cutting the barbed wire to allow entry to
the grounds. Molotov cocktails were thrown at equipment and
vehicles and they shot at the night watchman.





Istanbul (19700425 Al B04 F000 1000 T5b N666 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb exploded in the El Al Israel Airlines office in Istanbul.
There were no injuries.
Ankara (1970083 1 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000)
TUSLOG Detachment 30, a USAF facility in Ankara, was
bombed. Two additional devices that failed to explode were
also found in the facility.
24 September Ankara Two Dev Geng members, carrying 12 sticks of dynamite, were











(19701002 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000)
An explosive device was detonated outside the USAF
Commissary in Izmir. A second bomb consisting of seven
sticks of dynamite was found outside the commissary.
(19701003 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000)
The U.S. CENTO Headquarters in Ankara was bombed. The
bomb shattered virtually all of the glass in the windows on two
sides of the building. There were no injuries.
(19701003 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000)
An explosive device was thrown at the US IS offices in Ankara.
Damage was slight.
(19701006 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb that failed to detonate was found under the vehicle of a
member of the USAF near his Ankara apartment.
(19701 121 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
small dynamite charge, thrown from a moving vehicle, was
detonated outside the fence of the U.S. Embassy in Ankara.
There was slight damage and no injuries.
(19701 127 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000)
Three bombs exploded in the U.S. Officer's Open Mess at a
military installation in Ankara. There was minor damage, but
no injuries were reported.
(19701 127 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000)
Three bombs were detonated at the U.S. Military Annex in










Ankara Molotov cocktails were thrown at the U.S. Military Exchange
Annex. There were no injuries.
Ankara (19701224 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1400)
Two Ankara University students were apprehended while they
were trying to dynamite TUSLOG Detachment 30 in Ankara.
Ankara ( 1 970 1 229 A 1 B06 F000 1002 TO 1 N002 S640 RME P0000)
Two policemen outside the U.S. Embassy in Ankara were
wounded when fired upon by persons in a fast-moving vehicle.
Istanbul The USIS office in Istanbul received a telephone bomb threat.
There were no reports of a device being found or detonating.
Malatya A bomb slightly damaged a USAF truck. No injuries were
reported.
Ankara An official USAF vehicle, parked at the Heccettepe University
Hospital, sustained minor damage when hit by an explosive
device.
23 January Ankara (19710123 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000)
Bombs were found on the grounds of the U.S. Embassy
Ankara.
23 January Ankara (19710123 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000)
Bombs were found on the grounds of the USIS building in
Ankara.
25 January Ankara (19710125 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000)
Two Molotov cocktails were thrown onto the balcony of the
residence of a U.S. Foreign Service officer in Ankara. There
were no injuries and only a little fire damage.
25 January Istanbul Following an explosion heard elsewhere in Istanbul, Turkish
police received a bomb threat against a TUSLOG building.
There were no reports indicating an additional bomb was
located or detonated.
25 January Ankara The USAF NCO Club was bombed. There were no injuries.













The building, as well as two USAF vehicles, sustained minor
damage.
An explosive device was thrown into the TUSLOG motorpool.
Two military vehicles were damaged.
A bomb detonated under the private vehicle of a USAF
sergeant. The car suffered extensive damage, and the windows
in the sergeant's residence were shattered.
(19710208 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
gift-wrapped package containing four sticks of dynamite
exploded inside the apartment of a U.S. soldier, after his son
brought the package into the kitchen. Although damage was
heavy, there were no casualties. (Note - Additional sources
stated the soldier's POV was vandalized the night before.)
(19710210 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb was found and defused in an Ankara building occupied
by three U.S. military families.
(19710210 A 1 B04 F000 1002 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb exploded in a second floor bathroom of the Turkish-
American Association in Ankara, causing considerable damage
to the USIS library. Two people were slightly injured in the
blast.
(19710215 Al B01 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410)
An unknown number of TPLA (THKO) militants kidnapped
James Finlay (Sergeant), an unarmed USAF security policeman
patrolling Balgat Air Station in Ankara. The group made no
ransom demands. Reportedly, Finlay had come upon the
militants as they were attempting to steal arms from the base.
The militants released him unharmed 17 hours after the
kidnapping. According to the THKO Manifesto provided
during the 4 March 197 1 kidnapping of four USAF airmen,
THKO opted not to kill Finlay and released him because "he
was a Negro."
(19710217 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) At
approximately 0100, a bomb was thrown into the lower parking
lot of the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul. Turkish Police were able
to defuse it.
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Bolded dates denote a leftist terrorist attack resulting in the death of one or more U.S. person.
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17 February Istanbul (19710217 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb exploded outside the fence surrounding USAF TUSLOG
Detachment 29 in Istanbul. There was no damage.
19 February Istanbul (19710219 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T03 T12 N002 S640 RME
P0000 A7) A bomb damaged a USA Detachment 33-1
passenger boat (J-boat) in Istanbul.
1 9 February Istanbul ( 1 97 1 02 1 9 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T03 T 1 2 N002 S640 RME




Ankara ( 1 97 1 0220 A 1 B04 F000 1000 TO 1 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
device made of plastic explosives was found on the grounds of
the USIS in Ankara. The fuse had been lit, but the bomb failed
to explode.
Ankara ( 1 97 1 0304 A 1 B0 1 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P 14 1 0) At
0030, five heavily armed THKO members kidnapped four
USAF airmen—Jimmie J. Sexton (Staff Sergeant), James M.
Gholson (Airman First Class), L.J. Heavner (Airman First
Class), and Richard Caraszi (Airman First Class)—stationed
near Ankara. The kidnapping occurred on a road about 10
miles outside Ankara, while the four USAF airmen were being
driven (by a Turkish driver) back to Ankara. At 0200, the
Turkish Government captured one of the kidnappers, Mete
Ertekin, while he was attempting to ditch one of the kidnapping
vehicles in front of the Russian Embassy. He later divulged the
names of his accomplices, and some 30,000 police and soldiers
were mobilized to search for them. At 0830, a note from the
THKO was delivered to TRT and other Turkish news agencies,
demanding the publication of a THKO Manifesto (via TRT)
attacking U.S. imperialism in Turkey, and the payment of
$400,000. THKO gave 36 hours for this to be accomplished.
At 2000, a second ransom note was delivered to newspapers
address to the U.S. Ambassador, demanding the release of
THKO members, publicity for THKO, and it extended the
deadline by 12 hours. In addition, letters from the kidnapped
airmen and one military identification card was provided. At
0400, 5 March, at METU in Ankara, students armed with guns
and dynamite met Turkish security forces. After approximately
five hours, 2,000 students were rounded up. On that same day,
several student protest demonstrations erupted in Ankara at
several colleges. On 7 March, the Turkish press published the
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pictures and names of the suspected kidnappers. Between
2100 - 2200, 8 March, Turkish police stopped at the apartment
building where hostages were held to investigate an unrelated
domestic quarrel. At 2230, hostages ordered to lie flat on floor,
with apartment in darkness; the kidnappers then departed the
apartment. At approximately midnight, 8 March, the four
airmen departed the apartment, took a taxi to TUSLOG
billeting and reported their safe return. On 17 March, Deniz
Gezmi$ and Yusuf Asian were captured Sivas Province while
motorcycling toward the mountains of Malatya. On 22 March,
Turkish security captured Hiiseyin inan also traveling to
Malatya. On 28 April, Turkish Jandarma forces killed Sinan
Cemgil while he was attempting to lead a raid on a U.S. radar
installation in the Malatya mountains. On 6 May 1972, the
three captured were hanged. Each of the three were allowed to
make a last statement of revolutionary beliefs and was
permitted to kick the chair out form under himself.
14 March Istanbul (19710314 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
small bomb was thrown over the back wall of the U.S.
Consulate.
15 March Ankara (19710315 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410)
Members of the TPLA bombed the U.S. Embassy in Ankara.
There was considerable damage, but no injuries.
15 March Ankara Members of the TPLA bombed a branch of the American-
Turkish Trading Bank (as well as offices of the right-wing
Ankara newspaper Diinya). There were no reported injuries.
25 March Izmir (19710325 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
pipe bomb exploded at the rear of the U.S. Consulate in Izmir.
There was no damage or injuries.
28 March Izmir (19710328 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb exploded in the garden of the U.S. Consulate General's
residence in Izmir, causing no injuries or property damage.
2 April Ankara ( 1 97 10402 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T03 N996 S640 RME P0000)
Five bombs with fuses still smoking were discovered outside
the CENTO secretariat building in Ankara; a bomb exploded
outside the CENTO Headquarters in Ankara.
2 April Ankara (19710402 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410)
Four young Turks attacked the U.S. Officers' Open Mess in
Ankara. They threw two black powder bombs into the
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A device exploded in an empty lot beside the Turkish-
American Association Theater. No damages or injuries
resulted. Three unexploded dynamite sticks were found on the
sidewalk adjacent tot he theater.
Ten minutes after the explosion outside of the Turkish-
American Association Theater, an explosion occurred in front
of the Maltese-American facility, breaking windows and
slightly injuring the Turkish guard.
(19710504 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb exploded at the TUSLOG Detachment 30 airmen's billet
in Ankara, shattering all the windows in the building, which
was unoccupied at the time.
(19710517 Al B01 F001 1001 T01 N666 S640 RME P1410)
Members of the TPLF (THKC) kidnapped Ephraim Elrom, the
Israeli Consul General in Istanbul, and demanded the release of
all guerrillas being detained by the Turkish Government. The
Turkish Government rejected the demand, launched a house-to-
house search, and found Elrom's body in an apartment on May
23. He had been shot to death. Police later cornered two of the
kidnappers and in the ensuing gunfight, one was killed and the
other was captured. The captive escaped but was killed by
police on 27 March 1972.
A bomb exploded in a TUSLOG building. The explosion
caused no injuries or damages.
(19711012 Al B04F000I000T01 N002 S640 RME P1410)
Turkish terrorists bombed a car belonging to an employee of
the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul, as well as the vehicle of the
Consulate General. This attack was believed to be related to an
upcoming visit of U.S. Vice President to Turkey.
Turkish police reported that Dev Geng was considering
kidnapping diplomats, including the U.S. Ambassador.
(19720327 Al B01 F003 1000 T06 N396 S640 RME P1410
FB002) In the evening, five armed THKO and THKC members
kidnapped two British (Gordon Banner and Charles Turner)
and one Canadian (John Law) NATO radar technicians from
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the Car§amba installation, near the town of Unye. The hostages
were taken 60 miles away to the village of Kizildere. On 28
March, the Turkish court ordered postponement of three THKO
members' execution. At 0530, 30 March, negotiations began at
Kizildere between Turkish security and the kidnappers. The
Turkish Government demanded an unconditional surrender.
The kidnappers demanded the three THKO militants be
released. When they received no response they requested safe
passage out of Turkey to the Syrian border in exchange for the
hostages. The government refused to bargain with the
kidnappers or allow them safe passage out of the country. At
1610, Turkish security forces reportedly heard explosion in the
house where the kidnappers were held up. Assuming the
hostages were already dead, security forces rushed the house.
Many shots were fired and tear-gas was used. Upon entering
the house, authorities found everyone inside dead, including the
three hostages. According to Turkish security, the hostages
were bound and had been shot at close range. Nine dead
militants were located in the house: THKC militants Mahir
£ayan, Ahmet Atasoy, Ertan Saruhan, Lieutenant Saffet Alp,
Kazim Oziidogru, Selahattin H. Kurt, and Nihat Yilmaz; and
THKO militants Cihan Alptekin and Omer Ayna. The
following day, former Dev Geng President and THKC leader
Ertugrul Kurkcu was found hiding in a barn.
3 May Ankara ( 1 9720503 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000)
Four armed individuals planted bombs at the parking lot of the
U.S. Base Civil Engineering facility in Ankara. The bombs
failed to explode.
3 May Turkey (19720503 Al B03 F000 1000 T5a N640 S640 RME P1410)
Four Turkish students who were members of the TPLA
hijacked a Turkish airliner to Sofia, Bulgaria, where they
surrendered to Bulgarian authorities. The hijackers had
demanded the release of three prisoners in Turkey. The crew
and passengers were released on 4 May.
17 June Ankara A bomb placed at the U.S. Base Civil Engineers building failed
to detonate.
17 June Ankara Members of Dev Geng held a USAF policeman and a Turkish
watchman at gunpoint while they planted bombs at the
TUSLOG Detachment 30. The fuses on the bombs failed to
detonate.
22 October Istanbul (19721022 Al B03 F000 1000 T5a N640 S640 RME P1410)
131
Four men hijacked a THY B-707 (from Istanbul to Ankara) to
Bulgaria and threatened to blow up the plane and its 69
passengers if Turkey did not release 12 terrorist prisoners,
restore the right of workers to strike, and reorganize the
universities. The four hijackers surrendered to Bulgarian
authorities on 23 October, after Turkey refused their demands.
The hijackers were identified as university students Haji
Yiizdemir, Ahmed Maden, Yiidzel Zoskurt, and Dervis
Elmadjogulu. The pilot and one passenger were reported
wounded in the hijacking.
14 November Ankara The U.S. Information Center in Ankara was sabotaged.
1973
No Incidents Listed in Sources for 1973.
1974
30 October Ankara (19741030 Al B06 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000)
The residence of a U.S. serviceman assigned to the U.S.
Defense Attache's Office (DAO) in Ankara was the target of
automatic weapon fire. Thirteen bullets hit the front of the
residence and at least two entered the residence. No injuries
were sustained.
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10 March Istanbul (19750310 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410) A
packet of explosives was hurled into the garden of the U.S.
Consulate, only partially exploding. No damage was caused.
The Mahir £ayan Suicide Group claimed responsibility. The
bombing was reportedly in protest to the U.S. Secretary of
State's visit to Turkey.
22 May Istanbul (19750522 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410) A
bomb exploded, heavily damaging a USA truck on an Istanbul
street. No injuries were reported.
22 May Istanbul (19750522 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410)
An explosion at a joint U.S.-Turkish supply depot caused no
injuries or property damage. A previously unknown Marxist
group claimed responsibility.
24 September Istanbul A bomb caused minor damage to the Atakoy Hotel, which was




1 1 October Ankara
(19750928 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N230 S640 RME P0000) A
stick of dynamite was thrown into the garden of the Ankara
residence of the Spanish Ambassador.
(1975101 1 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb was thrown from a passing car into the parking lot of an
Ankara building occupied by the U.S. Base Civil Engineer
Detachment.
1 1 October Ankara ( 1975 101 1 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000)
An explosion occurred at the Ankara Officers' Club, occupied
by U.S. servicemen. No injuries were reported, although there
was property damage.
28 October Ankara At approximately 23 15, a bomb exploded on the rear patio of
the U.S. Officers' Club. There was damage to the building, but
no injuries.
28 October Ankara Fifteen minutes after an explosion at the U.S. Officers' Club,
another bomb exploded at the building housing TUSLOG
Detachment 30.
29 October Istanbul ( 1 975 1 029 A 1 B04 F000 1000 TO 1 N200 S640 RME P0000) A
dynamite bomb exploded in the parking lot of the British
Consulate. There were no injuries.
29 October Istanbul ( 1 975 1 029 A 1 B04 F000 1000 TO 1 N630 S640 RME P0000)
Two Molotov cocktails exploded in the Istanbul garden of the
Iranian Consulate. There were no injuries reported. Police
speculated the attack was to protest the visit of the Shah of Iran.
29 October Istanbul ( 1975 1029 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N630 S640 RME P0000) A
dynamite bomb exploded in front of the Turkish-Iranian
Friendship Society in Istanbul. Police speculated the attack
was to protest the visit of the Shah of Iran.
1976
28 January Ankara (19760128 Al B04 F000 1001 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb exploded under an unoccupied U.S. GOV in Ankara,
causing extensive property damage. The truck was parked in
front of a U.S. military transient building, Merhaba Palas. The






Ortakoy (19760319 Al B02 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P 14 10) A
fire that resulted from arson destroyed a building at the Ortakoy
U.S. Army installation. A Turkish terrorist group was believed
responsible. There were no injuries.
Istanbul ( 1 9760327 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000)
Two small bombs exploded in front of an apartment building
housing U.S. military personnel and dependents. No injuries
were reported.
Istanbul A bomb exploded at an Italian bank building. There were no
reported injuries.
Ankara ( 1 976033 1 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P0000) A




Ankara ( 1 976033 1 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T5b N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb exploded outside the entrance to the Pan American
Airlines office in Ankara causing extensive property damage
but no injuries. No group claimed credit for the bombing.
Istanbul ( 1 9760424 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T06 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb exploded at the entrance to the American Language and
Trade Institute in Istanbul, causing some damage. The facility
was a private girls' school funded by the American Board
Mission and the YWCA.
24 April Istanbul ( 1 9760424 A 1 B04 F000 1004 T5b N630 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb exploded at the Iran Air ticket office in Istanbul, causing
extensive damage and injuring four people. The bombing was





Izmir A car belonging to a civilian employee at TUSLOG
Detachment 133 was firebombed.
Izmir ( 1 9760506 A 1 B04 F000 1000 TO 1 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
pipe bomb exploded in the yard of the U.S. Consul General's
residence, causing minor property damage.
Izmir ( 1 9760506 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000)
The automobile of a DoD instructor at a USAF facility in Izmir
was set on fire and destroyed.
Istanbul ( 1 97608 1 1 A 1 B02 F004 1020 T5c N666 S640 RME P0 1 1 0)
Two members of the "Dr. George Habash Organization" [PLO]
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threw a hand grenade and sprayed submachine gun fire at a line
of passengers waiting to board an Israeli El Al Airlines B-707
jetliner (Flight 582) at Istanbul's Yesjlkoy Airport. Four
persons were killed in the explosion: one American (Harold W.
Rosenthal, staff aid to U.S. Senator Jacob Javits), one Japanese,
and two Israelis. Twenty additional persons were injured.
After the hand grenades were detonated and submachine guns
were fired at the passengers, there was a scattering of people
and the terrorists took a Turkish policewoman hostage. After
an hour-long standoff, the terrorists surrendered. A Turkish
criminal court sentenced the two guerrillas to life in prison.
The attack was regarded as revenge for the Israeli rescue raid





A bomb damaged a U.S. military vehicle.
(19761016 Al B04 F000 1000 T5b N002 S640 RME P0000) A
cleaning woman found a bomb on top of an air conditioner of
the Pan Am office in Izmir.
6 November Istanbul (19761 106 A 1 B04 F000 1001 T5b N666 S640 RME P1410) A
bomb exploded in Istanbul at the El Al Airlines office. One
person was injured. A group professing to be followers of the
late Mahir £ayan.
6 November Istanbul (19761 106 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T02 N210 S640 RME P1410) A
bomb exploded in Istanbul at the offices of Dutch a business
firm. A group professing to be followers of the late Mahir
£ayan claimed responsibility.
6 November Istanbul ( 1 976 1 1 06 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T02 N630 S640 RME P 14 1 0) A
bomb exploded in Istanbul at an Iranian business firm. A group
professing to be followers of the late Mahir £ayan claimed
responsibility.
6 November Istanbul (19761 106 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T01 N651 S640 RME P1410) A
bomb exploded at the Egyptian Consulate. A group professing
to be followers of the late Mahir £ayan claimed responsibility.
13 December Istanbul A terrorist, suspected of being with the Abu Nidal "Black June"
group, attempted an unspecified action against the Syrian
Consulate in Istanbul. Two Palestinian students were arrested.
1977
13 February Izmir A 17-year-old police cadet, Asian Minta§, hijacked a THY DC-
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1 8 February Izmir
9 with 5 1 passengers destined from Izmir to Istanbul directed it
be flown to Yugoslavia. The pilot and a stewardess were
slightly wounded. A passenger sneaked up and disarmed the
hijacker as the plane was landing. Police later arrested Mintas.
(19770218 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410) A
bomb exploded in the early morning hours at the USIS library
in Izmir. The detonation caused moderate property damage,
but no casualties. Several other bombings occurred in widely
scattered areas of Izmir the same night, all apparently against
Turkish targets. Several Turkish youths, believed to be
members of the Acilciler faction of the TPLP, were arrested in
late May and charged for the bombing and a 29 March attack
on the U.S. Consul General's residence.
6 March Ankara (19770306 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N645 S640 RME PI 400) A
bomb exploded outside the Iraqi Embassy in Ankara, causing
only minor damage to the building. According to a leaflet left





Diyarbakir (19770319 Al B03 F000 1000 T5a N640 S640 RME P1410)
Two Turkish youths armed with pistols hijacked a THY B-727
from Diyarbakir to Ankara. They were armed with pistols,
demanded $300,000 in Turkish lira, and ordered the plane
flown to Lebanon. The hijackers demanded a visit to the
nearest Palestinian refugee camp. Shortly after the aircraft's
arrival in Beirut all 174 passengers, including two Americans,
were released unharmed. The hijackers surrendered later the
same day and were taken into custody by Lebanese authorities.
Izmir (19770329 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410)
Unknown persons fired an automatic weapon from a passing
car at the U.S. Consul General's residence in Izmir. The attack
caused considerable property damage but no injuries. The
Consul General and his wife were in the residence at the time of
the attack. An unexploded pipe bomb was found in the street
behind the house. Turkish police viewed the attack as part of a
Turkish terrorist campaign to commemorate the 30 March
anniversary of the death of terrorist Mahir Cayan. Several
Turkish youths, believed to be members of the Acilciler faction
of the TPLP, were arrested in late May and charged with
responsibility for this attack and the 18 February bombing of
the USIS library.
Ankara About 50 youths threw several dozen rocks at the USIS
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Izmir A pipe bomb destroyed a car owned by a DoD school teacher.
The first explosion damaged another American-owned car.
Istanbul (19770519 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
small bomb exploded in the U.S. Consulate compound. The
explosion caused only slight property damage. The persons
responsible were not known.
Istanbul (19770529 Al B04 F005 142 T5c N640 S640 RME PI 221) A
powerful bomb exploded in Istanbul's Yesilkoy airport, killing
five persons and injuring 42. One of the injured was a U.S.
citizen. Damage to the building was extensive. A similar
bomb exploded the same afternoon in the Sirkeci train station,
causing one death, approximately 10 injuries, and heavily
damaging the terminal building. In an anonymous telephone
call to the French press agency in Athens, a group calling itself
the "28 May Armenian Organization" claimed responsibility for
the bombings.
Istanbul (19770617 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N210 S640 RME PI 920) A
small bomb was thrown into the compound of the Netherlands
Consulate General. The incident occurred during a
demonstration protesting Dutch policy toward the South
Moluccans. Several windows were shattered, but no one was
injured.
Turkey (19770700 Al B04 F000 1000 T07 N994 S640 RME P0000
A4) An explosion along the Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline stopped
the pipeline from functioning for two weeks. As a result of
tests and analyses carried out by a firm in Germany on pieces of
metal collected immediately after the explosion, it was
determined that the explosion was an act of sabotage.
Istanbul ( 1 9770702 A 1 B02 F000 1000 TO 1 N200 S640 RME P0000)
Five unidentified men forced their way into the grounds of the
French Ambassador's summer residence in Istanbul. They cut
telephone lines linking the gate to the residence and fired at the
gate guard. The men fled when the guard returned their fire.
Adana (19770729 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb exploded in back of the U.S. Consulate, causing minor
damage but no injuries. A second undetonated bomb was
discovered on the Consulate grounds.
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2 August Izmir (19770802 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000)
The U.S. Consul General's residence in Izmir was raked with
automatic weapon's fire during the early morning hours. There
were no injuries. (Note - The Department of State reported the
left-wing group Acilciler, a faction of the TPLP/F was
responsible for the attack.)
6 August Istanbul (19770806 Al B02 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1410)
The Intercontinental Hotel in Istanbul, owned by Pan American
Airlines, was raked with automatic weapon fire. Several
windows were broken, but no one was injured in the attack.
Twenty-three members of the Acilciler faction of the TPLP-F
were arrested in late August for involvement in this incident as
well as numerous bombings and several bank robberies.
10 September Adana (19770910 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb exploded in front of the Turkish-American Association,
shattering all the glass on the building's ground floor. No






Istanbul ( 1 977 1 009 A 1 B02 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb was thrown into the residences of U.S. Army personnel
in Yesilyurt. Three other USA personnel occupied the
dwelling, located in the "American House" apartment complex.
The bomb, composed of plastic explosive material, did not
detonate, but a small fire started, causing minor damage. There
were no injuries. No reason for the attack was known.
Izmir The NATO Hunting and Riding Club in the Bayrakli district of
Izmir was fired upon and bombed.
Antalya ( 1 977 1 020 A 1 B02 F000 1000 TO 1 N255 S640 RME P0000)
An explosive device was thrown at the West German
Consulate. Following this incident, the office was set on fire.
Furniture was damaged but no injuries were reported.
Turkey (19771025 Al B02 F000 1003 T01 N255 S640 RME P1920)
Two bombs thrown at the West German Cultural Center caused
several injuries and extensive damage. The explosions
occurred as about 40 young people, protesting the deaths of
three German terrorist leaders, gathered in front of the center.
Two Turkish bus drivers, waiting to take school children home,
were injured.
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10 December Istanbul (19771210 Al B02 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000)
Two bombs were thrown at buildings used to house U.S.
military personnel. No injuries were reported. (Note - DOS
further details the apartments as the Pansion House and the
American House.)









(19780108 Al B02 F000 1000 T07 N640 S640 RME PI 220
A4) An Armenian revolutionary group claimed responsibility
for several attacks which it said took place in Izmit, Turkey.
An anonymous caller described the attacks as explosions at an
oil refinery and attacks at bus and train stations. The Turkish
Under Secretary in Ankara denied any attempted sabotage, but
the group which called itself "May 28 Group, Branch of the
Central Organization of Justicers of Armenian Genocide,"
claimed responsibility for several attacks on Turkish Consulates
motivated by the Turkish army's "massacres" of whole
populations in 1915.
A USAF military truck was bombed.
(19780122 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000)
An explosive device was thrown into the U.S. Cultural Center
in Ankara. According to a TRT correspondent, the windows of
the center were broken but no one was injured.
At approximately 2145, the building housing the Turkish-
American Association—located near the Deputy Chief of
Mission's (DCM) residence—was bombed but received only
minor damage.
(19780125 Al B02 F000 1003 T03 N002 S640 RME P 14 10) A
van belonging to the U.S. military was fired upon with
automatic weapons as it was being driven on a mountain road
near Izmir. An American enlisted man and two Turkish
nationals, the van driver, and a cook from the installation, were
attacked by several men who searched the victims and the van
before returning to their car, firing more shots and fleeing. The
American and the van driver were hospitalized; the cook
received minor injuries. A Turkish official advised that the
"Begumcans Cell" was responsible for the incident and was
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known to plan acts of anti-American terrorism.
25 January Izmir A USAF airman's vehicle was stoned as he tried to leave a
vehicle inspection station. The airman was in uniform at the
time of the attack, and, although his vehicle was damaged, he
was not injured.
27 January Ankara At approximately 2200, the TUSLOG Base Civil Engineering
building was raked with 30 rounds from individuals in a
moving car. The building, which is located about 2 miles from
Ankara Air Station, also contained Boeing services and the
base maintenance contractor. Damage was limited to vehicles
parked in front of the building. The neighborhood where this
attack occurred had witnessed a number of bombings and
rakings of bus stops. In 1977, members of the left-wing
terrorist group Acilciler were arrested in the neighborhood.
1 6 February Ankara ( 1 97802 1 6 A 1 B04 F000 1000 TO 1 N002 S640 RME P0000)
An explosion at the USIS building resulted in broken glass. No
injuries were reported. The incident took place following an
unauthorized demonstration by local left-wing and right-wing
groups.









A bomb was defused in front of the Turkish-American
Association building.
A vehicle belonging to a USAF airman was bombed.
Shots were fired at a USAF vehicle.
Shots were fired at the USSR Trade Mission. It is believed that
the intended target was the U.S. Embassy.
( 197803 12 Al B04 F000 1000 T06 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb exploded under a car belonging to the principal of the
Tarsus American School in Adana. The fender of the car was
blown off and windows of nearby buildings shattered. There
were no injuries. A typewritten letter, signed "TIP," was
received the same day saying that other explosives had been
placed about the campus of the school. A Turkish police search
did not disclose any additional devices.
A vehicle belonging to a USAF civilian employee was bombed.
A USAF vehicle was set on fire.
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5 May Ankara (19780505 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb exploded between two buildings in Ankara. One of the
buildings housed the USICA. No injuries resulted and property
damage was limited to broken windows. No person or group
claimed responsibility.
12 May Istanbul (19780512 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N220 S640 RME PI 400) A
bomb, apparently set by leftists protesting French involvement
in Western Sahara, exploded in front of the French Consulate,
shattering windows and wrecking the entrance to the building.
There were no injuries reported. An anonymous telephone
caller told United Press International, "We revolutionaries,
protesting the latest massacres of French imperialism against
the Polisario Liberation Front guerrillas, have bombed the
French Consulate."
30 May Adana (19780530 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000)
Several rounds were fired at the U.S. Consulate. Local police
chased but lost the perpetrators in traffic. Five bullet holes
were found between two windows, one of which displayed a
sign for the U.S. Consulate. There were no injuries.
31 May Ankara A hotel housing USAF families was bombed. Damage was
light and there were not injuries.
15 June Ankara A U.S. DOS official was robbed. It was later determined that
the incident might have been an attempted kidnapping.
15 June Adana At approximately 2230, the personal vehicle of a USAF airman
was bombed. The vehicle was parked in front of the Stadium
apartments, about one block from the Turkish-American
Association building.
14 July Atas The Mobile Oil refinery was bombed. Damage was light with
no injuries.
21 July Atas Terrorists attempted to bomb the Mobile Oil refinery, but the
bomb failed to detonate.
30 September Istanbul (19780930 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N651 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb was thrown at the Egyptian Consulate, causing slight
damage. The attackers had approached using a boat.
30 September Istanbul (19780930 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb detonated near the U.S. Consulate. There was no damage
to the building and no injuries were reported; however, there
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(19781001 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N666 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb was thrown at the Israeli Consulate, causing no injuries.
A bomb exploded near the U.S. Consulate. Damage was
minimal with no injuries.
The gate of a USAF depot facility was raked. That same day,
eight shotguns were stolen from the NATO Rod and Gun Club.
(19781020 Al B04 F000 1000 T5b N002 S640 RME P0000)
An explosion at the offices of Pan American Airlines in
Istanbul caused property damage. No injuries were reported
and no group claimed responsibility.
(19781026 Al B02 F000 1001 T01 N002 S640 RME P 14 10) A
mob of left-wing Turkish youths attacked a van carrying U.S.
Cultural Attache John F. Ritchotte, ordered him and two aides
out and then burned the vehicle at a busy Istanbul intersection.
No one was hurt but one of the attackers was wounded in a
brief exchange of gunfire with police. An anonymous caller
told a news agency that the leftists were protesting the
reopening of U.S. bases in Turkey. (Note - Department of
State reported this incident took place on 25 October.)
Three members of Dev Geng confessed to entering an
American military officer's apartment for the purpose of
obtaining funds for their organization.
An armed individual (15 years old) attempted to hijack a USAF
school bus with NATO plates. The bus was carrying
elementary school children of American personnel of the Izmir
NATO Headquarters. The individual, who was trying to seek
the release of a group of Turkish anarchists who had pirated a




(19781226 Al B02 F000 1000 T06 N002 S640 RME P0000)
The car of an American in Izmir was firebombed, causing no
injuries.
(19781226 Al B02 F000 1000 T06 N002 S640 RME P0000)














Ankara (19790129 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N200 S640 RME POOOO) At
approximately 2015, a high-powered explosive device was
thrown into the Turkish-British Cultural Center in Ankara,
causing damage to the building but injuring no one.
Istanbul An explosive device was thrown at a U.S. military vehicle.
Damage was minimal and there were no injuries.
Izmir ( 1 97902 1 9 A 1 B02 F000 1000 T5b N002 S640 RME POOOO) A
bomb, thrown from a passing car, exploded outside the Pan Am
office in Izmir. The explosion broke windows in the office and
in various offices in the hotel located above the offices. No
injuries were reported and no group has claimed responsibility.
Izmir Youths attempted to burn the vehicle of a USAF airman.
Izmir ( 1 9790220 A 1 B02 F000 1000 T03 N396 S640 RME POOOO)
The car of a U.S. serviceman attached to the southeast NATO
Headquarters in Izmir was firebombed. (Note - Some sources
report that shots were also fired at the vehicle.)
Izmir At approximately 2200, Turkish police defused a bomb found
under a camper belonging to a U.S. serviceman.
Izmir At approximately 2315, a bomb exploded near a U.S.
sergeant's private vehicle. The explosion broke windows of a
nearby U.S. housing unit.
Izmir A bomb exploded in a parking lot, breaking 40 percent of the
250 windows in an adjacent U.S. housing unit.
Istanbul A Cypriot student, was shot to death in the Aksaray section of
Istanbul. The person firing the shot kidnapped his colleague,
and another group beat another of his friends. The secretariat-
general of the National Unity Party blamed the incident on
fighting between extremist groups.
Ankara ( 1 9790309 A 1 B02 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME POOOO)
An explosive device was thrown onto the patio of the Ankara
Officers' Mess. Gunfire was heard and shell casings were
found across the street. There were no injuries and damage was
minimal.
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1 1 March Izmir One jug of gasoline was placed in front and two jugs were
placed behind a building housing the offices of the USA
detachment and the Turkish Area Exchange. The jugs were not
detonated.
1 1 March Izmir (1979031 1 Al B02 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
Molotov cocktail was thrown against the front of the American
APO (military post office) in Izmir. A fire resulted, damaging
the wooden front doors; no injuries were reported. An
American high school located in the same building was the
target of rock throwing by unknown persons. No injuries were
reported. (Note - Other sources report that about 200 Turkish
nationals were present during these incident, chanting anti-U.S.
slogans and carrying signs.)
12 March Tarsus At approximately 2015, automatic weapons fire was directed at
the first- and second-story windows of the director's residence
at the Tarsus American College. Three British teachers and a
Turkish business manager of the school also were living in the
building. Although the building was occupied at the time of the
attack, there were no injuries.
12 March Izmir A stick of dynamite was found in front of a U.S. military
bowling alley. The Turkish police bomb squad removed the
dynamite.
25 March Izmir At approximately 0530, USAF officer's POV was set on fire.
Though there were no injuries, the car sustained extensive
damage. A 12-inch-wide sign, which was found 40 feet from
the car, read: "Go home Yankee" and included the words "Che
He Mahir [Che with Mahir]." Police believed the two words
refer to Che Guevera and Mahir Cayan, and that a faction of
Dev Geng was responsible for the attack. Police killed Cayan
on March 30, 1972.
26 March Ankara (19790326 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N666 S640 RME P1410)
An explosive device was thrown at the Israeli Embassy.
Turkish Revolutionaries claimed responsibility, protesting the









(19790327 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb exploded at the entrance of a USICA Associated Cultural
Center. No injuries were reported, although there were over
100 persons present. Damage was limited. No group claimed
responsibility. (Note - Additional reports of this incident state
there were about 180 people in the building watching a movie
during the incident.)
At approximately 2140, unknown assailants threw a bomb into
the parking lot of the U.S. Consulate, which resulted in minor
damage but no injuries.
A food can containing a bomb was found in a planter on the
sixth floor of a building approximately 30 yards from the U.S.
Base Exchange (BX)/Commissary and other U.S. facilities.
The sixth floor of the building housed the offices of Pet-Kim, a
state petrochemical enterprise. On the third floor of the
building are several U.S. military offices. Turkish Police
deactivated the bomb, comprised of four sticks of dynamite
with a fuse and battery.
(19790329 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000)
The POV of a U.S. Consulate official was hit by five gun shots
and a gasoline bomb in the garage of his residence in Istanbul.
Windows were broken and fire caused extensive damage but
there were no injuries reported. No group claimed
responsibility. (Note - Additional reporting indicates that an
eyewitness saw a man running from the area after the attack.
Though no group claimed credit for the attack, it was thought
this incident was connected to either the signing of the
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Accord, or in observance of the March
30, 1972, death of left-wing terrorist Mahir £ayan.)
At about 0615, a USA soldier's wife awoke to see a sign draped
over a wall located across from their residence. The sign read:
"Yankee Go Home," and had other writing in Turkish. When
the soldier left for work (0715), he took the sign with him to
show his supervisor. An hour later, the soldier's wife noticed a
package in her driveway containing what appeared to be a
bomb, which TNP later disarmed. The bomb consisted of a
low-grade commercial dynamite that had been wrapped in
paper and masking tape. A lit cigarette had apparently been
attached to the fuse, but burned out before it could ignite the
device. In inspecting the sign, the other wording read: "people
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30 March
of Kizildere city do not die," and "THKP-C cannot be defeated,
Damn American Imperialism."
Ankara ( 1 9790330 A 1 B04 F000 1000 TO 1 N002 S640 RME P0000)
Two explosive devices were left on the grounds of the U.S.
Chancery in Ankara. One exploded near a fence; the second
was found nearby but did not explode. No injuries were
reported and damage was minimal to the ground near the fence.
No group claimed responsibility. (Note - Additional sources
reported the incident was to commemorate the death of leftist
terrorist Mahir £ayan or to protest the Egypt-Israel Peace
Accord. In addition, approximately 15 explosion were set off
around Ankara on the same day, with no additional U.S.
facilities or persons affected.)
31 March Izmir At approximately 2200, a USAF officer's POV parked in front
of his house was doused with gasoline and set on fire. A
banner mentioning Kizildere and Dev Geng was placed behind
the officer's vehicle.
31 March Izmir At approximately 0255, a USAF sergeant and his family were
awakened by gunfire. The sergeant looked out the window to
see his car on fire. A total of seven shots were fired; six
entered the sergeant's apartment. The seventh shot entered an
apartment above, owned by a Turkish national. It appeared the
sergeant's car was doused with gasoline and then set on fire. It
was believed Dev Geng was responsible for the attack.
1 April Istanbul (19790401 Al B04 F000 1000 T5b N666 S640 RME P0140) A
bombing attempt was made on the Israeli El Al office in
Istanbul.
8 April Ankara ( 1 9790408 A 1 B04 F000 1000 TO 1 N666 S640 RME P0 1 40) A
bomb exploded in the Israeli Consulate in Ankara. There were
no injuries.
12 April Izmir (19790413 Al B06 F001 1001 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410) At
approximately 1715, two USAF NCOs were walking home
along Mustafa Enver Boulevard, an area of the city with a large
number of U.S. military support facilities for NATO and
apartments occupied by Americans. Two unidentified gunmen
attacked the two airmen, Edward Claypool (Master Sergeant)
and Geoffrey Vail (Staff Sergeant). Claypool was killed and
VAIL was seriously wounded. According to eyewitnesses, the
assassins were parked along Mustafa Enver Boulevard, and, as
the two airmen walked past the militants' car, the gunmen got
out, and one of them shot the two men at pointblank range
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using a paratroop assault-style AK-47 rifle firing 7.62 rounds.
The other terrorist may have been armed with a handgun.
Before returning to their car, one of the terrorist went up to
Claypool and attempted to fire another shot into his body, but
the gun jammed. The gunman then walked toward his vehicle
in a slow and casual manner despite the fact that at that hour of
the day, traffic was at its heaviest, and the streets were filled
with people. The gunmen then drove off at normal speed.
Police later found the vehicle, which was stolen, in a scrap
metal dump near a major highway. The THKP-C Eylem Birligi
(Action Unit) of the claimed credit for the attack. Though these
Americans had traveled the same route every day since 17
March 1979, it was believed they were targets of opportunity
because they were in uniform and in an area with a large U.S.
presence rather than being targets specifically singled out for
attack in advance.
14 April Diyarbakir (19790414 Al B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb detonated on a street in Diyarbakir, damaging a U.S.
General Electric employee's POV. There was extensive
damage to the car and street; no one claimed responsibility.
28 April Adana (19790428 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000)
An explosion outside the apartment building where the U.S.
Consul General resides resulted in broken windows. There
were no injuries reported. Authorities believed the blast was in
protest against the presence of the U.S. Consulate. No group
claimed responsibility. (Note - Some reports state that several
members of the prominent Sabanci family lived in the same
building. Turkish Police believed that the bomb was aimed at
both the Sabanci Corporation and the U.S. Consul General.
1 May
1 May
Adana A bomb slightly damaged the home of the U.S. Consul General.
Kayri (19790500 Al B04 F000 1000 T07 N645 S640 RME PI 433
A4) The Turkish-Iraqi pipeline near Kayri village was bombed
by Kurdish militants who, when captured in early 1982 claimed
that they been sent by the Kurdish National Unity Party leader
Jalal Talabani in Syria. The pipeline carried Iraqi oil from
Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Iskenderun.
4 May Ankara ( 1 9790504 A 1 B02 F000 1000 TO 1 N002 S640 RME P0000)
Unknown individuals burned two cars in Ankara. The cars
were parked outside the residence of U.S. Embassy personnel.
5 May Tarsus (19790505 Al B02 F000 1000 T06 N002 S640 RME P0000)
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Unidentified persons fired shots into the home of the director of
Tarsus American College in Tarsus. No injuries resulted.
6 May Istanbul ( 1 9790506 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T5c N640 S640 RME P0000)
Two explosive devices were detonated at the international
terminal of the Yesilkoy Airport in Istanbul. There was
extensive damage but no injuries were reported.
11 May Istanbul (19790512 Al B06 F001 1001 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410) At
approximately 0740, about 21 USA enlisted personnel were
waiting for a bus in front of the Atakoy Hotel, a temporary
facility for U.S. military personnel. The bus made regularly
scheduled runs between the hotel and £akmakh military base.
At this time, two masked gunmen, hiding in thick underbrush
across a four-lane highway opposite the hotel, appeared and
opened fire with high-powered rifles. The gunmen killed
Thomas Mosley (Private First Class) and wounded another
soldier. Other soldiers outside took cover in a nearby drainage
ditch, avoiding Mosely's fate. The gunmen fled in a waiting
taxis occupied by two other terrorists. The taxi, which was
stolen, was found 35 miles from the hotel abandoned in a
wooded area. The assistant manager of the hotel had
complained to Turkish authorities about the lack of protection
for the soldiers prior to Claypool's death (12 April 1979) and
again following it. After the second assassination, Turkish
Army regulars began patrolling the hotel entrance. One
eyewitness advised police that he had observed the same
vehicle used by the gunmen three days earlier near the site of
the incident during the early morning. The MLSPB, a faction
of the THKP-C, claimed responsibility for the attack. The U.S.
servicemen were attached to a NATO munitions supply depot
jointly run by Turkish and American military in (^akmakh. A
telephone caller said the victims were mercenaries serving at
U.S. installations in Turkey. Hours before the attack, TNP had
raided a MLSPB safe house. Documents recovered showed the
group was planning a number of attacks on U.S. targets, such as
the U.S. Consulate and TUSLOG Detachment 7 (Corlu Army
Installation). TNP speculated this raid may have prompted the
attack on the hotel. On 6 June, the Istanbul Security
Department said 13 extremists were captured in connection
with the attack and were also suspected of other terrorist acts.
14 May Istanbul A plan to kidnap the Israeli and U.S. consuls in Istanbul was
discovered. Two terrorists were killed and two were arrested.
15 May Ankara Shots were fired at the Israeli Embassy.
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17 May Izmir A USAF serviceman's POV was flrebombed outside his
residence.
28 May Ankara (19790528 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000)
An explosion occurred near a building housing the offices of
the USICA. Damage was minor. No injuries were reported.
29 May Ankara ( 1 9790529 A 1 B04 F000 1000 TO 1 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
pipe bomb exploded at the Turkish-American Association. No
injuries were reported and damage was minor.
29 May Iskenderun (19790529 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000)
An explosive device was thrown over the wall of a U.S.
military compound in Iskenderun. There was minor damage;
no injuries were reported. No group claimed responsibility.
2 June Adana (19790602 Al B06 F001 1000 T06 N002 S640 RME P0000)
Two THKP-C gunmen shot and killed a U.S. schoolteacher
—
David Goodman—in the southeastern Turkish town of Adana.
The victim had been running a private English language school
for two years. The two gunmen shot Goodman to death as he
opened his apartment in response to a knock. THKP-C claimed
Goodman was a "wealthy imperialist."
3 June Tarsus ( 1 9790603 A 1 B02 F000 1000 T06 N002 S640 RME P0000)
The off-campus residence of a U.S. faculty member of the
Tarsus American College was raked in Tarsus. No injuries
were reported. (Note - Other report attributed this attack to the
THKP-C.)
13 July Ankara (19790713 Al B05 F003 1001 T01 N651 S640 RME P0122)
Four Arabic-speaking men leaped from a car and started firing;
their first victims—two Turkish guards at the Egyptian
Embassy in Ankara—were killed instantly. The terrorists
jumped over the Embassy's fence and headed for its entrance,
spraying automatic rifle fire and tossing a grenade as they ran.
After a sharp gun battle with police in which one policeman
was wounded, the four attackers had the Embassy with about
20 hostages, including Ambassador Ahmed Kamal Olama,
under their control. The gunmen identified themselves as the
"Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution." They threatened to
blow up the Embassy and kill their hostages unless several
demands were met: they wanted Turkey to recognize the
"Palestinian state," cut diplomatic relations with the
government of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and give them
safe conduct out of the country. They also called for the release
of two colleagues from Egyptian jails. The terrorists freed one
149
14 July
hostage, Olama's Turkish secretary; the next morning two
hostages escaped from a ground-floor window; two other men
jumped from a window on the third floor (one, landing on his
head, died later in the hospital). After an all-night negotiating
session with Turkish officials, the guerrillas agreed to
unconditionally surrender. The four Palestinians, Mervan
Shebanu, 24, Hussein Suleiman Abdullah, 23, Mohammed
Abourezat, 19, and Mustafe Besheishi, 19, were sentenced to
death on 25 October 1979, by a martial law court in Ankara.
An appeals court ruled that their offense was not covered by
martial law and sent the case back for retrial in October 1980.
In December 1980, the four Palestinians were sentenced to die;
a Turkish civilian who aided them was sentenced to 21 years in
prison.
Ankara Weapons fire was directed at a housing facility for U.S.
military personnel. The building, located between the U.S. and
Egyptian Embassies, sustained minor damage.
22 July Ankara Bombs exploded in the Kauakaklidere section of Ankara, close
to the residence of the U.S. DCM. Two other bombs exploded
downtown in the Kizilay area of Ankara. It is believed that the
apparent targets were offices of the Ford Tractor Company,
IBM, and the agents for General Motors. Damage was very
light.
24 July Istanbul (19790724 Al B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1410) A
bomb exploded in the Istanbul offices of the U.S. Wells Fargo
Bank, causing damage but no injuries. Dev Sol claimed credit.
The bank had been involved in a controversial loan of $125
million to Turkey, secured against various Turkish agricultural
exports. The government was forced to repeal the agreement
following accusations that it was mortgaging the country's
products. (Note - Additional reports state that seven to eight
men entered the office and demanded petty cash and copies of
documents between Wells Fargo and the Turkish Government.
They then locked the employees in an office and detonated the
bomb in the director's office.)
24 July Ankara A bomb exploded in the offices of the American Board, which
is a publishing house run by the U.S.-based Quaker Church.
The assailants, who wore masks, entered the fourth floor of the
building and put the employees (4-5 Americans and 1 1 Turks)
in a room. After placing the hostages in another section of the
building , the terrorists detonated a bomb, causing minor







(19790828 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N630 S640 RME P0000)
Two unidentified persons threw a bomb at the Iranian
Consulate. Security forces defused it before it could explode.
(19790903 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N620 S640 RME P0000) At
approximately 1940, explosives were thrown at the Libyan
Embassy in Ankara. The windows of the embassy and
surrounding buildings were shattered during the explosion.
A U.S. Consular official was slightly wounded when he was




(19791 125 Al B07 F000 1000 T10 N328 S640 RME P1410)
Mehmet Ali Agca, a Turkish right-wing terrorist, escaped from
prison and threatened to assassinate Pope John Paul during his
three-day visit to Turkey. Agca was accused of murdering
journalist Abdi ipekci. Agca said the attack would be
"revenge" for the attack in Mecca.
(19791214 Al B06 F004 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1413) At
approximately 1545, a blue Turkish vehicle stopped near a U.S.
military bus stop in Florya, a section of Istanbul. Several
Turkish men exited the car and took positions one block in
either direction of the bus stop. Another care with three
Turkish men and a female driver was parked 30 yards away.
The three Turks in the car exited and hid behind a nearby shed.
After two hours, a USA minibus approached the bus stop. As
the driver got out of the van to open the baggage compartment,
the two terrorists hiding behind the shed, approached the
minibus. The third terrorist positioned himself on top of the
shed armed with an AK-47. One of the terrorist ordered the
four U.S. persons—James E. Smith (Sergeant), and civilian
contractors Elmer Cooper, Robert French, and Jim Clark—off
the bus. The Turkish bus driver and Smith ran for cover. The
terrorist on top of the shed fired at Smith and missed. Smith
was also chased by one of the other terrorists who shot him in
the back and then walked up and shot him several more times at
close range. At this time, a retired Turkish Army colonel who
lived in a nearby apartment heard and saw what was happening.
He went out on his balcony with a shotgun and fired at and
wounded the terrorist who killed Smith. At that instant, the
remaining three U.S. citizens were shot and killed in their
attempt to escape. The three terrorists immediately departed in
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the care driven by the female—later identified as Nalan
Guarates—and also believed to be the leader of the operation.
The MLSPB claimed credit for the attack stating, "guerrillas of
the cell sought to punish the Americans, because of America's
manipulation in Iran and elsewhere." All four worked at the
USAF Cakmakh base, one with the Boeing Corporation. A
follow up TNP investigation revealed that a landlady at one of
the apartments noticed an unidentified car parked in front of her
apartment near the bus stop 3-4 days prior to the attack. On
12 February 1980, the Istanbul Martial Law Command
announced the arrest of the alleged assassins. The authorities
claimed that the four Americans were killed "as the result of a
an armed attack against U.S. citizens assigned to Istanbul."
20 December Ankara A bomb caused minor damage to a USAF vehicle parked in
front of the residence of the manager of the Boeing Services
International Communications site.
1980
2 January Istanbul (19800102 Al B06 F001 1000 T5d N666 S640 RME P1413)
The MLSPB claimed responsibility for the slaying of an Israeli
head [Abraham Elazar] of an El Al Airlines office in an
Istanbul suburb. The slaying of Elazar was "designed to
retaliate against the Israeli massacre of Palestinians." The
organization claimed that Elazar was an agent of the Israeli
state security organization.
4 January Istanbul Two men and a woman entered a U.S. military motorpool,
poured gasoline on several cars and around the motorpool
office building, and then set them on fire. The building was
destroyed and several cars were damaged.
24 January Istanbul A leftist group protesting U.S.-Turkish cooperation firebombed
five banks in Istanbul, burning one branch down but causing no
injuries in the early morning attacks.
24 January Istanbul
1 7 February Ankara
Three men and a woman entered a U.S./NATO military motor
pool near Yesilkoy Airport in Istanbul's Sefakoy district,
poured gasoline on several vehicles and around the building,
and ignited it. Several vehicles were damaged, and the building
was destroyed, but no injuries were reported, as a Turkish
employee was able to escape the building in time. A banner
left on a gas pump read: "Victory for the THKP-C."
Two cars belonging to U.S. military personnel were set on fire.
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18 February Ankara (19800218 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME POOOO)
The home of two U.S. Embassy counselors was bombed. There
was minor damage but no one was injured.
1 8 February Izmir ( 1 98002 1 8 A 1 B02 F000 1000 T03 N396 S640 RME POOOO)
Terrorists used gas-soaked rags to set fire to two cars belonging
to two U.S. soldiers stationed with NATO Headquarters in
Izmir. No one was hurt, but due to this additional terrorist
incident, the National Security Council of Turkey agreed to
extend the period and scope of present martial law, including
outlying areas that had been victims of continuing unrest.
20 February Ankara Two vehicles belonging to U.S. military personnel were set on
fire.
22 February Ankara A bomb detonated outside a hotel housing U.S. military
personnel. Damage was light and there were no injuries.
23 February Istanbul A homemade bomb exploded on the grounds of the Soviet
Consulate, causing no injuries.
16 April Istanbul (19800416 Al B06 F003 1004 T03 N002 S640 RME P1413) At
approximately 0830, USN Petty Officer Sam Novello and
Turkish friend, Sabri Baytar, a former Turkish Navy Chief
Engineer, were leaving Novello' s apartment. As both men
were about to enter Novello' s pickup truck, two MLSPB
terrorists shot and killed them. A third terrorist was on a
waiting motorcycle. A police car patrolling the area heard the
shots and rushed to the crime scene. The police gave chase and
finally caught up with the terrorists at Emirgan, a small town on
the Bosphorus, three miles from the attack site. A gunfight
ensued, and one of the terrorist, later identified as Hakki Kolgu,
was fatally shot. The other assailants, Ahmet Saner and Kadir
Tandogan, were eventually captured. As a result of the gun
battle, one passer-by was accidentally killed. Kolgu died of
this wounds in a hospital, and on 25 June 1981, Tandogan and
Saner were hanged at Istanbul's Uskudar Pa§akapisi Prison.
According to the TNP, the three terrorists were involved in a
number of terrorist incidents prior to the murders of Novello
and Baytar. On 3 April, the three had killed four owners of a
small factory, and on 7 April, they killed a father and a son in
their grocery store. The trio was also involved in numerous
jewelry store robberies. It is interesting to note that shortly






he admitted in two Turkish youths on the pretext of their
looking for a lost bird. As one of the youths went out on the
balcony pretending to look for the bird, the other youth stayed
inside the apartment and appeared to be surveying it. It has
been a well-known practice for Turkish terrorist groups to use
young people for logistical support; e.g., surveillance.
Dev Yol claimed credit for bombing the NATO Rod and Gun
Club. Damage was minimal and there were no injuries.
(19800600 Al B04 F000 1000 T07 N645 S640 RME P1433
A4) The Turkish-Iraqi pipeline near Kayri village was bombed
by Kurdish militants who, when captured in early 1982 claimed
that they been sent by the Kurdish National Unity Party leader
Jalal Talabani in Syria. The pipeline carried Iraqi oil from
Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Iskenderun. The two Kurds
arrested were allegedly responsible for a similar bombing of the
pipeline in May 1979.
31 July Izmir Unidentified men threw Molotov cocktails into the home of a
USAF sergeant in Izmir. One of the bombs struck the sergeant,
resulting in bums on over 22 percent of his body. The other
bomb caused only minor property damage. The sergeant's
spouse, child, and a Turkish friend were inside the house at the
time of the attack. No group claimed credit for the attack.
8 August Istanbul A bomb was discovered in front of the Israeli Consul's
residence in Istanbul.
27 September Turkey (19800927 Al B04 F000 1000 T07 N645 S640 RME P1430
A4) A pipeline that carried oil from northern Iraq to the
Mediterranean was blown up in Turkey. The oil industry
reported Kurdish rebels carried out the attack but leaflets left at
the scene claimed the Iraqi Liberation Army conducted it. The
pipeline had been blown up six times since it was opened and
all the attacks have been in the Kurdish region of Turkey. This
explosion occurred only a few miles from the Syrian and Iraqi
borders. The resulting fire caused the halt of the oil flow
through the pipeline. The pipelines were the only oil outlets
still available to Iraq, because of the fighting at the head of the
Persian Gulf, since the start of the Iran/Iraq war.
2 October Izmir Bombs were discovered in the stairwell of a building housing
U.S. military personnel and in the doorway of the APO located
a few blocks away. Though they exploded before police had











light. In a note left at the scene, the group Dev Sol claimed
credit for the attacks.
A bomb exploded at a local Pan Am Airlines office.
Devrimci Sol claimed responsibility for placing a bomb under a
USAF airman's POV. Though the car was extensively damage,
there were no injuries.
(19801013 Al B03F001 1000 T5aN640 S640 RME P 1432)
Four armed Moslem extremists hijacked a THY B-727 with
155 persons aboard. The jet was bound from Istanbul to
Ankara, having originated in Munich. They demanded to be
flown to Teheran, Iran, but the pilot refused, insisting he had to
refuel and could not fly to Iran because it had been designated
as a war zone. Other demands were not reported, but during the
hijacking the hijackers announced that, "(the plane) is now
under the control of the Sheria (the holy Islamic law)." They
forced women on board to cover their heads Islamic style. The
plane landed in Diyarbakir to refuel and the hijackers released
40 passengers. The plane was surrounded by Turkish troops.
The hijackers set a deadline and demanded to be flown to Saudi
Arabia or they would blow up the plane. The Turkish
authorities refused to grant any demands and the deadline
passed without incident. At dawn on the next day, Turkish
commandos cut a hole in the back of the plane and entered the
aircraft in a flurry of shooting. They used automatic weapons
with blanks and revolvers with live ammunition. Later a
military communique stated all passengers were rescued and all
four terrorists were captured. The four hijackers were wounded
in the storming, as well as six passengers and one flight
attendant. The statement did not indicate any deaths but the
passengers said they believed one hostage was killed.
(19801030 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb blast at the Turkish-American Cultural Center near
Ankara caused extensive damage (some estimates put damages
at $100,000) but no casualties. It was the first attack on an
American building since the 12 September military coup.
(19801 108 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
U.S. military aircraft support depot in the Emek district of
Ankara was bombed. The bombing caused considerable
damage, but no injuries.
(19801 1 15 Al B06 F001 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410) At
approximately 0550, as two USAF airmen—William C.
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Herrington (Sergeant) and Jay M. Perry (Senior Airman)
—
were backing out of a driveway onto Atatiirk Boulevard, two
unidentified men approached the front of their car on the
driver's side. At this point, one of the men pulled out a
handgun from under his sweater and started firing at the
Harrington, who was driving. After the first shot was fired,
Perry got out of the car on the passenger's side and ran towards
two apartment buildings as the two gunmen were shooting at
him. Perry was able to escape unhurt. After the attack, police
found 1 3 shell casings from a 9mm parbellum [sic] round at the
crime scene. Herrington was hit nine times. Both men were in
uniform at the time of the attack. Herrington was the first U.S.
citizen to die in Turkey since a military coup on 1 2 September,
which launched an all-out offensive against terrorism. The
MLSPB claimed responsibility for the killing.
27 November Izmir Two men entered the NATO Rod and Gun Club and held the
guards while they planted a bomb. The device exploded
causing minor damage. A banner left at the scene was signed
Dev Sol.
10 December Izmir A bomb exploded at the Pan Am Airlines office causing minor
damage and no injuries.
1981
6 April Malatya A USAF vehicle carrying two U.S. airmen, a U.S. civilian, and
a Turkish Air Force enlisted man to their work site near the city
of Malatya was fired upon by two men using automatic
weapons. No one was injured, but the vehicle sustained
substantial damage. Though the occupants of the vehicle saw
only two men firing at them, police found 23 spent cartridges,
and an analysis of the crime scene indicated that as many as
four men may have been involved in the attack. The MLAPU
claimed responsibility for the attack.
24 April Istanbul (19810524 Al B03 F000 1007 T5a N640 S640 RME P141 1)
Four leftist gunmen hijacked a THY DC-9 en route from
Istanbul to Ankara as it left Yesjlkoy International Airport.
They ordered the pilot to land at the small military airfield at
Burgas, Bulgaria. The hijackers demanded $500,000 and
freedom for 47 prisoners in Turkish jails. They threatened to
kill five American bank executives among the 112 passengers
aboard and also to blow up the plane if their demands were not
met. Twenty-five women, children, and men with "chronic
ailments" were allowed to leave the plane at Burgas, a resort
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city on the Black Sea, leaving 91 passengers still in the plane,
plus a crew of six. The Turkish Government refused to
negotiate and asked Bulgaria to keep the plane from leaving
Burgas. Two passengers escaped by jumping from the plane
through an emergency exit. Bulgarian officials maintained
contact with the hijackers by radio. The hijackers threatened to
kill the five American passengers if their demands were not met
by a specified time. This deadline was extended, then finally
abandoned. The hijackers then asked for 200 envelopes and a
quantity of paper so that the hostages could write farewell
letters. The Turkish Government continued to refuse to accede
to the demands of the terrorists and threatened to execute the 47
jailed leftists if the hijackers carried out their threat to blow up
the plane. Twenty-four hours later, on May 25, a dramatic end
came to the hijacking. Two of the terrorists were lured from
the plane by the promise that they could make a statement to
the press. Once on the ground, they were immediately
overpowered. In an escape set up by hand signals, the pilot of
the jetliner sent the plane lurching forward, knocking everyone
standing in the plane off their feet. Some of the passengers
then took advantage of the confusion to overpower the two
gunmen left. One terrorist lost his weapon and either jumped
or was thrown from the plane. All 91 passengers were freed.
Five incurred minor injuries when one of the attacked hijackers
began to shoot his pistol wildly. Two of the hijackers were also
wounded. The gunmen were identified as members of Dev Sol,
whose members had been severely cracked down on by the
Turkish military authorities. The latter had seized power in
September 1980, saying the elected government had been
unable to quell violence between the left and right. Since then,
thousands of suspected political extremists had been arrested.
16 May Istanbul The May 15 Arab Organization for the Liberation of Palestine
bombed the Israeli El Al offices in Istanbul, shattering windows
but causing no injuries.
8 August Malatya (1981 0808 A 1 B06 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000)
Two or possibly four men armed with automatic weapons
opened fire on a USAF pickup truck carrying three U.S.
nationals, two of whom were USAF airmen, and a Turkish
national on the road just outside Malatya City. None of the
truck's occupants was injured; the truck sustained some
damage.
6 October Istanbul (1981 1006 Al B05 F000 1003 T01 N630 S640 RME P1430)
Anti-Khomeini forces shot up and ransacked the Iranian
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Consulate to protest the mounting number of executions and
oppressions of the Khomeini regime. Three people were
wounded in the shooting during the seizure. The 26 masked
Iranians, said to be students, held the consulate for about 50
minutes before Turkish police surrounded the building and
broke the siege. The Consul General and eight staff members
had been taken hostage at gunpoint and led to the basement,
while the dissidents threw out furniture and caused extensive
damage to the interior of the consulate.
1982
6 January Idil (19820106 Al B04 F000 1000 T07 N645 S640 RME P1400
A4) An explosion was reported in the Iraq-Iskenderun pipeline
which carried crude oil from Kirkuk (Iraq) to the Mediterranean
terminal of Yumurtalik. The explosion occurred 7 kilometers
from Idil, a town in Mardin Province. No one claimed credit
for the attack.
8 January Turkey (19820108 Al B04 F000 1000 T07 N645 S640 RME P1400
A4) An explosion for the second time in a week cut an Iraqi oil
pipeline. Turkish authorities said the 625-mile pipeline that
brings Iraqi oil to Turkey's Mediterranean coast exploded 42
miles inside the Turkish border and sabotage was suspected.
No one claimed credit for the attack.
9 January Istanbul (19820109 Al B04 F000 1000 T5b N666 S640 RME P0121)
The Arab May 15 Organization for the Liberation of Palestine




Ankara ( 1 98206 1 8 A 1 B02 F000 1000 T5b N002 S640 RME P0000)
Two men and two women set fire to the Pan Am Airlines office
in Ankara in protest against Israel's invasion of Lebanon. There
were no casualties, although there was extensive damage. The
perpetrators drove away unhampered.
Istanbul Three terrorists were arrested before carrying out a planned
attack on either the Israeli Consulate or Israeli El Al airlines
office.
7 August Ankara (19820807 Al B02 F009 1078 T5c N640 S640 RME P1210)
Armenian terrorists attacked the Ankara Esenboga Airport.
Nine people were killed and 78 injured in the bomb and
machine-gun shootout between the Armenians and Turkish
security forces. The dead included a U.S. citizen [Jean
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Bosworth] and a West German passenger. ASALA claimed
responsibility for the attack and stated the attack was against
the "Turkish fascist occupation of our land," and warned of
suicide attacks in the United States, Canada, England, Sweden,
and Switzerland unless 85 prisoners held in those countries
were not released within seven days. ASALA is one of two
Armenian terrorist groups responsible for the assassination of
several Turkish officials and members of their family since
1973. A caller to the press stated that the "Martyr Kharmian
Hayrik Suicide Squad" staged the operation. Hayrik was not
further identified. An Armenian terrorist was apprehended and
put on trial at the Ankara Martial Law Command 3d Military
Court on September 8. Levon Ekmekjian, a French national of
Lebanese extraction, was wounded during the attack and
admitted that he was an accomplice in the killing and that it had
been planned for some time. When he was on the stand, he
said, "I came here motivated by belief, however, after this
incident understand how ridiculous and wrong that belief
was...." Ekmekjian was sentenced to death, but was expected to
appeal the sentence. Claims later made by ASALA maintained
that there were two assault teams and that the first unit struck
the headquarters of the Turkish military police near the airport
and then took over the passenger terminal. ASALA claimed
there were more than 30 fatalities and 102 injuries in the two
operations.
1983
16 April Turkey (19830416 Al B03 F000 1000 T5a N640 S640 RME P141 1) A
Turkish hijacker surrendered to antiterrorist authorities in
Athens, Greece, after commandeering a THY flight with 1 14
passengers, who were not hurt. The hijacker appeared to be
mentally disturbed; he threatened to set the plane on fire unless
he was given safe passage to Sydney, Australia. According to
authorities, the man belonged to Dev Sol. (Note - FAA reports
this incident occurred on 15 April and was aboard a THY B-
727.)
16 June Istanbul (19830616 Al B02 F003 1027 T06 N640 S640 RME P1210)
Five bombs exploded in front of the Grand Bazaar in Istanbul
and two men shot into a crowd killing two people and
wounding 27. One of the attackers was also killed. ASALA
claimed credit for the incident which coincided with the
anniversary of a 1970 workers' revolt in Turkey.
23 November Corlu At approximately 6:15 p.m., a U.S. serviceman dressed in
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civilian clothes was waiting at a bus stop. He was approached
by a Turkish national who asked him in English, "Where are
you from? Where do you live? What is your name?" The
serviceman stated that he was an American and did not speak
Turkish very well. As the American began to walk away, the
Turkish national grabbed him and tried to force him into a car
with two or three other Turkish males. One of the men in the
car grabbed the American's leg and attempted to help the other
man force him into the care. Fortunately, the American was
able to break free and run away. Since the serviceman was
black and was waiting at a bus stop that is frequented by U.S.
military personnel, it was easy for the Turks to identify him as
an American. Though no further information developed on this
incident, it is no known if this attack was criminal, terrorist, or
personal in nature.
20 December Izmir (19831220 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410)
Turkish police found a car loaded with high explosives in a
parking lot near U.S. and French facilities in Izmir. The car
was discovered abandoned about 100 yards from the U.S.
Officers' Club and a seaside hotel frequented by U.S.
servicemen.
21 December Istanbul Two gunmen overpowered a guard and hurled a bag of
explosives into the fountain in front of the Iraqi Consulate.
Three persons were injured and the windows of nearby
buildings broken by the blast.
21 December Ankara A car bomb exploded in a residential area and resulted in
broken windows but no injuries. Prior to the explosion, Ahmed
Ahkir Mansour, a Syrian, and Muhammed Muassir, an Iranian,
were arrested near the car, which they had intended to move to
the Iraqi Embassy. This was revealed in a confession given
under interrogation. An anonymous caller to the London office
of Agence France-Presse claimed that the Islamic Dawa was
responsible.
1984
26 April Turkey (19840426 B10 F000 1000 T01 N640 S640 RME P1210)
ASALA warned Turkish Prime Minister Ozal, that if he went
ahead with plans to pay an official visit to Iran, a major
operation against Turkey would be staged. The threat, issued to
the Teheran offices of Agence France-Presse, came in the wake
of recent attacks on Turkish diplomats serving in Teheran,
which injured two of them. The number of Armenians taken
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into custody as the result of these incidents was reported to
have reached 13. Turkish sources indicated that some of those
arrested would soon be tried and most likely shot by the Islamic
Government of Iran, which was known for the harsh sentences.
18 June
3 September
Istanbul Three incendiary devices were discovered in Istanbul and
disarmed. One device was discovered in front of the offices of
the American Express Bank. The other devices were found
under vehicles belonging to TNP and the Jandarma. Police
believed Dev Sol was responsible.
Istanbul (19840903 Al B04 F002 1000 T16 N640 S640 RME P1216)
Two Lebanese were killed in a car bomb explosion at a parking
lot near the Topkapi Palace in Istanbul. The Armenian
Revolutionary Army claimed responsibility for the blast.
Authorities speculate the two died when their bomb
prematurely exploded. The pair entered Turkey from Syria to
conduct a sabotage operation.
1985
28 June Turkey A THY B-727 destined for Istanbul from Frankfurt (West
Germany) was hijacked. Perpetrator(s) and objective(s) were
unknown.
24 July Ankara ( 1 9850724 A 1 B06 F00 1 1000 TO 1 N663 S640 RME P0 1 20)
Jordanian envoy Ziyad Sati was shot three times in the head as
he stopped at a red light in a residential area of Ankara. The
gunman escaped on foot. An anonymous caller said that Sati
was killed because of his "services to imperialism." Black
September also claimed responsibility. In October of 1986, six
confessed members of an Abu Nidal terrorist cell were arrested
and held responsible for the assassination. In November 1986,
a Syrian diplomat indicted for organizing the murder was
recalled to Damascus.
20 August Istanbul (19850820 Al B06 F001 1000 T16 N630 S640 RME P0000) A
former colonel in the Iranian police, Behruz Shahverdi, was
found murdered at home in Istanbul. He was one of the leaders
of the Iranian national resistance movement directed from Paris
by the Shah's former prime minister, Shapur Bakhtiar.
Authorities claim Shahverdi was involved in planning an attack
on Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. Shahverdi had
earlier been suspected of being a double agent, but he managed
to clear himself of suspicion. He was then instructed to find out




the double agent to Paris. He was assassinated shortly after all
of this had occurred, and the killer was not been identified.
(19850828 Al B04 F000 1000 T5b N666 S640 RME P1434) A
bomb exploded near an office of the Israeli El Al Airlines
office, shattering its front window but causing no injuries or
other damage. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.
(19851220 Al B06 F001 1000 T16 N630 S640 RME P2001)
Hadi Aziz Murad, an Iranian commando colonel, was
assassinated at his home in Bakirkoy, Istanbul. Murad was a
representative in Turkey of the Nesebenti resistance
organization, a supporter of the Shah, and it was he who was
reportedly waging an anti-Khomeini struggle in Turkey.
Agents of the Iranian National Intelligence and Security
Organization (SAVAMA) were believed responsible.
1986
1 1 April Istanbul In Istanbul, police arrested eight Turks and two Tunisians who
were plotting to sabotage and assault the Turkish-Iraqi oil
pipeline, the U.S. Consulate, the Iraqi Consulate, and other
targets. One pistol and bullets were found during searches of
the suspects' homes and offices. According to authorities, an




Ankara ( 1 98604 1 8 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P 1 300
P2009) An attempt by five Libyans to bomb a U.S. officers'
club in Ankara was foiled by Turkish police, who stopped two
of the Libyans outside of the club. One of the suspects
attempted to throw away a bag which contained grenades and
other explosives. The incident occurred on a Friday night when
the club was usually full of U.S. families, who used the dining
facilities. There was speculation the Libyan Ambassador was
involved. The Ambassador reportedly had a long history of
involvement with Libyan terrorist operations, including an
assassination campaign against Libyan dissidents residing in
the United States. Three of the five Libyans charged were
protected by diplomatic immunity and could not be prosecuted.
Two Libyans were given five year jail terms.
Istanbul A bomb was found in the basement of the KOC-American
Bank (formerly American Express). An anonymous telephone
caller stated that a bomb was located on the bank premises.
TNP found the bomb in a large trash container in the basement
parking garage of the building. No group claimed credit for the
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attempted bombing.
19 April Istanbul TNP discovered another bomb at the KO£-American Bank.
The bomb, which was placed in front of the building, consisted
of a soda can filled with black powder. According to
eyewitnesses, two youths were seen running away from the
bank. Though no group claimed credit for the attack, the




In letters sent from Italy to news agencies in Ankara, Islamic
Jihad threatened to attack Turkish missions world-wide unless
Turkey withdrew its support of Iraq.
(19860906 Al B02 F022 1003 T10 N995 S640 RME P0120)
During services, two Arab terrorists attacked Istanbul's main
synagogue, killing 22 and wounding three others. They opened
fire on the worshipers and then doused their victims' bodies
with gasoline and set them on fire. Next a grenade exploded,
and two of terrorists were killed. It was unclear whether the
grenades went off accidentally or whether it was suicide. Both
the Palestine Revenge Organization and the Northern Arab
Unity Organization claimed responsibility for the attack. The
Islamic Resistance claimed it had masterminded the action in
retaliation for a recent Israeli raid on a guerrilla base in
southern Lebanon. On 6 November 1986, Turkey's state
security court released an indictment claiming the Abu Nidal
group had definitely been responsible for the attack. Two
members of Abu Nidal who are linked to this incident were
arrested in Italy in June 1987.
20 September Turkey (19860920 Al B07 F000 1000 T5a N640 S640 RME P1430)
Three Iranians were arrested after an attempt to smuggle a
briefcase wired for explosives aboard a THY flight to northern
Cyprus. While no actual explosives were found inside, the
handle was wired to explode if touched and the mechanism set
off alarms at security checks.
1 9 October Mardin ( 1 986 1 1 9 A 1 B02 F000 1000 T03 N396 S640 RME P0000)
An unidentified group of armed men attacked a NATO radar
station in Mardin, in southwestern Turkey. This was the first
attack against a NATO installation in Turkey. Damage was
minor.
24 October Istanbul (19861024 Al B06 F001 1000 T16 N630 S640 RME P0000)
The former bodyguard of the late Shah of Iran was shot at point
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3 November Adana
blank range and killed in an Istanbul suburb. Colonel Ahmad
Hamed Monfared was the third former Iranian army officer to
be killed in Turkey in 17 months. Sources said the former
officers were known to be in touch with army officers inside
Iran working to overthrow Ayatollah Khomeini.
The local representative of the Colgate-Polmolive Company
received a threatening note from a group called the Turkish
Republican Army (TRA). The note read in part, "...murder
American, Americans out, no Americans no problems." The
businessman stated that a group of Americans who lived across
the street from him were employed at Incirlik Air Base, and,




Istanbul ( 1 9870305 A 1 B06 F002 1000 T03 N667 S640 RME P0 1 20)
The Abu Nidal organization claimed to have executed by
hanging two Palestinians who they accused of being members
of Jordanian intelligence. The executions of Nathem Abd
Ahmed Abu Sbeih and his uncle, Khaled Muhammad Ali
Musalam Abu Sbeih occurred in Istanbul, Turkey.
Turkey (19870409 Al B07 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME PI434
N666 T01) Four men with links to Islamic Jihad were arrested
by TNP after the discovery of a plot to bomb a U.S. air base
and Israeli diplomatic facilities in Turkey. Two of the men
were Turkish, one was Iranian, and the other was Lebanese.
28 July Istanbul ( 1 9870728 A 1 B06 F00 1 100 1 T09 N630 S640 RME P0000)
Iranian exile Mansuri Mohammad Hasan was murdered in his
home by an unknown gunman who fled in a Mercedes
suspected of belonging to the Iraqi Consulate. Benhan Fadil,
first secretary at the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, was visiting Hasan
at the time of the murder, and was himself seriously injured by
the assassin.
1 1 September Istanbul
1 1 September Istanbul
(1987091 1 Al B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P 14 10) A
bomb exploded outside of the Citibank office in Istanbul. The
June 16 Organization claimed the attack to protest alleged
torture of Turkish prisoners. (Note - This group first surfaced
in August 1987, when it attacked a police station in Istanbul.)
(1987091 1 Al B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P 14 10) A
bomb exploded outside of the Sheraton Hotel in Istanbul. The
June 16 Organization claimed the attack to protest alleged
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torture of Turkish prisoners.
1 1 September Istanbul (1987091 1 Al B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P 14 10) A
bomb exploded outside of the Ramada Inn in Istanbul. The
bomb was described as a half-stick of dynamite, and detonated
outside the building. The June 16 Organization claimed the
attack to protest alleged torture of Turkish prisoners.
1988
10 March Istanbul ( 1 98803 1 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T02 N670 S640 RME P0000
N002) A bomb detonated outside the Saudi-American Bank.
The bank was affiliated with Citibank. The KO£-American
Bank (affiliated with American Express) was also housed in the
same building. No group claimed credit for the attack.
14 April Istanbul ( 1 98804 14 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T5b N666 S640 RME P0000) A




(19880721 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N670 S640 RME P1432
P2001) A bomb was discovered near the Saudi Arabian
Cultural Mission in Ankara. A group called "Black Friday"
claimed responsibility for planting the bomb. The group was
believed to be made up of pro-Iranian terrorists whose name
symbolizes the date of the previous year's religious pilgrimage
to Mecca when hundreds of Iranian radicals were killed. The
attempted bombing coincided with the current year's
pilgrimage.
(19880909 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N645 S640 RME P1400) A





(19880918 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N645 S640 RME PI 400) A
bomb exploded in the courtyard of the Iraqi Embassy. The
Ka'ba Liberation Organization-Muhammad Al Sadr claimed
responsibility.
(19881007 Al B05 F000 1000 T01 N155 S640 RME P0000)
After forcing their way into the Istanbul office of the Chilean
Honorary Consul, four gunmen threatened him. It is unclear
how long the Honorary Consul was held before the gunmen
fled, firing one shot into the floor.
(19881021 Al B06 F001 1000 T17 N002 S640 RME P0000
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FA001) An American who had just arrived in Istanbul for a
language conference was murdered in a park. The victim was a
translator for Radio Liberty, a Munich-based U.S. network that
broadcasted to the Soviet Union. No one claimed responsibility
for the murder.
23 October Turkey (19881023 Al B01 F000 1000 T16 N630 S640 RME P2001)
Five Iranians (including two diplomats) were arrested after
trying to smuggle an Iranian dissident back to Iran.
25 October Ankara (19881025 Al B06 F001 1000 T01 N670 S640 RME PI434
P2001) The Islamic Jihad-Hijaz claimed responsibility for
assassinating a Saudi Arabian diplomat in Ankara. The Second
Secretary of the Saudi Embassy was killed as he was
approaching his home around 2100 hours.
28 October Turkey ( 1 988 1 028 A 1 B02 F000 1000 T06 N770 S640 RME P0000
T01) A gasoline bomb was thrown into the playground of a
Pakistani Embassy school. The school serves the children of
diplomats from Moslem countries.
30 October Izmir (19881030 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb went off in a car owned by a U.S. teacher at the DoD
school for dependents in Izmir. There were no injuries and no
one claimed credit for the attack.
22 December Turkey (19881222 Al B06 F001 1000 T01 N235 S640 RME P0000)
The Second Secretary at the Portuguese Embassy was found
stabbed to death on the Tarsus-Ankara Highway.
1989
27 January Istanbul (19890127 Al B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P141 1)
See Next Entry.
27 January Istanbul (19890127 Al B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P141 1)
See Next Entry.
27 January Ankara (19890127 Al B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P141 1)
Dev Sol carried out coordinated bomb attacks against three
U.S.-Turkish business concerns in Istanbul and Ankara. In
each attack, groups of five armed terrorists tied up office
employees, spray-painted slogans, and set off explosives in
unoccupied areas of the targeted buildings. While property




A British Airways plane carrying 1 17 passengers and 8 crew
landed at Munich's Riem Airport after a bomb threat against
the Ankara-Istanbul-London flight. No bomb was found after
the plane was evacuated. The caller told British airlines
authorities in Istanbul that the Turkish-Kurdish People's
Struggle had planted a bomb.
(19890320 Al B04 F000 1000 T5b N699 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb exploded in front of the United Arab Emirates Airline
office. There were no casualties.
2 April Ankara (19890402 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N200 S640 RME PI 432)
Moslem Fundamentalists were suspected of bombing a British
Embassy vehicle. The attack followed continued threats
against British interests in connection with the Salman Rushdie
affair.
2 April Ankara (19890402 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N200 S640 RME PI 432)
Moslem Fundamentalists were suspected of bombing the
British Cultural Center. The attack followed continued threats




(19890823 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N666 S640 RME PI 433) A
bomb went off at the Israeli Consulate. A group calling itself
the Armed People's Unit, believed linked to the PKK, was
believed responsible.
(1989091 1 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P141 1)
An explosive device was thrown at the U.S. Consulate.
Authorities arrested a female medical student believed affiliated
with Dev Sol. (Note - Additional sources stated that at 0705,
Pembegul Bindir, threw a pipe bomb that hit the top of the
Consulate wall and bounced back. She immediately picked up
the device and hurled it with greater force, this time hitting the
Consul General's car. The device bounced off the windshield
of the car and exploded a few feet away. Preliminary
investigation indicated the device consisted of dynamite and
metal. Shrapnel hit the main building, a house, a security
vehicle, and the Consul General's vehicle. Pieces of the
shrapnel narrowly missed two members of the Consulate guard
force. The assailant was arrested at the scene. Although no
group claimed credit for the attack, 1 2 September was the ninth




16 October Ankara (19891016 Al B04 F000 1001 T01 N670 S640 RME P1434
P2001) A Saudi diplomat was seriously injured when a car
bomb exploded outside the Saudi military attaches office in
Ankara's Cankaya district. Hezbollah claimed responsibility,
saying the bombing was in retaliation for the recent Saudi
execution of 16 Kuwaiti nationals involved in the Mecca
bombings the previous July.
9 November Izmir A pipe bomb detonated in the rear of the USAF commissary.
The commissary was closed at the time of the incident, and no
employees were present. There was no claim of responsibility
for this action.
10 November Izmir (19891 1 10 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P141 1) A
bomb went off outside a U.S. military shop in Izmir. Dev Sol
was believed to have been responsible.
14 November Istanbul (19891 1 14 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P141 1)
An U.S. office in Istanbul was bombed. Dev Sol was
suspected.
6 December Istanbul (19891206 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410 A7
T12) A boat belonging to the U.S. Consulate was destroyed by
a bomb claimed by the "Warriors of the 16th of June
Movement." The group received its name from a workers'
protest movement that paralyzed Istanbul on June 15 and 16,
1970. The action was carried out to protest Turkish economic
policies. (Note - Additional sources reported that at about
1830, two men detonated a firebomb on the rear deck of the
Hiawatha, a 15-meter wooden motor launch owned by the U.S.
Government. No one was aboard the boat at the time of the
attack. The local fire department put out the fire, but not before
the boat was severely damaged. A 2-meter-long pole was
found in the water next to the Hiawatha, and had probably been
used to put the device on the boat. Approximately 98 hours
after the incident, the Turkish newspaper Terciiman received an
anonymous call in which the caller claimed credit for the attack
on behalf of the June 16 Organization. The caller went on to
say, "These kinds of attacks will go on. We are against the
IMF and price increases. We will fight for the Turkish Kurds."
1990
14 January Ankara (199001 14 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N670 S640 RME P1432
U5) A car belonging to a Saudi Arabian diplomat was bombed
in Ankara. Pro-Iranian terrorists were suspected.
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23 February Adana ( 1 9900223 A 1 B02 F000 1000 TO 1 N002 S640 RME P 1 4 1
U5) Suspected leftists firebombed the American Cultural
Center in Adana.
7 March Istanbul (19900307 Al B06 F002 1000 T17 N640 S640 RME P1432
U2) An Islamic fundamentalist group claimed responsibility for
the assassination of a leading Turkish journalist critical of
Muslim fundamentalists. His driver was also killed in the







Istanbul (19900314 Al B06 F000 1001 T16 N630 S640 RME P1432
U5) Suspected pro-Iranian gunmen shot and wounded an anti-
Iranian government activist while he drove to Istanbul's airport.
Istanbul (19900521 Al B04 F000 1000 T5b N666 S640 RME P0000
U 1 ) A small bomb went off outside of the Israeli El Al Airlines
office in Istanbul. (Note - According to FAA reports, an
unidentified individual contacted local newspapers and claimed
the bombing on behalf of the Armed People's Unit, believed to
be a sub-unit of the Turkish Revolutionary Communist
Party/Unit.)
Istanbul A small bomb detonated at a U.S. DoD motorpool. The U.S.
company VBR, which also held the current base maintenance
contract for Turkey, owned the site. A subsequent investigation
of the device determined it was more of a noise bomb, which
could not have caused property damage or injuries.
Istanbul ( 199007 1 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P 14_
U2) A group calling itself the Resistance Movement bombed a
McDonald's restaurant in Istanbul. (Note - Additional reports
state that at 1 100, four men entered the McDonald's in the
Bayazit section of the city. The men ordered drinks, and then
began smashing windows and mirrors using sticks and clubs.
Before fleeing, the men threw three or four Molotov cocktails
at the restaurant. No injuries were reported, but material
damage was substantial. A handwritten note was discovered at
the scene containing a message in English stating, "Go home,
Yankee," and was signed Resistance Movement. This attack
may have been related to a recent visit to Turkey by the U.S.
Secretary of Defense.
Ankara A previously unknown Muslim militant group, the Brotherhood
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15 August Turkey
of Martyrs, threatened to sabotage the Thai Embassy and airline
in Turkey, if Thai authorities took action against rioting Shi'ite
Muslims in southern Thailand. Reuters received the group's
threatening letter.
(19900815 Al? B06 F001 1000 T06 N630 S640 RME P2001
U4) Iranian Government agents were believed to have
assassinated Ahmad Kashefpour, an opponent of the Iranian
24 August Istanbul
1 6 September Ankara
(19900824 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N230 S640 RME P0000
U 1 ) A bomb hidden in a bag exploded in the fourth floor
doorway of the Spanish Consulate in Istanbul. No group
claimed responsibility.
A man claiming Abu Nidal membership telephoned the
Kuwaiti Embassy and warned that Embassy personnel would
be killed unless they recognized the Iraqi takeover of their
country.
1 8 October Istanbul At 2000, an improvised explosive device exploded at the
McDonald's restaurant in the Nisantasi section of the city,
bomb, contained in a soda can, was placed on an outside





At 2015, a second device explode in a trash can located inside
the restroom of the McDonald's restaurant at Taksim Square,
causing some material damage but no injuries. An unidentified
man telephoned the press 2 hours after the attack, and stated
that the Revolutionary War Cells was responsible for the
bombing (including the one at 2000). The caller further stated
that "our aim is to protest the American Sixth Fleet visit to our
country—everything is for the THKP-C (Turkish People's
Liberation Party-Front), everything is for the victory."
Twelve to 14 students from the Technical University, armed
with sticks and clubs, attacked six U.S. crewmen from the USS
Saratoga. One crewman was reported injured. The only
identifiable word spoken by the attackers was "Saratoga."
According to press reports, the attackers burned a cardboard
U.S. flag and shouted, "Damn American imperialism."
At approximately 1800, five to six youths threw bottles at a
Turkish bus transporting USN personnel from the Giizelbahce
dock to Izmir. At the time of the attack, the U.S. Aircraft
Carrier USS Kennedy and the cruiser USS Gates were in port.
170
The following day, leaflets were found in the parking lot of an
apartment building occupied primarily by U.S. military
personnel, as well as on the windshield of some 10 cars (with
foreign civilian license plates) parked in the lot. The leaflets
read: "Yankee go home, condemn American Imperialism," and
were signed by a heretofore unknown group called Socialist
Youth. It is believed that this incident was related to U.S.
actions in the Gulf.
1991
1 January Istanbul At 0130, a pipe bomb exploded a the Ramada Hotel. The
explosion caused minimal damage. Though shrapnel hit a
passer-by in the leg, the time of the explosion and the fact the
device was placed in an unused doorway indicated the
perpetrators did not intend to cause injuries. According to
police, the device consisted of a metal pipe with a partial stick
of dynamite inside. The pipe was sawed through in several
sections so it would fragment upon detonation. Prior to the
bombing, the hotel received two phone calls asking the hotel to
cancel a party, because the holiday espouses behavior contrary
to the Moslem faith.
7 January Adana At 0900, a DoD contractor' was set on fire. The fire caused
minor damage but no injuries.
13 January Adana An unknown individual poured flammable liquid on the rear of
a car owned by a U.S. citizen at Incirlik Air Base and set it on
fire. The individual then shouted, "No war," and fled the area.
Only the paint on the car was damaged.
17 January Istanbul Two hours after the Gulf War began, a group of individuals
telephoned local newspapers to inform them that they had
"placed an explosive in the U.S. Consulate in the Galantasaray
quarter of Istanbul and the explosive will detonate in 30
minutes." No bomb was found.
21 January Istanbul (19910121 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P141
1
N396) Dev Sol claimed responsibility for an explosion which
severely damaged a U.S. military customs clearance depot in
Istanbul. The group said the action was taken to protest U.S.
imperialism and the use of force in the Persian Gulf. (Note -
Additional reporting stated that at 1955, a bomb exploded
outside the U.S. MTMC, causing extensive damage but no
injuries. The office was on the ground floor of a four-story
building. In a call to the Turkish newspaper Milliyet, Dev Sol
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claimed credit for the attack, stating that it was to "protest
against the imperialist forces in the Gulf."
23 January Istanbul (19910123 Al B04 F000 1001 T10 N002 S640 RME P1411) A
woman was injured when a bomb detonated at the American
Board of Foreign Missions (ABFM), part of the U.S.-based
United Church of Christ. Dev Sol claimed responsibility.
(Note - Additional reports stated three men entered the ABFM
building at 0910, overpowered the guard, and placed the
employees in another room before setting off a pipe bomb.)
23 January Istanbul (19910123 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P 141 1) A
bomb went off at the office of the American Bureau of
Shipping (ABS) in Istanbul. Dev Sol claimed responsibility.
(Note - Further information claimed four men entered the ABS
building at 0900, overpowered the guard and the staff, and then
set off a pipe bomb that caused minor damage and no injuries.
The assailants wrote anti-Gulf comments on the walls and
verbally protested U.S. action in the Gulf to the guard and
staff.)
23 January Mercan During the early morning, armed men attacked a U.S. financial
consulting firm in Mercan. After overcoming the guards, they
threw explosives in the buildings and escaped. Extensive
damage—but no casualties—was reported.
25 January Ankara (19910125 Al B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb discovered at an American bank in Ankara was safely
defused. (Note - Additional reports stated a guard discovered
the bomb behind the Citibank building. The device consisted
of a 500-gram can filled with a liquid explosive and safety fuse
ignited by a match. It appeared the fuse burned out before
reaching the can.)
26 January Adana (19910126 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb damaged a car outside of the U.S. Consulate. No injuries
were reported. The attack occurred in Adana, which is near
Incirlik Air Base, which was used by U.S. aircraft in the war
with Iraq. (Note - Additional reports stated the bomb at the
Consulate damaged two cars that belonged to Turkish
occupants of the building that houses the Consulate. Several
windows of the building in which the Consulate was located
were blown out. The Turkish newspaper Milliyet received a
call immediately after the bombing in which the caller claimed
the attacks in the name of Dev Sol. The caller stated that "the
U.S. should take its hands off the Middle East....The Middle
East belongs to the people of the Middle East—we claim credit
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for the bombings in Adana. . ..You [read Milliyet] will be
informed by a written notice later."
26 January Adana ( 1 99 1 1 26 A 1 B04 F000 1000 TO 1 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb caused moderate damage at a Turkish-American Club.
No injuries were reported. The attack occurred in Adana, which
is near LAB, which was used by U.S. aircraft in the war with
Iraq. (Note - Additional reports stated the TAA suffered
damage to the building's front door area, and numerous
windows in the adjacent area were blown out. The Turkish
newspaper Milliyet received a call immediately after the
bombing—and the earlier bombing at the U.S. Consulate—in
which the caller claimed the attacks in the name of Dev Sol.
The caller stated that "the U.S. should take its hands off the
Middle East. . .. The Middle East belongs to the people of the
Middle East—we claim credit for the bombings in
Adana. . . .You [read Milliyet] will be informed by a written
notice later."
27 January Ankara (19910127 A 1 B04 F000 1000 T5b N996 S640 RME P141
1
N740 S670) A bomb went off at the joint Japanese-Saudi ticket
office in Ankara. Dev Sol claimed responsibility.
27 January Turkey (19910127 Al B04 F000 1000 T5b N220 S640 RME P141 1)
Dev Sol claimed responsibility for a bomb that went off at the
Air France agency.
29 January Izmir (19910129 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N220 S640 RME P141 1)
Dev Sol claimed responsibility for an explosion at the French
Consulate. The explosion destroyed three cars, while damaging
two others. The French Consulate is near the U.S. military-
operated Kordon Hotel.
29 January Izmir (19910129 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P141 1)
Dev Sol claimed responsibility for a bomb at a U.S. depot. The
explosion occurred outside the U.S. military's engineering
warehouse, causing extensive damage to a number of cars, one
of which belonged to a U.S. serviceman.
29 January Izmir (19910129 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P141 1)
Dev Sol claimed responsibility for a bomb at the American
Cultural Center. At 0700, a U.S. Consulate roving security
patrol discovered a sports bag placed next to some propane gas
tubes a the back of the building. The police were called and the
device detonated while being removed. Three policemen were
slightly injured and a number of windows were broken in the
center's building.
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29 January Istanbul A bomb exploded at the International Catholic Migration
Commission. Damage was minimal and no injuries occurred.
No group claimed credit.
29 January Ankara At 1927, unknown individuals poured a flammable liquid on
three vehicles owned by U.S. military personnel. The
flammable liquid was lit, causing extensive damage to two of
the cars and minor damage to the third. No one was hurt in the
incident. At the time of the attack, the cars were parked at an
off-base apartment building near Ankara Air Station. The
vehicles had blue-and-white license plates identifying them as
belonging to non-diplomatic foreigners.
29 January Ankara Devrimci Sol bombed the offices of a British insurance
company.
6 February Istanbul At 1830, two men approached the Proctor and Gamble factory
and placed a fake banner bomb that stated "Workers fight
against imperialist war," and signed by the Turkish Communist
Party. Before departing the area, they threw a Molotov cocktail
toward the factory, which resulted in no damage or injuries.
7 February Adana (19910207 Al B06 F001 1000 T06 N002 S640 RME P141
1
FA001) On February 7, 1991, Bobbie Eugene Mozelle, a
Customs Specialist with VBR, at IAB, Adana, Turkey, became
the first American killed by terrorists during Operation
DESERT STORM, and the first terrorist-related American
death in Turkey in 12 years. At Approximately 0715, Mozelle
exited his house carrying a coffee cup in one hand and an
attached case and a gas mask in the other. He walked to his
car—a green 1963 Mercedes—that he always parked in front of
his apartment building. When he approached the passenger
side of his vehicle, he placed the attache case and gas mask on
the ground, and with the coffee cup still in his left hand, he
proceeded to unlock the car door. At that point, a man in hi
mid-to-late 20s approached Mozelle from the rear of his vehicle
and shot him five times with a 7.65mm handgun. Crime scene
evidence indicates that the gunman fired the first three shots
from a distance of 5 - 7 feet, and moved in closer for the last
two shots. Given Mozelle' s size—6 feet tall and over 300
pounds—the last two shots fired at close range were most likely
"the coup de grace." At the same time, a second gunman
commandeered a taxi that happened to be passing by the attack
site. The terrorist pulled the taxi driver out of the taxi and
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attempted to put the car in reverse. When he failed to do so,
both gunman fled the area on foot. Shortly before noon on the
day of the attack, anonymous calls to various local newspapers
claimed the attack in the name of Dev Sol and the MLSPB.
The caller for the MLSPB state that "We punished a CIA
agent. . .Turkish lands are not an American base. . . . We want
them [United States forces] to leave immediately." According
to the Dev Sol caller, "We are calling in the name of Dev Sol
Armed Revolutionary Units. We have punished a CIA agent in
Adana, Turkey. The bases cannot be used for U.S. imperialism.
Turkish and Kurdish people are not the servants of American
imperialism. . . . We will not be the tools of the bloody games of
the United States." On June 17, 1991, Turkish police raided a
Dev Sol safe house in Adana, and arrested four individuals.
Among those arrested were Ali Sahin and Adnan Temiz. Sahin
admitted to shooting Mozelle and Adana Regional Jandarma
Commander Brigadier General Temel Cingoz on 23 May 1991.
Among the weapons found in the safe house was the 7.65mm
pistol which ballistic tests matched to the Mozelle and Cingoz
murders. Tactically, the early morning hours present the best
opportunities for a terrorist group to attack. At that time of the
day there is little pedestrian or vehicular traffic. Additionally,
the potential target lacks alertness and situational awareness.
At this time of the day, the assassins are reasonably certain of
two key elements—the location of the target and his next move.
The principle was not lost on Dev Sol. Of the 51 lethal
attacks—which resulted in 73 deaths—carried out by Dev Sol
against retired and active TNP officers, military, and
government officials from January 1990 to December 1993, 23
were carried out in the morning hours while the victim was at
or near his residence or en route to work. Of the 17 attempted
assassination of retired and active Turkish police, military, and
government personnel during the cited period, 10 occurred
while the victim was at or near his residence or en route to
work. Excluding those blind indiscriminate attacks (i.e., raking
police cars, shooting police in tea houses, etc.) by Dev Sol
against police in response to significant raids on its safe houses
that began in July 1991, the percentage of attacks carried out at
or near the victim's residence or while en route to work
dramatically increases to 72 percent. Almost all the Dev Sol
assassinations were carried out on week-days when the targets'
movements were more predictable. The weekday morning
pattern changed when a story in the Turkish press highlighted
Dev SoVs penchant for weekday attacks. Thereafter, Dev Sol
carried out it first lethal weekend attack when it assassinated
retired Turkish Army General Memduh Unlutiirk on Sunday, 7
175
April 1991. Prior to the assassination of Unliitiirk, only one of
Dev Sol's previous 19 violent attacks had taken place on a
weekend. On Sunday, 26 August 1990, Dev Sol gunmen
attempted to assassinate Adnan Ozbey, a retired army major
who had served at Metri§ Military Prison during the September
1980 military takeover.
7 February Izmir (19910207 Al B04 F000 1000 T03 N396 S640 RME P141 1) A
bomb was thrown into the garden of a NATO (6th Allied
Tactical Air Force Command) command post in Izmir.






At approximately 2000, a bomb detonated at the USAF-leased
park and recreation facility at Bayralkli Park causing minor
damage and no injuries. The park was closed at the time of the
attack. Dev Sol claimed responsibility.
(19910208 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N220 S640 RME P141 1) A
bomb exploded in the garden of the French Consulate.
Devrimci Sol claimed responsibility.
A bomb exploded in the garden of the Baraka building, which
housed the offices of Digital Equipment and Corporation, and
Kodak. There were no injuries. The Turkish Revolutionary
Communist Union claimed credit in a phone call to several
newspapers.
At 21 15, an unknown person or persons threw two Molotov
cocktails into the McDonald's restaurant in the Kadikoy section
of Istanbul. The devices burned, but did not detonate. Patrons
in the crowded restaurant broke windows in order to escape as
the devices rolled near them on the floor.
28 February Izmir (19910228 Al B06 F000 1001 T03 N002 S640 RME PI422
N396) Three weeks after the assassination of Mozelle,
Devrimci Sol struck again, when militants attempted to
assassinate USAF Lieutenant Colonel Alvin Macke. At
approximately 1700, while Macke was waiting for the elevator
in the lobby of his apartment building, the building janitor,
another American who lived in the building, and two
unidentified Turkish men, joined him. When the janitor asked
the two Turks what they were doing in the building they
indicated that they were conducting a survey and distributing
questionnaires. When the elevator arrived, Macke, the other
American, and the two Turks entered the elevator. Upon
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reaching Macke's floor, Macke and the two Turks got off the
elevator. The other American stayed in the elevator and went
up to his floor. The two Turks walked past Macke as if they
were going to visit someone on the floor. With his back to the
men, his attache case in his left hand, and his keys in his right,
Macke began to unlock the door to his apartment. Then, for
some inexplicable reason, Macke turned his head to the right.
Unbeknownst to Macke, one of the men had a gun pointed to
the back of his head. By turning his head, Macke avoided
being shot in the back of the head, and the bullet hit him just
under the right hear and jawbone. Through wounded, Macke
grabbed his attache case with both hands and threw it at the
terrorists in self-defense. Macke's actions startled the two
terrorist, but before descending the stairwell, the gunman fired
two more rounds at Macke. These hit the wall across from the •
elevator. As the two men fled down the stairs, Macke chased
them to the foot of the stairs, but collapsed from loss of blood.
An anonymous caller telephoned the local press after the attack
and claimed the operation in the name of Dev Sol. The caller
further stated, "We have punished one more senior imperialist
officer.... We will carry on until imperialism gets its hands off
the region." A subsequent police investigation helped police
identify Kahraman Altun and Bulent Sari as the two men
involved in the attack against Macke. On 16 March 1991,
Altun was killed when a bomb he was placing prematurely
detonated in Izmir. On 6 April 1991, Sari was arrested by the
police while boarding a bus in the Balcova district in Izmir.
Sari indicated that Altun shot Macke, and that he (Sari) was just
involved in the surveillance. Sari was eventually charged with
participation in a number of terrorist incidents, as well as being
an accomplice in the shooting of Macke.
3 March Istanbul At 2010, an unidentified male attempted to throw a Molotov
cocktail through the front window of the McDonald's
restaurant in the Nisantasi section of Istanbul. The device
broke the outer section of the double-pained window and
ignited. Damage was minimal and no injuries occurred.
1 5 March Izmir (19910315 Al B02 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P0000)
An individual who threw an explosive into a U.S. warehouse in
Izmir was killed in the attempt.
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!16 March 180 Ankara A bomb detonated behind the building housing the offices of
IBM. The explosion caused minor damage and no injuries.





Ankara A bomb exploded outside an office building housing General
Dynamics. The company shared a building with non-
American-affiliate companies.
Adana A bomb exploded near the Turkish American Association,
shattering windows. No injuries were reported.
Adana A bomb detonated in a high-rise building office outside the
eighth-floor office of the American Life Insurance Company.
The explosion blew the front door off its hinges and shattered a
number of windows. No injuries were reported.
16 March
16 March
Istanbul A bomb exploded in the parking lot of the Bank of Boston.
The explosion caused minor damage but no injuries.
Istanbul A bomb detonated in front of the building housing Sky Courier
International, an import/export company. The explosion caused
minor damage but no injuries.
1 6 March
16 March
Istanbul A bomb exploded on the unoccupied fourth floor of an office
building housing the offices of the American Publication and
Distribution Center. The explosion caused minor damage but
no injuries.
Istanbul A bomb exploded inside a Coca-Cola factory. The explosion
caused minor damage but no injuries.
1 6 March Istanbul A bomb exploded in front of the Pepsi-Cola computer center.
The explosion caused minor damage but no injuries.
16 March Istanbul A bomb exploded in front of the Genoto building. The
explosion caused minor damage but no injuries.
U.S. Department of State, Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans: 1991, 39. On
16 March, an unidentified male called the offices of the Turkish newspaper Milliyet and stated Devrimci
Sol claimed credit for all the bombings on 16 March. The caller further stated, "I am calling in the name of
Dev Sol/Armed Revolutionary Units...American imperialism continues its worldwide massacres. The final
one is the massacre of the people of the Middle East. We bombed the American companies to protest the





A bomb exploded on the street in front of the Cigna SA
Insurance Company, a joint American- Sabanci insurance
company venture. The explosion caused minor damage but no
injuries.
At approximately 2000, one bomber was killed and his
accomplice was injured when a bomb they were placing
prematurely detonated. The intended target was either an
American-owned car, or a Turkish auto parts company that
carried General Motors and Detroit Diesel parts. The car was
parked in front of the auto parts company at the time of the
attack. The dead man was identified as a Dev Sol member.
16 March
22 March
Izmir A bomb exploded outside the front door of the Military
Transport Management Command Office causing minor
damage.
Istanbul (19910322 Al B06 F001 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P141
1
FA001 T03) At approximately 12 noon, three men rang the
doorbell at the VBR office in Istanbul. The secretary looked
through a peephole and noticed that one of the men was
wearing a police uniform and let them in. The uniformed
officer asked to speak to the person in charge. The three were
directed into the Deputy Site Manager's office. They engaged
him in conversation about the security situation in Istanbul and
asked if any Americans worked in the office. The Deputy Site
Manager indicated that the Site Manager (John Gandy) and the
secretary were Americans. At that point one of the terrorist
dressed in civilian clothes asked to speak to the Site Manager.
When Gandy came into the Deputy Site Manager's office, one
of the terrorist dressed in civilian clothes asked the American
secretary and a Turkish co-worker to join them in the office.
With all four of them in the office, one of the terrorists drew his
handgun and told them to kneel on the floor. As the hostages
were being tied up, the gunman indicated that they were
members of an Armed Revolutionary Unit of Dev Sol. Once
the hostages were tied up, the terrorists took Gandy back to his
office. Inside Gander's office, the terrorist wrote slogans on the
walls, seated Gandy on a chair, and bound and gagged him
before shooting him three times, twice in the head and once in
the chest. Written (all in Turkish) on the wall closest to Gandy
was the statement, "We are determined and we shall win. Dev
Sol Armed Revolutionary Unit." On the adjacent wall was
written, "The Middle East belongs to the Middle East people....
It cannot be divided. Dev Sol." A third slogan was written on
the office's outer wall which read, "We are sending an
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American to Bush with Ozal." Following the attack, a woman
called the local press in Istanbul and stated, "We are giving one
of Bush's kids to Ozal to take with him to the U.S., in order that
he does not go without anything. . . . Today, in Yesilyurt we
punished the American working on the NATO base of the
U.S.... We claim the attack in the name of Dev Sol Armed
Revolutionary Unit." At the crime scene police found three
7.65mm shell casings near Gandy's body. Though the murder
weapon was never found, it was determined that Gandy was
shot with a gun equipped with a sound suppressor. Since
Gandy lived only two blocks from the his office, it appeared
that Dev Sol purposely shot him in his office to demonstrate its
ability to penetrate a "hardened" area and instill fear throughout
the foreign business community by killing a businessman in the
one place he would feel safe—his office. The terrorists also
carefully noted and took operation advantage of the fact that it
was the Islamic Holy month of Ramadan when many practicing
Moslems fast. In addition, the attack occurred when the janitor
at Gandy's building—as well as those in the surrounding
buildings—could be expected to be at the local mosque for
prayer.
25 March Ankara (19910325 Al B04 F000 1001 T01 N645 S640 RME P1434)
The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for a bomb which
detonated in the car of the Iraqi trade attache in Ankara. The
diplomat, who was accompanied by his four children, was
slightly injured in the attack.
26 March Istanbul (19910326 Al B04 F000 1000 T07a N210 S640 RME P1410
A4 T02 P 141 1) A bomb went off in front of the Istanbul office
of Shell Oil. THKP-C claimed responsibility, as did Dev Sol.
26 March Istanbul (19910326 Al B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1410
P141 1) The Citibank branch in Istanbul was bombed. One
person was injured in the Izmir attack. THKP-C claimed
responsibility, as did Dev Sol.
26 March Izmir (19910326 Al B04 F000 1001 T02 N002 S640 RME P1410
P141 1) The Citibank branch in Izmir was bombed. No one was
reported injured. THKP-C claimed responsibility, as did Dev
Sol.
27 March Istanbul A private, 24-passenger General Aviation aircraft MI-8
helicopter was destroyed by fire resulting from an explosive
device put on board. The helicopter was unoccupied at a




the device. Dev Sol claimed responsibility because of a failure
to compensate laid off workers in a factory owned by the
company. No injuries were reported.
Istanbul (19910409 Al B02 F036 1007 T15 N350 S640 RME P0000)
Sabotage of a Greek tourist bus in Istanbul resulted in the
deaths of 36 tourists. Seven people were injured.
Istanbul Dev Sol claimed responsibility for two separate pipe bomb
attacks at the offices of Pacific Aviation and Istanbul Airlines
in Istanbul. The reason given for the attacks was that the
airlines, by operating domestic flights, were weakening a
workers' strike against Turkish Airlines. The bombings caused
considerable damage but no injuries.
22 May Bursa At 2215, an explosive device went off behind the office of
IBM. The bomb broke some windows behind the single-story
building, but caused no injuries. A man called the local press
and stated Dev Sol was responsible.
24 May
22 July
Istanbul ( 1 99 10524 A 1 B02 F000 1000 TO 1 N200 S640 RME P0000)
Molotov cocktails were thrown at the British Consulate.
Istanbul (19910722 Al B02 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P141 1)





Istanbul A bomb exploded at the branch office of General Electric.
Damage was minimal. Dev Sol was believed to have conducted
the bombing.
Van (19910802 Al B01 F000 1000 T06 N255 S640 RME PI 422)
The PKK kidnapped ten German campers near the border.
They were reportedly released on 9 August.
Istanbul (19910819 Al B06 F001 1000 T02 N200 S640 RME P14_
P ) A British executive—Andrew Blake—with a Turkish-
British insurance company was assassinated. A single gunman
shot him as he was riding in the Istanbul office elevator. Dev
Sol and the Turkish wing of Islamic Jihad both claimed credit.
The victim's company had been on the Dev Sol "hit list" that
was discovered in a raid on a safe house in July. It is
speculated that Dev Sol mistook Blake as a U.S. citizen.
30 August Erzurum (19910830 Al B01 F000 1000 T06 N996 S640 RME P.




Australian—were kidnapped while traveling by car from
Erzurum to Bingol. They were released 20 September.
Two U.S. and two Mexican citizens, along with their Turkish
guide, were detained after armed men in uniforms near Kars in
northeastern Turkey stopped their minibus. After breaking
windows in the minibus and burning the luggage, the gunmen,
who were believed to be members of the PKK, ordered their
captives to follow them into the hills. Due to medical
problems, one of the U.S. women remained behind with the
minibus. After three hours, when it appeared the remaining







(1991 1028 A 1 B04 F001 1001 T03 N002 S640 RME PI 432) A
bomb went off under the car of a U.S. serviceman in Ankara,
killing USAF Staff Sergeant Victor Marvick and injuring his
wife. The Turkish Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility, saying
they "would not allow the imperialist powers to divide up the
Middle East at the peace summit."
(19911028 A 1 B04F000I001 T01 N651 S640 RME P1432)
An hour after a bomb blast killed a USAF sergeant, a bomb
went off under the car of an Egyptian diplomat as he prepared
to drive his daughter to school. The victim was seriously
injured by the blast. The Turkish Islamic Jihad claimed
responsibility, saying they "would not allow the imperialist
powers to divide up the Middle East at the peace summit." A
Turkish newspaper reported the group had carried out the
assassination because the victim had decoded Islamic Jihad's
communication computer codes.
(1991 1 108 Al B02 F000 1000 T02 N740 S640 RME P1433)
Suspected Kurdish extremists hurled petrol bombs at a
Japanese-owned Toyota dealership.
The PKK sent a letter to newspapers warning it would target
German interests in Turkey and urged Germans not to visit




Ankara (19920307 Al B06 F001 1000 T01 N666 S640 RME PI434
B04) A car bomb killed the regional security officer of the
Israeli Embassy. The Islamic Revenge Organization claimed
responsibility in protest to Israel's 16 February assassination of
Hezbollah secretary-general Sheikh Mousawi in Lebanon.
Istanbul At approximately 2345, TNP cordoned off the area around the
U.S. Consulate based on a telephone call they received that a
car bomb was parked around the vicinity of the Consulate
compound. During the sweep of the area, TNP identified a
stolen car parked on the back street directly behind the
Consulate. Inside the trunk of the car police found two gas
cylinders containing explosives. Police were able to deactivate
the devices. No one claimed credit.
16 April Istanbul (19920416 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
rocket attack during the night damaged the U.S. Consulate. At
21 15, an RPG-type device was fired at the rear of the Consulate
from a small park some 150 meters from the Consulate. The
projectile broke up when it hit a tree located in the Consulate
garden. Shrapnel from the device peppered the building and
shattered a window on the third floor of the building. No one
was injured. An anonymous caller to the Turkish newspaper




Istanbul The Iranian group Mojahedin charged that their member,
Mansur Amini, had been kidnapped in Istanbul by the
"diplomat-terrorists of the Khomeini regime's embassy."
Amini 's body, with his fingernails pulled out and genitals
mutilated, was found in a shallow grave.
Istanbul Turkish police disabled bombs found under two cars belonging
to the Iranian People's Mojahedin in Istanbul.
Mus. A 6-year-old Iranian child was killed and six Iranians and three
other people injured when separatist terrorists attacked a
passenger train during the night in eastern Mus. Province near
Kurtkale station.
1 1 July Izmir (1992071 1 Al B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P141
1
N255) Dev Sol claimed responsibility for a bomb attack at a
U.S.-German owned GM/Opel showroom in Izmir. At
approximately 2130, a pipe containing 1.5 kilograms of
explosive material exploded near the door to the service
entrance of the building. The building suffered extensive
damage, as did 30 cars. One person in the general area of the
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explosion was slightly injured. Following the attack, a local
newspaper received two telephone calls in which the caller
claimed the attack in the name of a Dev Sol SDB.
1 1 July Istanbul (1992071 1 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P141 1)
Dev Sol fired a RPG at the U.S. Consulate. At 2140, Dev Sol
terrorists fired a rocket at the Consulate. Damage was minimal
and no one was hurt. The rocket was fired from the same
location as the April 16 rocket attack. The rocket launcher and
a piece of paper with the Dev Sol symbol were found at the
scene. Following the attack, an anonymous caller to the local
press stated that he was with the SDB of Dev Sol, and that, "We
destroyed the U.S. Consulate in memory of our martyrs of July
12, 1991." On 12 July 1991, Turkish security personnel raided
eight Dev Sol safe houses in Istanbul that resulted in the death
of 12 Dev Sol members, and the arrest of 12 others.
1 1 July Istanbul (1992071 1 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P141 1)
Police defused a Dev Sol bomb planted under the car of a U.S.
education official, mistaken for a U.S. military official. At
1745, just after the U.S. citizen, head of the American Board
Mission, left his apartment by car, the caretaker of his
apartment building noticed a paper bag in the spot where the
American had parked his car. On closer examination, a bomb
was discovered inside the bag. It appeared the bag fell off the
car as the American drove off. Though no group claimed credit





Four or five rounds of shotgun fire were directed at the IBM
building. No one was hurt.
A Molotov cocktail was thrown at the KO£-American bank.
Damage was minimal and no one was hurt.
(19920716 Al B02 F000 1000 T5b N666 S640 RME P0000)
The offices of the Israeli El Al Airlines were attacked.
(19920827 Al B02 F000 1000 T5a N640 S640 RME P0000) A
Turkish airliner bound for Saudi Arabia was shot at while
taking off from Adana. Despite a number of bullet holes in the
fuselage, the plane continued on safely to its destination.
28 August Istanbul (19920828 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N200 S640 RME P1433) A
bomb went off at the British Consulate. The PKK claimed
responsibility.
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1 September Diyarbakir (19920901 Al B02 F000 1000 T07 N210 S640 RME P141
1
T02) Members of Dev Sol set fire to an oil storage tank near
Diyarbakir which was owned by a subsidiary of Royal Dutch
Shell.
1 1 September Sason (19920911 Al B02 F003 1001 T07 N210 S640 RME P1433
T02 N002) The PKK attacked a joint U.S.-Turkish Shell Oil
facility. The guerrillas, dressed in military uniforms, forced
their way into the offices and separated managers from the
other staff. They then opened fire on the managers. Three
people were killed and a Dutch manager slightly wounded.
(Note - DOS reports state this incident occurred on 9
September in Sason (Batman Province), at a Mobile Oil
exploration site, and the three killed were Turkish. In addition,
that five workers were wounded (no Americans).
22 September Istanbul 19920922 Al B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb went off at the U.S.-owned Bank of Boston. (Note -
According to DOS reports, TPLP-F/PRS claimed responsibility
for the attack on Boston Bank.)
22 September Istanbul
22 September Istanbul
(19920922 Al B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P0000)
Bombs were defused at a Coca-Cola factory. (Note -
According to DOS reports, the press reported erroneously that
the defused bomb was at Coca-Cola factory, when it was
actually the Isma bottling plant, which did bottle Coca-Cola
products.)
(19920922 Al B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P0000)
Bombs were defused at the U.S.-Turkish KOC-American Bank
in west Istanbul.
22 September Turkey (19920922 Al B04 F000 1000 T02 N742 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb was defused at the Japanese-Turkish automobile
company Toyota-S.A.
4 October Batman (19921004 Al B02 F000 1000 T07a N002 S640 RME P1433
T02 A4) PKK guerrillas attacked a U.S.-operated Mobil Oil
facility in Southeastern Turkey. The attack damaged two fuel
tanks, but caused no injuries.
4 October Batman PKK guerrillas attacked a Mobil Oil remote power distribution
center in Batman Province. The attack caused extensive




Istanbul At 2030, a bomb was left at the entrance of a building housing
the offices of McCann-Erickson advertising agency. The bomb
shattered some windows in the entrance way. No one was
injured. The agency occupied the top two floors of the building
and a Turkish holding company called £ukurova was located
on the ground floor.
Batman (19921 1 18 Al B02 F000 1000 T07a N002 S640 RME P1433
T02 A4) PKK attacked a Mobile Oil facility. Four generators
were knocked out in the attack, but no one was injured.
22 November Turkey (19921 122 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N366 S640 RME P1433) A
firebomb planted at the Russian Consulate was disarmed. The
PKK claimed responsibility.
1 1 December Ankara At 2030, a bomb went off in the car of Yas Panjurman, the
Second Secretary at the Indian Embassy, causing no casualties.
The blast damaged three vehicles and shattered windows in
nearby buildings.
20 December Ankara At 2000, an IED detonated at the U.S. Embassy. The explosion
resulted in minor damage and no injuries. No group claimed
credit for the attack.
20 December Ankara At 2000, an EED detonated at the French Embassy. The
explosion resulted in minor damage and no injuries. No group
claimed credit for the attack.
27 December Turkey (19921227 Al B04F001 1000 T12 N996 S640 RME P 141
1
P1410 A7) Both the TPLP-F and Dev Sol claimed





Istanbul ( 1 992 1 228 A 1 B0 1 F000 1000 T 1 6 N630 S640 RME P0000)
Iranian Abbas Golizade was kidnapped in Istanbul. The victim,
an Iranian opposition activist, was reportedly a bodyguard of
the former Shah of Iran.
Istanbul (19930126 Al B06 F001 1000 T17 N640 S640 RME P1433
P1432) A well4cnown leftist journalist, Ugur Mumcu, was
killed when a bomb exploded under his car in Istanbul. He
often criticized Islamic fundamentalism in his columns for the
newspaper Cwnhurriyet. Eleven people were arrested.
Among them were four Iranians and a Syrian. A Kurdish
separatist group and three Islamic groups all claimed credit.
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28 January Istanbul Police bodyguards foiled an attempt to ambush the motorcade
of a prominent Jewish businessman and community leader in
Istanbul. Police recovered an RPG- 18 rocket at the scene. On
30 January, police arrested two of the terrorists as they fled








Istanbul (19930423 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N200 S640 RME P1410) A
bomb exploded while being carried by a man near the British
Consulate in Istanbul. The man shouted slogans of an illegal
leftist group as he was being arrested. Police found a gun and a
light-anti-tank rocket in the bag.
Antalya (19930627 Al B02 F000 1026 T02 N640 S640 RME P1433
N255 N380 N375 T06a) A tourist hotel in Antalya was the
target of a bomb which was thrown onto the grounds. Twenty-
six people were injured including Germans, Swedes, and a
Finn. PKK was suspected, especially because they had warned
of such attacks after being "spurned by the government during a
self-imposed truce."
Turkey (199307?? Al B01 F000 1000 T06a N220 S640 RME P1433
T15) The PKK kidnapped four French tourists from their bus in
Southeastern Turkey. The PKK said the tourists would be held
until the Turkish government ceased operations against them.
Istanbul (199307?? Al B04 F000 1003 T06a N997 S640 RME P1433) A
small bomb exploded near the Aya Sofya (Hagia Sophia)
Cathedral Museum. It was planted in a trash can near an ATM.
Three tourists were injured. The PKK was suspected.
Guroymak (19930705 Al B01 F000 1000 T06a N996 S640 RME P1433
N200 N900) PKK guerrillas kidnapped two cousins—one
British and the other Australian—while they were touring
southeastern Turkey on bicycles. They were released on 10
August 1993.
Turkey (19930724 Al B01 F000 1000 T06a N220 S640 RME P1433)
PKK rebels kidnapped four French tourists from a tour bus.
They were released on 9 August 1993.
Istanbul (19930725 A 1 B04 F000 1004 T06a N640 S640 RME P0000)
Three tourists and a Turk were injured when a bomb hidden in
a litter bin exploded near the 6th Century Aya Sofya (Hagia
Sophia) cathedral.
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30 July Kusadasi (19930730 Al B04 F000 1018 T06 N640 S640 RME P0000
T06a) Eighteen people, including six foreign tourists, were







Istanbul (19930810 Al B02 F000 1000 T02 N996 S640 RME P1433)
Suspected PKK separatists threw a grenade into a tourist-filled
restaurant in Istanbul. The grenade failed to explode, thus
causing no injuries.
Batman At 1630, a utility crew of four Mobil Oil contractors and three
third-party contractors (none Americans) were reported missing
while en route to Batman. The minibus was eventually found
empty near the Batman-Diyarbakir highway. According to
Turkish press reporting, the workers were released on the
weekend of 21-22 August 1993. PKK rebels were suspected.
Turkey (19930815 Al B01 F000 1000 T06a N996 S640 RME P1433
N255 N920) PKK guerrillas kidnapped three male foreign
tourists—two Germans and a New Zealander—in eastern
Turkey.
Istanbul (19930818 Al B02 F000 101 1 T06a N310 S640 RME P1433
T15) An explosive was thrown at a Hungarian tour bus in the
Laleli district of Istanbul. Three Hungarians on the bus were
injured as well as eight bystanders, including one Hungarian
and one Azerbaijani. Authorities suspect PKK separatist
involvement. ( A teenage boy is suspected.)
Turkey (19930821 Al B01 F000 1000 T06a N996 S640 RME P1433
N325 N225) PKK guerrillas kidnapped four foreign tourists
—
three Swiss and one Italian—near the Iranian border.
22 August Batman (19930822 Al B01 F000 1000 T06 N700 S640 RME P1433)
PKK rebels kidnapped four ethnic Turks from Afghanistan
from a bus at a roadblock in Batman Province.
25 August
25 August
Turkey Four terrorists, masquerading as Turkish security officials,
kidnapped Iranian dissident Mohammad Khaderi from his
residence. On 4 September, his body was discovered on the
side of Kiur§ehir-B6ztepe Highway.
Istanbul (19930825 Al B02 F000 1006 T06a N255 S640 RME P1410)
A Molotov cocktail was thrown at a group of German tourists
in the Topkapi district of Istanbul. Six women in the group
sustained minor injuries.
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28 August Ankara (19930828 Al B06 F001 1000 T06 N630 S640 RME P0000) A
gunman, speaking Farsi, shot to death an Iranian dissident at
the victim's home in Ankara.
1 September Batman (19930901 Al B01 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1433)
The PKK kidnapped and released seven employees of a U.S.
corporation in Batman Province. The group was taken from a
bus at a roadblock and held for several days.
12 September Turkey
9 October
(19930912 Al B01 F000 1000 T06 N996 S640 RME P1433
N765 N630) The PKK kidnapped six Bangladeshis and two
Iranians in Southeastern Turkey. This occurred as the PKK
was releasing three other foreign hostages.
Erzurum (19931009 Al B01 F000 1000 T06 N996 S640 RME P1433)
The PKK kidnapped an American and a New Zealander in
eastern Turkey. They were eventually released unharmed on 1
8
November 1993.
14 October Turkey (19931014 Al B01 F000 1000 T06a N210 S640 RME P1433)
The PKK kidnapped a Dutch tourist. He was released on 14
November 1993.
2 December Adana At 1330, an IED damaged a U.S. Government van used by
VBR at Incirlik Air Base. No one was hurt. The van was
parked in front of VBR's office at the time of the explosion.
Following the attack, an anonymous caller contacted several







Iranian state agents were believed responsible for the
assassination of a member of the Iranian Kurdish Democratic
Party Central Committee in Corum.
Istanbul (199401 19 Al B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1410
R14;20) A series of bombings rocked Istanbul, including one at
a McDonald's restaurant. A group calling itself IBDA-Islamic
Retaliation Detachments claimed responsibility.
Istanbul A bomb exploded in the Haydarpa§a train station in Istanbul,
injuring a Singaporean.
Istanbul ( 1 9940324 A 1 B04 F000 1004 T06 N360 S640 RME P0000









the Covered Bazaar on Kapalicarsi's Yaglikcilar street. Four
persons were injured, including two Romanians. The PKK was
suspected. They had recently announced a campaign against
tourists in Turkey.
Istanbul ( 1 9940328(27) A 1 B04 F000 1003 T06a N996 S640 RME
P1433 R5) A bomb exploded at the St. Sophia religious shrine
and tourist attraction in Istanbul, injuring three European
tourists from Germany, Spain and the Netherlands. The PKK
claimed responsibility for the bombing as part of its campaign
to ruin Turkey's tourist industry.
Istanbul ( 1 9940402 A 1 B04 F002 10 1 5 T06 N996 S640 RME P0000 R
1
N616 N230) A bomb exploded in the Covered Bazaar in
Istanbul. Two people died, one Spanish and one Tunisian.
Twelve people were wounded including several foreigners—
a
Tunisian, two French, a Lebanese, and Spanish and Belgian
tourists. This incident was part of a PKK campaign to dissuade
tourists from travelling to Turkey. (Note - DOS reports state
that the two fatal victims were Spanish and Belgian.)
Ankara (19940410 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410
R20) Demonstrators upset by reports of Serbs using chemical
weapons against Bosnian Muslims attacked the U.S. Embassy.
The demonstration began outside the UN building across from
the Embassy before targeting the U.S. site. The protesters
threw rocks, jumped the fence, hung banners and kicked down
a security door.
Ankara (19940420 Al B04 F000 1000 T01 N345 S640 RME P1410
Rl) The car of the First Secretary to the Embassy of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia was the target of a bombing. The
bombing occurred outside his residence. A group calling itself
the IBDA claimed responsibility.
Fethiye (19940621 Al B04 F000 1010 T06a N996 S640 RME P1433
R2 N200 N305 N255 N640) See Next Entry.
Fethiye (19940621 Al B04 F000 1010 T06a N996 S640 RME P1433
R2 N200 N305 N255 N640) Two bombs exploded in Fethiye,
60 miles from Marmaris, wounding 10 tourists. An Austrian,
two Germans, three Britons and four Turks were among those
injured. The Kurdish Patriotic Union was suspected.
Marmaris (19940622 Al B04 F001 1021 T06a N996 S640 RME P1433
N200 R15;2) Bomb explosions in Marmaris injured 21 people,
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26 June Istanbul
among them five British tourists. One of the British tourists
died a few days later. The Kurdish Patriotic Union announced
it was responsible for the bombings.
(19940626 Al B04 F002 1000 T02 N002 S640 REU P0000
R20) A bomb planted in a McDonald's restaurant in Istanbul
was discovered, but exploded while being defused, killing one




Adana (1994072? A 1 B04 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A
bomb planted on the fuel pipeline leading to the joint U.S.-
Turkish LAB was defused just before it was to explode.
Turkey (19940808 Al B01 F000 1000 T06a N375 S640 RME P1433
Rl) PKK rebels kidnapped two Finnish tourists travelling in
eastern Turkey, stating the tourists did not have "entry visas for
Kurdistan." They were released soon afterwards.
Istanbul ( 1 99408 1 2 A 1 B04 F00 1 1008 T 1 5 N996 S640 RME P0000
Rl;?) One Romanian was killed, and a Czech and a Swede (one
source reports a Swiss national) were injured, along with six
Turks, when the International Topkapi Bus Terminal in Istanbul
was bombed. (Note - DOS reported the Romanian killed was a
consular official.)
14 September Ankara
1 2 December Istanbul
25 December Izmir
(19940914 Al B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 REU P0000
R20) A bomb was found and defused at a McDonald's
restaurant in Ankara. No claim of responsibility was made.
(19941212 Al B04 F000 1008 T06a N360 N640 S640 RME
P1410 R20) A bomb exploded in Istanbul injuring eight
persons, four of whom were Romanian tourists. The PKK was
suspected.
(19941225 Al B04 F000 1002 T02 N002 S640 RME P0000
R20) A car bomb, hidden in a parked taxi, exploded in front of
the Hilton Hotel. A second bomb found in the car was defused.
No one claimed responsibility. Two people were injured in the
explosion and four vehicles where damaged.
1995
15 January Istanbul (199501 15 Al B01 F002 1000 T06 N630 S640 RME P1433
R24) Two Iranian men were kidnapped from their house in
Atakoy section of Istanbul. Their tortured bodies were found
two weeks later in the Silivri section of Istanbul. The PKK
191
claimed the kidnapping and killings. The PKK claimed the
men had provided Turkish authorities with a list of Turkish
Kurds who supported the PKK.
18 January Ankara (199501 18 A2 B01 F000 1000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1420
R12;5) A previously unknown group—the Lebanese Freedom
Fighters—claimed to have kidnapped a U.S. military officer
and his son. They demanded Israel release Mustafa Dirani, a
Lebanese cleric, whom they had kidnapped from Lebanon to
use as a trade for Ron Arad, an Israeli soldier held since 1986.
On 24 January 1995, the two were found alive after being lost
in snow-covered mountains. They had not been kidnapped.
1
9
January Turkey The PKK published a warning in the Kurdish news agency
KURD-A, threatening to attack German facilities in Turkey.
The groups warned against vacation visits in Turkey.
21 April Istanbul (19950421 Al B04 F001 1000 TOO N630 S640 RME P0000 Ul
R25) A tow truck driver was killed when a bomb exploded
inside a car he was removing from an Istanbul car park, in the
district of Sarayburnu. No claim was made and the intended
target was not clear but the location was a tourist area, and was






Diyarbakir A U.S. civilian employee of Lockheed Martin, working at
Pirinclik Air Station, a radar surveillance station, was shot and
badly injured in an armed attack on a brothel near Diyarbakir.
Turkish police suspected the PKK.
Siirt (19950714 Al B01 F000 1000 T06a N740 S640 RME P1433
R2;23 U4) Kurdish separatist kidnapped a Japanese tourist
from a bus near Siirt. They stopped the bus, robbed the
passengers and then took the Japanese man with them. He was
released on 17 July 1995. The PKK was suspected.
Istanbul (19950714 Al B05 F000 1000 T06a N996 S640 RME P1410
R27) DHKP-C terrorists seized the Galata Tower, an historic
tourist site in Istanbul, and held 30 people hostage including 16
foreign tourists. Three of the hostages were U.S. citizens. The
DHKP-C militants hung banners from the top floor restaurant
protesting the detention of those who occupied the New
Democracy Movement offices the previous day.
Istanbul (19950827 Al B04 F002 1030 T06 N663 S640 RME P1433
R14) Two bombs planted in trash cans exploded in central
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Istanbul killing two people, including a Jordanian woman, and
injuring 30 others, including an American, an Austrian, an
Italian, and a Jordanian. The Kurdistan Islamic Unity Party
claimed responsibility.
27 August Istanbul (19950827 Al B04 F000 1008 T02 N370 S640 RME P0000
R14) A bombing at a restaurant in the Aksaray district of
Istanbul injured eight people, including six Ukrainians.
20 October Adana At approximately 1210, unknown individuals fired at a bus
contracted to transport USAF military personnel between
Incirlik Air base and leased military housing in Adana. The
bus was the second of two buses traveling together some 50
yards apart from each other. One round hit the bus and
shattered a window, but none of the three occupants (two Turks
and a USAF member) were hurt in the attack. No one claimed




(19951020 Al B04 F000 1000 T02 N002 S640 RME P0000
R20) A bomb exploded at a Coca-Cola warehouse in Istanbul.
No group claimed responsibility. (Note - According to DOS
reports DHKP-C claimed responsibility for the attack.)
At approximately 0215, a bomb exploded under a car belonging
to the Turkish manager of a Pepsi-Cola bottling company. No
one was hurt in the attack, and no group claimed credit.
(19951128 Al B06 F001 1000 T02 N640 S640 RME P1434
R14;23 U2 JT) A Turkish Jewish businessman was shot to
death in Bursa. A caller claimed that the murder was in
retaliation for the killing of Islamic Jihad Movement in
Palestine leader, Fathi al-Shaqaqi in Malta in October.
Hezbollah claimed responsibility. Police suspect a contract
killing related to business dealings.
1996
16 January Trabzon (199601 16 Al B03 F000 1001 T12 N366 S640 RME P1410 JT)
Turkish-Abkhazian supporters of Chechen separatism hijacked
a ferry—the Avrasya—sailing under the Panamanian flag and
threatened to blow up the vessel unless Russian forces allowed
Chechen gunmen free passage from a siege in the Dagestani
village of Pervomaiskaya. Of the 160 passengers on board, 1 14
were Russian. A security guard was injured during the initial
assault on the vessel. After being refused entry to Istanbul
because of the suspected quantities of explosives on board,
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Turkish authorities, in association with the Chechen foreign
minister, negotiated an end to the hijack. Nine men were
arrested at the port of Eregli and the ship then continued its
journey. It arrived in Sochi, Russia, on 23 January 1996.
20 February Istanbul ( 1 9960220 A 1 B06 F002 1000 T09 N630 S640 RME P200 1
)
Two Iranian dissident members of Mujahedin-e Khalq were
killed in Istanbul. A number of Iranians and Turks were
arrested in April 1996, in connection with the killing. Islamic




Istanbul (19960428 Al B04 F000 1000 T5b N365 S640 RME PI 545
P1410 AA JT) A bomb exploded near to the Russian Aeroflot
International Airlines office in the Beyoglu district of Istanbul.
There were no casualties but the doors and windows of the
office were destroyed. A previously unknown group calling
themselves the Organization for Solidarity with the Chechen
Resistance Fighters claimed responsibility.
Istanbul An unexploded IED was discovered in the international section
of Istanbul's Ataturk Airport. The device was discovered in a
bathroom after a bomb threat had been called in and the bomb
squad alerted. The device was described as "rudimentary." No




Gunmen from the PKK stopped a passenger bus along the
Bingol-Elazig Highway and took three foreigners—an Iranian,
a Polish man, and his fiance off the bus and kidnapped them.
The three were eventually released unharmed on 27 September
1996, in Bingol.
(19961026 Al B02 F000 1000 T01 N710 S640 RME P0000 Ul
R27) An explosion near the Chinese Consulate in Istanbul
caused no damage.
(19961 1 17 AA B07 F000 1000 T5a N255 S640 RME P0000)
An Airbus 320 owned by the German airline Aero Lloyd was
forced to land in Sofia, Bulgaria, after a bomb warning. The
flight, with 100 passengers on board, was diverted en route
from Istanbul to Frankfurt and searched at Sofia. No bomb was
found.
1 7 November Istanbul (199611 17 Al B01 F017I040T6aN370S640RMEP1410
R20) A fire at a hotel in Istanbul killed 17 Ukrainians and
injured 40 other people. An electrical fire was initially blamed
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but Turkish Islamic Jihad later claimed responsibility for the
incident.
28 November Bursa (19961 128 A 1 B06 F001 1000 T06 N995 N640 S640 RME
P1410 U3 R4) Gunman killed a Jewish businessman when they
opened fire on his car while he traveled in Bursa. The gunman
claimed the attack in retaliation for the assassination in Malta of
the leader of a militant Islamic group. Reportedly Israeli agents







Turkish police defused an EED found 5 meters from the
Aksaray McDonald's restaurant. No one claimed
responsibility.
A Molotov cocktail was thrown at the American Girls School,
which offers "Western-style" education to a largely Turkish
student body. No one was hurt in the attack. Four members of
the illegal Turkish group IBDA-C were arrested in connection
with the attack. The members were protesting the mandatory 8-
year education system being implemented in Turkey.
Two pipe bombs exploded outside of a General Electric
appliance outlet. There were no injuries or property damage.
A flag from a group called TKEP/L was found at the scene.
(19971005 A7 B04 F000 1000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410
R20) Two explosive devices were found outside the U.S.
Consulate in Istanbul. They were put there by the TKEP/L.
Flyers and a flag were left with the devices. The flag had the
initials "TKEP/L." Written on the flyers in Spanish and
Turkish was: "Revolution Forever-Che," and "Che-
Revolutions are coming."
Nine PKK terrorists kidnapped two Bulgarian and one Turkish
engineers from a coal mine. The Turkish engineer was found
dead, but the Bulgarians were released unharmed on 16
October.
10 December Mersin A bomb was found inside an empty gas canister as it was being
unloaded from a truck near the Atas. Oil refinery. The Atas.
refinery is a joint venture of Mobil Oil, British Petroleum, and






Adana A man and a woman, allegedly members of DHKP-C, were
caught in Adana. According to the Turkish Police, the two
planned to attack Incirlik Air Base and a police station in
Osmaniye. U.S. military personnel and aircraft are stationed at
the base. The police search of the two militants' house
discovered two hand grenades, two hand-make bombs, a sketch
depicting "the act of terrorism planned" for Incirlik Air Base, a
cellular phone, and DHKP-C documents.
Adana A lone hijacker seized control of a THY Avro RJ100 aircraft
with 63 passengers and five crew members shortly after takeoff
from Adana. The flight was enroute to Ankara. The hijacker
—
male—claimed he had an explosive device hidden in a stuffed
panda bear and demanded to be flown to Tehran, Iran. The
police convinced the hijacker to allow landing at Diyarbakir
Airport in Turkey, where 20 passengers were released. The
passengers overpowered the hijacker while on the ground and
the he was taken into custody. It was believed the hijacker was
protesting the oppression of Muslims in Algeria.
Istanbul Two PKK members on a motorcycle threw a bomb into a park
near the Blue Mosque in Istanbul. The explosion injured two
Indian tourists, a New Zealander, four Turkish civilians, and
two Turkish soldiers. On 12 April authorities arrested the two




Armed PKK militants kidnapped a German tourist and a
Turkish truck driver at a roadblock in Agri. The German
tourist was found unharmed the next morning near the
kidnapping site, but the truck driver remained missing.
A man hijacked THY Flight 145 (Airbus A-310) enroute from
Ankara to Istanbul and diverted it to Trabzon to protest the
Turkish Government's ban on women wearing the traditional
Islamic head covering, or chador, at universities. Although he
claimed to have a bomb, it was later reported that the hijacker
had only a plastic toy gun. The flight had 76 passengers, all of
which were released unharmed when the hijacker surrendered
to police.
A man with a handgun and a grenade hijacked THY Flight 487,
which had departed Adana at approximately 1940. enroute to
Ankara. The B-737 carried approximately 40 passengers and
crew. The hijacker demanded to be taken to Lausanne,
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Switzerland, but agreed to the pilot's request to land at Sofia,
Bulgaria, for refueling. The pilot, however, landed at Ankara's
Esenboga Airport, while the hijacker believed they were in
Sofia. The hijacker told the passengers he was protesting the
Turkish Government's "dirty war" against ethnic Kurds. The
pilot also read a statement from the hijacker demanding to be
taken to Lausanne because it was there that the modern Turkish
state was created in a treaty signed 75 years earlier. (The
hijacking occurred during the 75th anniversary celebration of
the Turkish Republic.) The hijacker's statement also praised
"Chairman Apo," Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK.
Although negotiations were conducted, the hijacker did not
release any passengers. Approximately seven hours after the
plane landed TNP special action teams stormed the plane
through the rear door, evacuated some passengers, and killed
the hijacker in the cockpit. There were no other injuries. It is
not known whether the hijacker acted on his own or on behalf
of the PKK. Coincidentally, one week earlier this same plane
was prevented from taking off in Strasbourg, France, by
protesters trying to prevent the deportation of a Kurd to Turkey.
17 December Ankara A group of approximately 50 demonstrators from the Turkish
Workers Party held a peaceful demonstration in front of the
main gate at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara. This incident was in
response to U.S. Operation DESERT FOX against Iraq,
between 16-19 December 1998.
20 December Istanbul Some 300 people representing the Freedom and Solidarity
Party staged a peaceful demonstration in front of the U.S.
Consulate. This incident was in response to U.S. Operation
DESERT FOX against Iraq, between 16-19 December 1998.
1999
4 June Istanbul Turkish police killed two DHKP-C militants during an attempt
to attack the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul with a "Light Anti-tank
Weapon" or LAW. The two apparently had set up at a
construction site, from where they intended to launch the LAW
at the Consulate. According to the police, the two militants had
two Lama-type hand guns, magazines, and 15 rounds of
ammunition, one LAW, a hammer, a knife, and a pair of
surgical gloves. In an Internet statement attributed to the
DHKC Press Bureau, the attack was attempted because the U.S.
had been "bombing the People of Yugoslavia for months
because it want[ed] to break it up and establish its domination."
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APPENDIX I - TURKIYEHALKKURTULU§ ORDUSU MANIFESTO 181
The following is a translation of the Manifesto provided by Tiirkiye Halk Kurtulu§
Ordusu (THKO) or Turkish People's Liberation Army, following the kidnapping of four
USAF airmen on 4 March 1971.
MANIFESTO OF THE TURKISH PEOPLES' LIBERATION ARMY
THE TURKISH PEOPLES' LIBERATION ARMY'S CALL TO ALL THE
PEOPLES OF THE WORLD AND TO THE PEOPLES OF TURKEY
This is the voice of the People's Liberation Army of Turkey.
1
.
The Peoples' Liberation Army of Turkey believes that the liberation of our people and
the independence of our country will be achieved by armed struggle and that this course
is the only course.
2. The Peoples' Liberation Army of Turkey calls all patriots to the ranks of this sacred
struggle and declares that it will continue to fight to the last man in its struggle against
the traitors.
3. Our aim is to liquidate American and all foreign enemies, destroy the traitors and
establish a fully independent Turkey cleared of the enemy.
4. The Peoples' Liberation Army of Turkey is the vanguard force of our oppressed
peoples and will not enter any movement beyond the liberation of our people.
5. We announce to our people: don't pay attention to the wealth of the enemy, its
number, resources and terror. Don't succumb to the enemy; we shall forcibly extract our
rights because they take everything from us by force.
TO ALL PATRIOTS:
Rather than living dishonorably, die honorably. Instead of pleading, resort to force.
Have confidence in yourself and those like you, and not in orders.




Revolutionaries: Abandon the methods of struggle by peaceful means. Join the ranks of
the Peoples' Liberation Army in armed struggle which is the basis of the policy of
violence which will lead the peoples' masses to liberation. Let us all together wave the
peoples' banner of national liberation war against the aggressive policy of imperialism.
Workers, peasants: the Gendarmerie and police of the herd of traitors continue to plan
new crimes every day. We have not yet taken the revenge of our brothers who were shot
and tortured in commando attacks in the east, on the June 16 incidents, at Bossa and
many other places. Let us all raise the banner of revolt against the herd of traitors who
are exploiting our sweat and blood.
Teachers, minor officials: do not ask for mercy from the lackeys who are reluctantly
paying you the equivalent of a piece of dry bread but who banish you from place to place
when they don't like it and who exploit you like a servant. The only path of liberation of
the oppressed is a sacred revolt against the oppressors.
Peoples' Liberation Army of Turkey assumes the responsibility of the incidents which
took place within the short period it has engaged in its struggle and makes its first
declaration to our people:
1
.
On the night of December 29, 1970 the policemen of the riot squad on duty in front of
the American Embassy were shot. This incident gave confidence to the revolutionaries
and to the people and for the first time in Turkey the traitors were faced with a terrorist
act of the revolutionaries.
2. On January 1 1, 1971, the Emek branch of IS bank was robbed and 24 thousand liras
were taken. The objective of the robbery was to upset the business mechanism of the
banks that secure the continuation of the system of exploitation on the one hand, and to
secure arms in order to be able to fight better with the enemy on the other hand. For this
reason, after the robbery the enemy has increased its pressure on the people and our
fighters with an unprecedented savagery. After one month of pursuit, the enemy failed to
catch our fighters, but helped them to become heroes, in a short time.
3. In mid-February an American launch was bombed and was saved from sinking with
great difficulty.
4. On the night of February 20 two policemen of the riot squad were shot. This action
was carried out for the same reasons as the shooting of the policemen in Ankara.
5. On the night of February 16 the American base at Balgat was entered. The base
remained under the control of our fighters for four hours. The base was entered for the
purpose of [obtaining] [sic] ammunition; no weapons were found on the guards. Upon
departure our fighters took along with them an American sergeant on guard duty, but
gave up shooting him when it was seen that he was a Negro, and he was released after
securing necessary information [intelligence] [sic] about Americans in Ankara.
208
The incidents proved the following:
The enemy is cruel, but also an extreme coward in appearance. Although it appears
strong it is weak. We are the strong, brave and courageous ones. For the past month and
a half the police organization of the traitor administration has bowed to a handful of our
fighters. Despite all pressure and violence, not one of our fighters has be caught, but in
order to deceive the people and to appear successful some revolutionaries who had no
connection with the incidents were arrested and tortured.
The Peoples' Liberation Army of Turkey has taken hostage four American NCO's
stationed at TUSLOG Det 18 American base.
The hostages are:
S/Sgt. Jimmie J. Sexton
A/lc James M. Gholson
A/lc L. J. Heavner
A/lc Richard Caraszi
The Peoples' Liberation Army of Turkey is giving 36 hours to release the Americans it
has taken hostage. Within this period government officials should announce through
TRT and the press that the conditions set forth shall be complied with. All developments
should be made public through the same media by the authorities. If such an
announcement is not made, it will be considered that the conditions are not accepted. At




In order to secure the release of all the hostages, USA shall pay a ransom of $400,000
(four hundred thousand) dollars to the Peoples' Liberation Army of Turkey. (The method
of pickup shall be relayed later.)
2. The declaration of the Peoples' Liberation Army of Turkey entitled "To All the
Peoples of the World and to the People of Turkey" and the conditions shall be broadcast
over TRT on 0730, 1300, and 1900 hours news bulletins in their entirety.
3. No revolutionary shall be arrested because of this incident during the time American
hostages are in custody.
Note: The period stipulated begins at 5:00 o'clock on the morning of March 4, 1971 and
expired at 1800 hours on March 5. It should be known that any search campaign to be
undertaken by the police shall endanger the lives of the hostages.
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Officers, students, technicians: Use the weapon in your hands for the sake of the
liberation of our country. Oppose the commanders under orders to NATO and the
interest of the traitors fed by American.
Small tradesmen, artisans, orphans, widows and pensioners: you are in need of
protection to live as human beings, to be considered as human beings. Poverty bends you
more with each passing day. You look to the future with fear. Your salvation is not
separate from the salvation of all of our people. Until the end of the traitors who have put
you into this state comes, you will know no comfort.
All patriots:
Because of America and the traitors in her services, we have become step-children in our
own country. No one is certain of the future. Our lives pass in hunger and want, without
doctors, medicine, without schools, roads. We cannot leave the homeland to the coming
generation in this state. It is our most sacred duty to rebel against the handful of traitors
who suck our life blood, and against America behind them. As long as this order of
pillage continues we will be the ones who die of hunger, who are without work, who are
not treated as human beings, who groan under high cost of living and increased prices,
and who are mistreated.
Until now we always begged but we did not get anything. As we asked for little we were
dragged towards a precipice. We waited for help from them, but gained nothing but
harm.
Therefore:
There is no other course but to rebel against the traitors.
If we are weak today it is because we are not united, for they throw us against each other.
Let's open our eyes well and see the real enemy all together. The real enemy is America,
the treacherous bosses, the agas, the usurers, the money-lenders.
Let us not be afraid:
It is a debt of honor to fight for salvation of the country and besides we have not life left
to lose.
Already, from the police to our president, no one sleeps easily in their homes: they
cannot come and go comfortably to their homes. They know very well what will happen
tomorrow and that the Peoples' Liberation Army of Turkey, which is a handful of
fighters today, will tomorrow become thousands and millions and they wonder what they
will do then.
We repeat: Do not take heed of the numbers of the enemy, its wealth, its terrorism and
the means it has. When we take away the weapons and means in its hands there will be
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no power left to stop us. Let us get rid of the lack of confidence we have in ourselves and
in those like ourselves. Let us know well that no force is capable of withstanding the
peoples' power, that is to say, our power. Let us take up our sacred duty in this
honorable struggle.
The Turkey of tomorrow will become a paradise for us, the dungeon for the enemy.
The Peoples' Liberation Army of Turkey declares that it will continue this struggle to the
last breath and to the last drop of its life-blood.
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APPENDIX J - DEVRIMCI SOL 'NEWS BULLETIN' NO. 9 182
Devrimci Sol News Bulleting No. 9, dated 22 March 1991. In the following bulletin,
Devrimci Sol claims responsibility for the assassination of U.S. civilian John Gandy in
Istanbul.
WE ARE GIVING OZAL ONE OF BU.S.H'S CHILDREN SO THAT HE DOES
NOT GO TO AMERICA EMPTY-HANDED.
Ozal, who opened all the country's doors to the American war machine during the
imperialist were waged against the peoples of the Middle East and turned the bases into
headquarters of murder, is going to meet Bush. To get the payoff for his 'servitude' to
America, to turn the country into an arsenal for the U.S. in the Middle East, and to sign
new agreements with the imperialists.
We repudiate all agreements that strengthen imperialism. We stand against the whole
economic, political and military presence of imperialism in our country. We want the
U.S. and NATO bases to be closed and all the bilateral agreements to be annulled.
Our aim is an independent and democratic Turkey. This is what we are fighting and
struggling for. But Ozal wonders 'What are we good for?' He should have learned this a
long time ago. However, if he still hasn't, while he is in the U.S. he can ask Bush, from
whom he always seeks advice, and learn what we are good for. He knows us from
Vietnam, Angola, Nicaragua, Salvador, and Palestine. Who knows those who struggle
against imperialism better than Bush?
Yes, we say an independent Turkey is a country where the people control their own
destiny. In this country, there is no place for collaborators ! But servants of imperialism,
like Ozal, pretend not to hear this. And they have the audacity to say 'What are we good
for'!
Our actions will definitely teach Ozal what we are good for!
In order not to go to the U.S. empty-handed, he can take one Bush's children with him.
He can tell Bush that we say, 'Either Turkey is to be independent or imperialists will
continue to collect their dead friends.'




We will continue to target imperialist bases, U.S. installation, agents and officials unless
the imperialist murderers take their hands off our country and leave. We will not agree to
turn Turkish lands into arsenals and war bases for imperialist in the Middle East. We will
make it impossible for the imperialist murderers and their collaborators to live in our
country.
Our anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic struggle will continue until we create an independent,
democratic, and socialist Turkey.
We carried out the attack against John Gandy, the manager of TUSLOG and the
American firm of Vinnel-Brown and Root for this reason.
DOWN WITH IMPERIALISM!
WE DO NOT WANT IMPERIALIST BASES AND TREATIES!
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APPENDIX K - DEVRIMCI SOL COMMUNIQUE ON OPERATION DESERT
STORM 183
Devrimci Sol Communique, undated. In the following communique Devrimci Sol speaks
of the group's opposition to the U.S.-led military Operation DESERT STORM.
DO NOT KEEP SILENT ABOUT THE ARAB VICTIMS!
FIGHT IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION!
Right now, terrible mass murder is taking place in the Middle East. The people in Iraq
are being exterminated. The imperialists are perpetrating a bloodbath in the Middle East
with weapons that were brought to the area months earlier. Iraq was turned into a hell by
the bombardments of the so-called allied forces. The western mass media, controlled by
the imperialists, are broadcasting false information. But not even these lies can hide the
cruel suffering they themselves have caused.
This war is being waged in the interest of the oil monopolies and oil sheikhs. Blood is
flowing for the sake of the imperialist thieves. Imperialism does not accept anything that
goes against its interests in this oil-rich region. The reason for the oppression of the
people in the Middle East is that the imperialists insist on playing a dominant role. While
the war is going on, they want to destroy the national and social movements in the region.
Beside the intervention by the U.S., France, Britain, and Saudi Arabia, other imperialist
nations are preparing for action. The Turkish government, which has been playing the
role of warmonger from the beginning of the crisis, allows its country to be used as a base
for attacks on Iraq and is preparing for a second front in which Turkey can play an active
role in the war.
In spite of the propaganda of the imperialist press, there is a growing awareness among
the people of the world of why and in whose interests this war is being waged.
Everywhere in the world, protests are increasing. The rage of the people in the Middle
East is growing, and so is their resistance. The imperialists will not gain their objective
through genocide. They will suffer severe reverses, as history has shown in Vietnam,
Algeria and Angola. The fascist Ozal regime collaborates with the imperialists. The
offer to use the Incirlik NATO base for U.S. bombing raids against Iraq is simply an
attempt to drag Turkey into the war.
Ozal participates in the frontal attack on the Arab population. Strengthen the resistance




SMASH THE IMPERIALIST WAR!
IMPERIALIST TROOPS OUT OF THE MIDDLE EAST!
DO NOT KEEP SILENT ABOUT THE MASS MURDER OF ARAB
POPULATIONS!
BU.S.H, MAJOR AND MITTERRAND ARE MURDERERS!







184APPENDIX L - DEVRIMCI SOL 'NEWS BULLETIN' NO. 3
Devhmci Sol News Bulleting No. 3, dated 1 March 1991. In the following bulletin,
Devrimci Sol claims responsibility for the attempted assassination of USAF Lieutenant
Colonel ALVLN MACKE in Izmir.
OUR LAND IS NOT A BASE FOR IMPERIALIST MURDERS!
The NATO and U.S. bases located in Turkey were among the centers of aggression used
against the peoples of the Middle East. American bombers taking off from Incirlik,
Erhac, and Batman bases carried death to the people of Iraq. With the tens of thousands
of bombs used in Iraq, people were savagely massacred without any civilian-military
discrimination, and all the economic and cultural wealth of Iraq was destroyed.
Despite all the effort spent to conceal the facts, today the reality of how the imperialist
powers massacred thousands of people is slowly revealing itself. A massacre was
brought about in the Middle East with the use of all the advances of technology.
We will never forget this massacre!
The Ozal government collaborated in the criminal actions of imperialism against the Iraqi
people by allowing the use of Turkish soil as a base for this massacre. The Ozal
government is at least as responsible as imperialism for the burning to death of thousands
of women and children in shelters.
Ozal's policies have been those of creating animosity between peoples. As a result of
this policy and under the guidance of U.S. imperialism, Turkey has turned into a new
Israel.
The war made it apparent that the U.S. and NATO bases fulfill no other function than
strengthening the presence of imperialism in our country and reinforcing its dependence;
the importance of closing down the U.S. and NATO bases, annulling all bilateral
agreements that reinforce imperial dependence and withdrawing from all imperial
pacts
—
primarily NATO—has become obvious once more.
Thanks to the Ozal government acting as a servant of imperialism, the imperialist
murderers are now able to act in our country as if it were theirs. While totally neglecting
the safety of its own people, the government has mobilized all its forces for the
Americans.
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This will not be forgotten!
TURKEY IS NOT A PLAYGROUND FOR IMPERIALIST!
We will hold the Ozal government responsible for its policy of national dishonor and for
being the servant of imperialism. The dishonor of promoting interests by shedding the
people's blood will not go unpunished.
'FIGHTING AGAINST THE OZAL GOVERNMENT IS FIGHTING AGAINST
IMPERIALISM' will be our battle cry in our struggle for an independent and democratic
Turkey.
Today the imperialists are enjoying their victory of having destroyed Iraq and massacred
its people. It is futile to boast about this, for they have been unable to overcome a
people's struggle led by revolutionaries. Their only success is in having the Saddam
administration, which they once co-operated with and supported, accede to their
demands. That such administrations cannot resist imperialism even if they fight it from
time to time is not a new phenomenon.
The war against imperialism in the Middle East is not over!
The U.S. should not think that the war is over because it beat Iraq. The war will continue
even more fiercely with the participation of Arab, Turkish, Kurdish and Persian peoples,
who will bring an end to their collaborator administrations, supported by imperialism,
and destroy the status quo imposed on the peoples.
The people of Iraq, after gaining power themselves, will succeed in organizing the
resistance against imperialism and defeating it.
The reality is that the U.S. attacked Iraq, not to liberate Kuwait, but to impose its control
over Middle Eastern oil, that it wants to enslave people by usurping their resources, that it
wants to convey to the world a message - 'either you obey me or you will be bombed to
destruction' - and that imperialism's aggression knows no boundaries.
But the people will not yield to imperialism!
The terror and massacres of imperialism will not stop the anti-imperialist fight for
independence and freedom.
We will continue our actions against imperialism and the Ozal administration!
We will hold the Ozal administration responsible for co-operating with imperialism, for
acting as its hired gunman—working in exchange for dollars—and for massacring the
Arab people.
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We will demand an explanation for turning Turkish and Kurdish lands into bases of
aggression of imperialism against the people.
The American Lieutenant-Colonel Alvin Macke, stationed at the NATO headquarters in
Izmir, has been punished by our organization.
THE U.S. AND NATO BASES SHOULD BE CLOSED DOWN IMMEDIATELY!
DOWN WITH IMPERIALISM AND THE OZAL COLLABORATOR
GOVERNMENT!
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APPENDIX M - DHKC'S "PEOPLE'S PARTY" PROGRAM 185
The following is an "English" version of the "Revolutionary People's Liberation Party's






The Revolutionary People's Liberation Party's
Program
We are fighting for the liberation of our people: Turkish, Kurdish and all other
nationalities; We are fighting for justice, equality, and conditions of life that are fit for
human beings.
LET U.S. FIGHT AND BUILD OUR PEOPLE'S POWER
OUR PARTY'S ULTIMATE GOAL
Our party's world view is Marxism-Leninism, and we are fighting to this end. The
ultimate aim of the DHKP is the creation of a society without exploitation and without
classes. Our immediate aim, however, is to establish the revolutionary power of the
people - the power of all the people's forces that are against oligarchy and imperialism.
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"Revolutionary People's Liberation Party's Program," Available [Online]
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WHAT KIND OF REVOLUTION DO WE STRIVE FOR?
Our revolution is anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic in character. This is based on the
economic, social and political analysis of our country. It is not feudalism which is
dominant in our country, but capitalism. But in our country, capitalism has not developed
on its own basis, as in the United States, Japan or Europe. Rather, capitalism was
introduced and developed here as a result of imperialism and dependency. That is why
the imperialist crisis has hit our country in such an unbearable way - just like it has every
other neo-colonial country.
The domestic ruling class is the principal ally of imperialism in our country. It is the
monopolists and the bourgeoisie who are collaborating with imperialism. The domestic
ruling class was in league with imperialism from the beginning. In order to maintain its
regime of exploitation politically, economically and ideologically, the monopolists need
to work together with "pre-capitalist elements" (big landowners, profiteers and
merchants). The classes who are oppressed in this regime based on extreme exploitation
are, in the first place, the workers, the landless peasants and the rural petty bourgeoisie.
The social and political powers which are holding back the development of the
productive forces are imperialism and the oligarchy.
This short summary presents a picture and shows the character of our revolution.
THE PATH TO LIBERATION
In our country, a distorted form of capitalism holds sway. The country is under the
economic and political hegemony of imperialism. It is ruled by a fascist type of state.
This state has always brutally and bloodily suppressed the struggles of the masses for
basic rights, justice and equality. The political parties and organisations which exist and
are active within the framework of this system were created by the regime in order to
strengthen the system and to hinder the politicisation of the people's struggles, to divert it
away from the struggle for power.
They try to neutralise any kind of mass resistance against the brutal exploitation of
imperialism and the oligarchy by any means necessary - including large scale massacres.
The economic and political hegemony of imperialism encompasses all regions of our
country. It controls and dominates the collaborationist regime.
In our country, which is dependent on imperialism and ruled by fascism, it is impossible
to change the character of the regime by means of elections.
This is the reason why armed struggle is the only way to destroy the fascist power which
is controlled by imperialism and the oligarchy.
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The people's war - carried out with arms - under the leadership of the revolutionary party
and front, will grow in rural and urban areas through armed propaganda. It will be
strengthened and will develop into guerrilla war, and a guerrilla army will be created.
Together with the growing movement of the people and local uprisings, a people's army
will develop. The people's war will eventually destroy the oligarchy's state through a total
uprising and will establish the revolutionary power of the people. Our party sees the first
phase of this people's war as a guerrilla war fought by the vanguard, on the basis of
armed propaganda.
Armed struggle is the basis of the people's war, but it is not the only way to fight. This
war is being fought according the PASS, the Politicised Military Strategy of War, which
corresponds to the conditions and circumstances in our country. The guerrilla war in rural
and urban areas is the basis for the revolutionary struggle. In addition to the guerrilla war,
short-term rights and freedoms are fought for and defended. Any idea which detracts
from the revolution and causes it to deviate from its line, is fought against ideologically.
While our party takes part in the everyday economic and democratic struggles of the
people, it also makes it clear that final liberation cannot be achieved through these
struggles alone, and makes clear the aim of conquest of power.
Economic and democratic struggles are subordinate to the armed struggle - they
strengthen the people's war.
The aim of the people's war is to destroy the economic and political power of
imperialism, the oligarchy and the fascist state, and to establish the revolutionary power
of the people.
The revolutionary power of the people is the revolutionary power of all classes and strata
that are not part of imperialism and the oligarchy.
THE STRATA AND CLASSES AMONG THE PEOPLE
In the war for the establishment of the revolutionary power of the people, our party relies
principally on the following forces: the working class, impoverished and small peasants,
civil servants and all other working people, small producers in the cities and in the
countryside, small traders, craftsmen, students, intellectuals and everyone who has not
lost their national values, who wants independence for out country and liberty for our
people, and who is against exploitation and oppression.
EXTERNAL FORCES WHO SUPPORT OUR REVOLUTION
Our revolution is also a revolution in the Middle East and in the Balkans. This is why it is
above all the proletariat and people of this region who are the friends and allies of our
revolution. In other countries all over the world, our friends and allies are the proletariat,
the revolutionary and democratic people, and the forces of national and social liberation.
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after the fall of revisionism, there are new friends and allies which have emerged from
the dynamics of the new socialist movements.
THE ENEMIES IN THIS WAR
Our enemies in this war are:
first of all, U.S. imperialism and all imperialist forces, together with their military,
economic and political bases, their offices, and their secret service bases set up under the
guise of providing "aid";
the monopolists and merchants, the profiteers, the big landowners and their private armed
forces;
all those in positions of political and bureaucratic responsibility in the government and
the state, along with the members of parliament and the parties which defend the regime;
the repressive apparatus of the state, the army, the police, the secret service, the counter-
guerrilla and the "village protectors";
all political parties which have taken their place within the oligarchic structure and which
support the regime, are fascist, or want to hinder the revolutionary people's war;
all state and private institutions which support imperialism and the oligarchy, and which
are used as a means to hinder the revolutionary war;
all spies, agents, agents provocateurs and their organisations which serve the regime in
order to hinder the revolutionary war.
While the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party fights against these enemies of the
people, it also strives to win over or to at least neutralise those strata among the people
who have been misled by the enemy or who have fallen victim to their own short-term
interests. Our Party strives to broaden the people's front and to strengthen the unity of this
front against the enemies of the people.
THE TASKS OF REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S POWER
Just like the other peoples of the world who are oppressed and exploited, our peoples, the
Turkish and Kurdish nation and all other nationalities, are exploited and oppressed by
imperialism and its tool, the collaborationist ruling classes. Dependency on imperialism
is not a new phenomenon.
It began at the time of the Ottoman Empire through classical colonialism, and continued
at the beginning of the 20th century with imperialist colonialism. The peoples who lived
under the Ottoman Empire were exploited by imperialism until they had shed their last
drop of blood, and they were oppressed militarily, politically and culturally. In the years
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after the first imperialist war, Anatolia was occupied by several imperialist states. This
was the start of direct imperialist exploitation and oppression. Through the policy of so-
called "divide and rule", the people's living in Anatolia were incited to "tear each other
apart".
This dependency on imperialism was brought to an end for a limited period of time
through the war of liberation waged by the people's and nations of Anatolia in fraternal
solidarity with each other. However, because of its class character, the petty bourgeoisie,
which was the class which led the struggle for liberation, followed a capitalist line, and
imperialism trapped the whole world - except for the Soviet Union - in a pincer
movement. Imperialism had enough power to once again entrap countries which had won
their political liberation. For this reason, in our country a new process of colonisation
began after the second imperialist war, a process which accelerated in the years which
followed.
The result was that our country became a cheap policeman for NATO, and especially for
the U.S. Hundreds of army bases were built in our country and the army was placed
under the command of U.S. and NATO generals. Governments could only survive with
the agreement of the U.S. They became a tool for carrying out the political and economic
plans of imperialism.
Political domination was supplemented by economic domination. Imperialist economic
institutions like the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD determine the economy of our
neo-colonial country. In addition, imperialist culture was foisted upon our country.
Everything is influenced by imperialism's degenerate consumer culture: music, cinema,
the press and television, and even the ways of thinking and living that the people adopt
on all social levels.
Imperialism is backed by the oligarchy and its fascist state in implementing the covert
occupation and open exploitation of our country. The collaborationist and exploiting
minority are the henchmen of imperialism. To get a piece of the cake, which is soaked
with the blood of our people, it collaborates with imperialism and sells the whole country,
together with its commodities, its cultural values, its dignity, its independence and even
the life of the people itself to imperialism.
In our country, the state - along with its army, police, bureaucracy and ideological
institutions - is a tool in the hands of imperialism and oligarchy for the oppression of the
people. The fascist state is a weapon, looking after the interests of imperialism and the
oligarchy, and holding the working people hostage through terror, intimidation and
demagogy. This deadly weapon is above all used against the Marxist-Leninist movement
along with every progressive, patriotic and democratic movement.
Our country has been occupied by imperialism through this fascist state.
We will put an end to this regime of bloody exploitation through the anti-imperialist
revolution, and we will establish the power of the people. The power of the people will
implement revolutionary and democratic transformation.
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A) ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL
a - REVOLUTIONARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE AND PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY
The revolutionary power of the people will destroy the fascist state, the oppressing
instrument of imperialism and the oligarchy, with its army, police, bureaucracy and all its
ideological, cultural and other institutions.
The revolutionary power of the people will establish a new kind of state on the ruins of
the old system.
This state will not be bourgeois, but rather will be placed under the hegemony of the
proletariat. This means democracy for the forces of the people and dictatorship over the
oligarchy and imperialist forces. The state will not be alienated from society, but will
adapt to its internal and external conditions.
Even though the main aspect will be the hegemony of the proletariat, the revolutionary
power of the people will at the same time be the power of the other strata and classes of
the people. This is why the class struggle of the proletariat and other working classes and
strata who want to lead the revolution on towards socialism is inevitable within the
revolutionary power of the people. This fight will be directed against all conservative
forces which want to stop the development of the revolution. The form of this struggle
will depend primarily on the internal balance of forces, and secondly on the external
balance of forces.
In this people's democracy, the people will elect, control and dismiss representatives in
all social and political organisations. This principle has nothing to do with bourgeois
democracy, where one of the bourgeois parties always rules. People's democracy means
the self-determination of the people. The party of the proletariat, the leading force in the
anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic revolution, will also be in a leading position under the
revolutionary power of the people. The parties and organisations which have taken part in
the people's front as representatives of the other people's forces, will also have their place
under people's democracy.
The highest representative and decision-making organ is the people's parliament. The
members of the people's parliament are elected through free elections. The people can
dismiss the representatives of their region through elections at any time.
The revolutionary power of the people hands over supervision and direction of the media
to the people and its organised forces. The media will be run in the interests of the
revolution and the people in the fields of education, vocational training and culture. In
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addition to this, they will be used for the ideological activities and the social
organisations of the people.
The revolutionary power of the people will abolish all restrictions that hinder the
organisation of the people's forces. The right to organise economically, culturally,
socially and politically will be guaranteed to all strata and classes of the people, to the
peasants, to the civil servants, to the small traders, to women, to the youth, and above all
to the working class. Their organisations will be supported and protected.
Any counter-revolutionary organisations and activity against the revolution will be
punished without pity. The forces of the oligarchy and imperialist will be given no kind
of freedom.
The representatives of the state who have committed crimes against the revolution, along
with everyone who has oppressed the people, torturers, civil fascists and imperialist
agents will be punished.
All political prisoners will be set free. The inhuman fascists, torturers and everyone who
has committed crimes against the revolution are excluded from this measure. The
prisoners who have committed crimes because of the influence of ideologically and
culturally degenerate values will be granted an amnesty and reintegrated into society.
b - DEFENCE OF THE PEOPLE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S ARMY
The revolutionary power of the people will abolish the fascist army and the special forces
for internal security like the secret service, the police and the counter-guerrilla. These are
based on slave-like discipline, are permeated by a conservative ideology, and have the
aim of supporting the interests of imperialism and the oligarchy, he revolutionary power
of the people will derive its power from the armed people, and will defend the interests of
the revolution and of the people against any enemy, internal or external.
The defense of the people will be guaranteed primarily through a part of the armed
people, the revolutionary people's army, strengthened in the course of revolutionary war.
Its power and its roots lie in the people. It is a defensive army, for protection against all
kinds of counter-revolutionary sabotage and imperialist attacks.
The revolutionary people's army will not be based on the slave-like discipline of the
fascist system, but on revolutionary discipline and on comradely relations. It will be
aware of the interests of the revolution and of internationalist duties.
The revolutionary people's army will not be a burden on society but instead will take part
in production itself, without neglecting its tasks, and will always be a part of the people.
So long as imperialism exists, it will be necessary to have a people's army equipped with
modern arms and techniques. Its training and equipment will match the standards of the
permanent development of military needs.
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The revolutionary people's army is a specific way of organising the armed people.
In addition to the revolutionary people's army, the armed people will form people's
militias, secret services and services for internal security. These organisations will protect
the interests of the revolution under the supervision of the political organs of people's
democracy.
c - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY
Any relation based on political, economic, military or cultural dependency on
imperialism will be ended. The independence of our country will be the central issue. On
the international level, a policy of independence will be followed.
All relations with neo-colonial economic institutions like the IMF, World Bank and
OECD will be terminated.
Our country will leave all imperialist and aggressive alliances, above all NATO. Every
bi-lateral agreement with the imperialists in pursuit of aggressive aims will be publicized
and declared void. U.S. and NATO military bases will be confiscated in the name of the
people. Army equipment and credits which create new forms of dependency will not be
accepted.
Our international relations will not be governed by unprincipled pragmatism. The foreign
policy of the revolutionary people's state will develop fraternal relations as well as
solidarity and friendship between peoples. It will defend these principles and put them
into practice.
The revolutionary power of the people will defend the people's right to self-determination
without making any concessions.
The revolutionary power of the people will develop relations based on equality, in
accordance with the principles of friendship and mutual respect with all countries,
especially with neighbouring countries.
The revolutionary power of the people will resist imperialism's "divide and rule" policies
and will defend the rights of the Turkish and the Greek people in the Aegean Sea. In
order to ensure that both peoples live in peace and like brothers and sisters, the
revolutionary power of the people will deal with all problems without prejudice and on
the basis of friendship and solidarity. It will try to make the Aegean sea a sea of peace
which both peoples will be able to use freely.
On the other hand, the revolutionary power of the people will resolutely resist any
attempts to turn Cyprus into an imperialist base. It will immediately withdraw the Turkish
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army of occupation. It will render any support it can for the establishment of a free and
independent Cyprus where the Greek and Turkish peoples can live like brothers and
sisters. In addition to this, the right of self-determination for the island's inhabitants will
be defended unequivocally.
The revolutionary power of the people will show solidarity with socialist and anti-
imperialist states, national liberation movements and progressive proletarian movements
in the capitalist countries, and will unequivocally defend the principle of equality.
The revolutionary power of the people will confront imperialist attacks on the peoples of
the world. On the international level, it will pursue a policy to expose imperialism and
reaction. The revolutionary power of the people is aware that real peace can only be
established if imperialism is wiped out all over the world, and will therefore take action
to support the oppressed peoples' struggles for independence.
The revolutionary power of the people will be a military base in the fight against
imperialism, which will fiercely defend and practise internationalism.
d - FREEDOM OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE
The ruling classes have been denying the existence of the Kurdish people for years. They
have tried everything to wipe out the Kurdish people. The Kurdish uprisings in support of
nationalist demands have been suppressed with terror. A policy of assimilation is being
pursued, using terror, laws of settlement and cultural assimilation, with the aim of
eliminating the Kurdish people altogether.
Under these circumstances, it is the duty of the Marxist-Leninists to promote confidence
among the nations in struggle, to fight against national oppression, and to unify all
members of the working class - and above all the proletariat - of the Turkish and Kurdish
nations, along with all other nationalities, in the fight against imperialism and the
oligarchy. To fulfil this task it is not enough just to pursue a revolutionary struggle
against imperialism and the oligarchy. It is equally important to create confidence
between both nations in the struggle against the chauvinism of the oppressing nation and
the nationalism of the oppressed nation.
It is the Kurdish and Turkish proletariat who have the power to fulfil this task.
As the anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic revolution is carried out under the hegemony
of the proletariat, it will also solve the national question of the Kurdish people, and will
not allow the hostile seeds of chauvinism to be sowed anew.
The people's anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic revolution will abolish the social basis of
national oppression by ending the rule of imperialism and the oligarchy, and will create
the objective basis for the right of peoples to self-determination. Without destroying and
taking over the central state power, no nation will gain freedom.
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The revolutionary power of the people will solve the national question according to the
principle of self-determination of the people.
It will guarantee the right to self-determination of the people. This also includes the right
to secession.
The revolutionary power of the people is of the opinion that the nations should unify
under the roof of one state - in which there is the right to form a separate state - rather
than founding individual, independent states. The division of the nations into several
small states would make the working classes of the different nations captives of
bourgeois prejudices. The peoples' confidence in each other would be damaged. This
leaves the peoples in a weaker position with respect to imperialism. In addition to this,
unifying under the roof of one state in order to end the economic and cultural
backwardness of the oppressed nation and to put real equality into practice is a
revolutionary solution, which assists both nations to be a unified force against
imperialism, which is in the interests of both nations.
In the event that the Kurdish nation insists on the creation of an independent national
state, despite the revolutionary solution, the revolutionary power of the people will
support this under the condition that the Kurdish nation does not support imperialism, and
that it does not oppose either the interests of the Kurdish and Turkish proletariats or the
interests of both nations.
The revolutionary power of the people will take all measures needed for the economic,
social and cultural development of the Kurdish nation. In order to abolish inequality as a
remnant of the old regime, economic, social and cultural development will be the primary
factor. Special efforts will be made to achieve this.
In the interests of the proletariat and the people, the revolutionary power of the people
will support the demand for the unification of the Kurdish nation, which has to live in
different countries. It considers this fight as an important step towards revolution in the
Middle East. It will fight for this on every level: political, diplomatic and military.
The revolutionary power of the people will guarantee the national minorities (Arabs,
Circassians, Georgians, Armenians) their social and cultural rights such as the protection
and promotion of their language and culture.
The revolutionary power of the people will fight against all counter-revolutionary
activities as well as against all activities that hinder the revolutionary solution to the
national question, such as petty bourgeois and bourgeois nationalism. Based on the
hegemony and the power of the revolutionary proletariat, it will try to convince the petty
bourgeoisie and fight against its national prejudices.
Nationalism does not lead nations to freedom.
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e - THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
The revolutionary power of the people will establish a new judicial system on the ruins of
the old, rotten judicial system, which has defended the interests of imperialism and the
oligarchy. This new system will defend the interests of the revolution and of the people.
Together with the people, a judicial system will be established which will guarantee that
the people will participate in the setting of all sentences.
The new judicial system will institute proceedings, make inquiries and decide punishment
in cases of problems and crimes that occur among the people. It will do so on the basis of
revolutionary values and social rights.
The new system intends to establish a dictatorship over the counter-revolutionaries, and
every counter-revolutionary will be found out and punished.
Jurisdiction will be free. The accused will be guaranteed the right to defend themselves.
The judicial system will function also as an educational institution in which people who
have committed crimes will be won back for society again. They will become productive
and thinking people. Those who are re-integrated into society will immediately be set
free, no matter how long there sentences are. Measures will be taken to support them so
that they can lead a life in conditions which are fit for human beings. Prisons will no
longer serve to destroy human personality. All inhuman actions in prisons will be banned.
No punishment will be ordered which does not correspond to human dignity. The prisons
will be cleansed of all traces of the oligarchic regime, which is based on torture and
humiliation. Any kind of torture will be severely punished as a crime against humanity.
B - ON THE ECONOMIC LEVEL
The anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic revolution will put an end to the economic hegemony
of the oligarchy and imperialism because they hinder the development of the productive
forces and the economic growth of the country. It will take action to ensure that all
resources and products will serve to increase the wealth of the people, and it will make
possible the free development of the productive forces.
The revolutionary power of the people will develop heavy industry in order to eliminate
the negative effects of distorted capitalism and to establish an economy able to meet the
basic needs of the people. Agriculture will be modernised and adapted to the needs of
industry. A just system of taxes will be established, taking into account the individual
level of income. Tax revenue will be used to increase the wealth of the people. The basis
for a socialist economy, which ends exploitation and turns final liberation into a reality,
will be created. In areas where the conditions allow it, the transition to the socialist mode
of production will be created.
231
Although it is under the hegemony of the proletariat, the revolutionary power of the
people will take into account the interests of all classes and strata taking part in the
revolution when carrying out its economic measures.
The revolutionary power of the people is the period of the transition from capitalism to
socialism. The proletariat will start to realise socialism in this transition period. The
transition to socialism is no sudden event, but an aim realised in the course of time.
Therefore this transition phase cannot be planned mechanically. The economy, which is
not socialist in character at the beginning, will develop its socialist character as the
hegemony of the proletariat increases. However, small scale manufacturing on a capitalist
basis will continue to exist in this increasingly socialist economy.
a - TRADE AND INDUSTRY
All property belonging to imperialism and the oligarchy - factories, companies, banks,
real estate, power stations, financial assets - will be confiscated and nationalized.
The alliances with the EC and links to imperialist institutions of exploitation like the
IMF, World Bank and OECD, will be terminated. All debt to imperialist states, banks and
companies will be annulled.
The revolutionary power of the people will hand over control of the confiscated
production units to the proletariat. Production will be carried out with socialist
consciousness, for the benefit of the people. Counter-revolutionary activities, speculation
and exploitation will be forbidden. Small scale production, which will persist for some
time, will be changed and supported according to the needs of the planned economy.
Production will be carried out in accordance with a plan worked out by the revolutionary
power of the people. Heavy industry will be dealt with as the primary factor in building
up new factories. The production of consumer goods will in no way be neglected, taking
into account the needs of the people. Inventions will no longer be carried out according to
the capitalist rule of profit, but will be adapted to the needs of the planned economy,
which will create social change.
In order to foster the expansion of the planned economy, fraternal and equal relations will
be established with the socialist countries. Under the control of the revolutionary power
of the people, the only economic relations which will be pursued will be those which
neither create dependency on the developed capitalist states nor jeopardize the
independence of the country.
All former privately and state owned banks will be amalgamated into the national bank.
The national bank will serve the interests of the planned economy and the needs of small
scale production and socialist agriculture.
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Foreign trade will be monitored by the revolutionary power of the people. Domestic trade
will be shaped in accordance with the needs of the people. Profiteering, the black market
and speculation will be forbidden and punished.
No measures will be taken against small and medium sized firms which work for the
benefit of the people, in accordance with the planned economy, maintaining the interests
of the people and which do not support counter-revolutionaries.
b - AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK BREEDING
The land and the means of production belonging to the big landowners will be
confiscated. In this way the size of the maximum size of land holding will be determined
in accordance with the actual situation. The remnants of feudalism will be completely
eradicated.
The landless peasants and peasants who do not have enough land will be given land to
work on, with the reservation that the land remains the property of the nation. An
extensive land and agricultural reform programme will be carried out.
The capitalist farms and estates will be confiscated, and will be made into large-scale
production units under the control of the rural proletariat. The large-scale production
units under the control of the rural proletariat will develop into the socialist mode of
production in the course of time.
The distribution of land and the organisation of collective production will be carried out
at the same time.
Land granted by the revolution power of the people must not be transferred to anyone
else.
Leasing of land will be forbidden. Land is to be given to those who work on it.
The peasants' debts and mortgages to big landowners, profiteers and the banks will be
annulled.
Agricultural machinery will be held collectively at the disposal of farmers, in order to
achieve modernisation and increase the size of crops. Farmers will receive cheap credits,
fertilizer, seed and chemicals. They will be guaranteed minimum prices that will be
determined by the people, taking into account production costs. The revolutionary power
of the people will also take care of the rural infrastructure.
Land that is not fertile will be improved and made fit for agricultural use through
specially developed projects.
Livestock and pasture lands belonging to the big landowners and capitalists will be
confiscated and used in large-scale production units.
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Small scale livestock producers will be supported with fodder, pasture land and breeding
animals. Their organisation into collective units will be supported.
c - NATURAL RESOURCES
All raw materials and productive units which exploit raw materials will be state owned.
The imperialist monopolies will have no rights to search for and exploit raw materials.
The exploration and exploitation of raw materials will be placed under the control of the
revolutionary power of the people.
The forests are the property of the people. On this basis, the revolutionary power of the
people will ensure that the farmers will be able to use the crops of the forest and will
protect the interests of the forest farmers.
Natural resources like the seas, lakes and rivers are owned by the people. Capitalist firms
which exploit these resources will be confiscated. Profiteers and swindlers will be
dismissed from the existing co-operatives. Small firms will receive support, and their
unification into collectives will be supported.
d - BEACHES AND NATURAL SITES
The capitalist plunder of the beaches will be terminated. The tourist firms and institutions
belonging to the small minority which exploits the beaches will be confiscated.
Destruction of beaches through building will be prevented. All beaches will be
redeveloped and placed at the disposal of the people.
Natural sites (natural parks, green areas and deer reservations) are the property of all
mankind. This is why our natural sites, destroyed and wasted by capitalism, will be
revived and protected. Programmes and plans will be drawn up for the development of
these beautiful sites and the creation of new ones all over the country.
C - SOCIETY AND SOCIAL CLASSES
In the oligarchic regime of today, the working people do not have organisations like trade
unions, associations and co-operatives to protect and further their interests. The
organisations that exist have been stripped of their functions.
The people do not have a secure future. They live in poverty. Unemployment,
homelessness and the lack of basic necessities mean that the impoverished people suffer
from social deprivation. They are forced to steal and commit crimes in order to survive.
Those who find work experience great difficulties in finding a place to live and getting
enough to eat.•&*
The working class, the leading force of the revolution, has no stake in the current regime.
The workers are not protected in case of accident. They are either not organised in trade
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unions, because they are afraid of being sacked, or they are organised in unions
controlled by the bosses, and they receive ridiculously low wages. The politicians oppose
wage increases. They increase inflation, taxation and the prices of consumer goods. In so
doing, they further increase the exploitation of the proletariat. This is all carried out in
order to increase profits for the capitalists so that they can live a life of luxury.
Those who cannot find work in the cities find "jobs" like porters, butlers, servants and
street dealers. Millions manage to survive and avoid starvation in this way. They are
deprived any kind of social security.
Compared with the impoverished masses, the situation of the petty bourgeoisie is better.
But the petty bourgeois masses are also relentlessly exploited by imperialism and the
oligarchy. The mechanisms of capitalist exploitation force them down to the level of the
proletariat and the impoverished masses through bankruptcy. Under the oligarchic
regime, however, there are also mechanisms to replenish the ranks of the petty
bourgeoisie and replace those who are driven down socially.
It is true that the petty bourgeoisie, which is made up of employees, civil servants, small
employers, doctors, lawyers, engineers and university students, is bound to the existing
system. But many are unsatisfied. Those who face being pushed down the social scale
take the side of the proletariat and socialism. Only a small part, which is able to climb the
social ladder, is for the continuation of the present system.
The situation of the middle bourgeoisie and the non-monopoly bourgeoisie is different,
however. As they lose the major part of their value added to imperialism and the
monopoly bourgeoisie, they try to compensate for their losses through increased
exploitation of the workers. In small firms, the workers are brutally exploited. They have
to work under the worst conditions and earn minimal wages. They are deprived of any
kind of social security and are frequently sacked.
Even though this bourgeoisie is able to survive by exploiting the workers, it has
renounced its mission as the representative of independent capitalism in neo-colonies like
Turkey. It has become the henchman of the monopoly bourgeoisie. In spite of its conflicts
with imperialism and the monopoly bourgeoisie, it supports the present regime. Only a
small part, at risk of being driven down into the small bourgeoisie, might support the
revolution, while another part may remain neutral.
The size of the rural proletariat in the large capitalist and state owned estates is increasing
because of the development of capitalism in agriculture. The rural proletariat, however,
works without any organisation, and without any social security. In many parts, the
conditions of the rural proletariat can be compared with that of serfs in feudal times.
The impoverished peasants - the semi-proletariat - constitute the majority in rural areas.
They own very little land and means of production, and therefore have to work certain
months of the year as rural proletarians. The labourers and lumberjacks, exploited under
feudal conditions in Kurdistan, also belong to the ranks of the impoverished peasants.
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The rural petty bourgeoisie is also very widespread in Turkey. Its members own enough
land and means of production to survive. They are also exploited in many ways. On the
one hand, they are exploited by the state through taxation, low prices for their products
and increasingly high prices for fertiliser and means of production. On the other hand, big
landowners, big merchants, profiteers and the banks oppress the petty bourgeoisie. This is
why the rural petty bourgeoisie experiences the same kind of poverty as the petty
bourgeoisie in the cities. Many members of the petty bourgeoisie are forced into the ranks
of the proletariat and a replaced by new people.
Except for a small minority, which is able to climb up the social ladder, the rural petty
bourgeoisie is discontented. They will take part in the revolutionary struggle under the
leadership of the proletariat. The layer of small peasants can even be won for socialism.
The rural middle bourgeoisie and the rich farmers live from the exploitation of the rural
proletariat. There are, however, conflicts with the big landowners and the monopoly
bourgeoisie. In spite of this, they will not support the revolution, except for a minority.
The above mentioned classes and strata are exploited by imperialism and the oligarchy.
The social gap between the oligarchy and the people is getting wider and wider every
day. It can be seen in unemployment, homelessness, poverty, moral degradation,
prostitution, social crime and the need to live "with something to eat and some clothes."
The anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic revolution will completely transform this social
situation. The revolutionary power of the people will promote all forms of social and
cultural development of the people, and work relentlessly to improve the material and
cultural level of the people. It will carry out the necessary revolutionary changes so that
everyone will have the same social opportunities.
CLASSES
The revolutionary power of the people will disband the political and economic
organisations of the oligarchy (TUSIAD, TISK, TOBB, TZOB ...) and ban lockouts in
capitalist enterprises that continue to participate in these organisations.
The revolutionary power of the people will take all measures to ensure that the working
class - the leading class in the anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic revolution - will be able
to direct and control the production and distribution of goods from all factories, coal
mines, power stations, capitalist and state owned estates and all big production units. It
will permit all workers to develop materially and culturally through its wage policy.
It will enable to proletariat to organise itself in trade unions, and to organise itself socially
and culturally in rural and urban areas.
It will create conditions for the maximum possible reduction in working hours.
Professional training opportunities and opportunities for cultural development will be
created for the workers.
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The right to strike will be guaranteed.
The risk of accidents at the workplace will be minimized through appropriate measures.
The social security of the workers will be guaranteed.
Those unable to work will be guaranteed the best standard of life possible.
The revolutionary power of the people will also strive to solve the problems of workers
who have migrated to foreign countries. It will take all necessary measures to eradicate
the economic and social conditions which give rise to emigration.
Child labour will be banned.
Impoverished peasants will be given land. They will be supported with means of
production and credits.
Measures will be taken so that the millions of impoverished people and the unemployed
masses will be able to take part in production. Those who are willing to work and who do
not get a job in spite of searching for one, will be guaranteed social security through
unemployment insurance.
The debts of urban and rural small producers to the state, the banks and big companies
will be annulled. Small scale production will be supported with credits, means of
production and fixed minimum prices. The right of small scale producers to organise
themselves will be protected and their unification into co-operatives will be supported.
The intellectuals, teachers, and self-employed professionals (doctors, engineers, artists,
writers ...) working for the interests of the people will be supported. Institutions will be
created for them to contribute to social change and to enable them to apply their
experiences and abilities to the benefit of the people. The intellectuals will play a very
important role as part of the struggle for the society of the future and the creation of
socialist men and women.
b - YOUTH
The revolutionary power of the people is aware that it is the youth who will create the
future. For this reason, it will create all kinds of opportunities for them. The aim is the
creation of healthy, productive, and revolutionary women and men.
Youth organisations will be formed all over the country to deal with the problems of the
youth and give them the opportunity to take part in leading the country. Possibilities will
be created for the development of relations and common activities with revolutionary
youth organisations from other countries.
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The youth will be given the right to vote at the age of 18, and the right to stand for
election at the age of 2 1
.
Education of the youth will be one of the most important tasks of the revolutionary power
of the people. The education system will be shaped in co-operation with the youth.
Opportunities will be created for the mental, physical and cultural development of the
youth. The aim is to educate healthy, creative, dynamic, patriotic revolutionaries,
committed to internationalism and the equality and fraternity of all the peoples of the
world. To this end, the necessary schools, gymnasiums, sports stadiums and cultural
centres will be established. The youth will be able to take advantage of all opportunities
to develop themselves.
c - WOMEN
Economic, political, social, tradition and any other kind of oppression of women will be
eradicated. They will participate productively and creatively in society as respected
people. Their role as second class citizens will be brought to an end.
Effective measures will be taken to ensure that women can develop their consciousness,
their organisation and their level of activity. Women will be guaranteed full participation
in the leadership of the country in all spheres.
Exploitation based on gender discrimination will be ended.
Women and men will be equal in all spheres of society. Social conditions will be created
to liberate women from the role of unpaid slaves in the household. There will be practical
equality between men and women.
It will not be permitted for women to be used as objects for advertising or as commodities
because of their gender. All official and unofficial brothels will be closed. The economic
and social basis of prostitution will be destroyed. The dignity and esteem of women will
be raised. The capitalist moral code, which humiliates women and only regards them as
sex objects, will be eradicated. Instead, a new morality will be created, based on love and
respect.
The traditional feudal conception, which hinders the development of women, will be
fought against. There will be a struggle for democratization within the family.
Whereas the positive characteristics of the family, which was formed in accordance with
the cultural and moral values of our society, will be protected, the economic
independence of individual family members will be striven for. All types of relationship
based on conservatism and economic dependency will be eradicated. All measures will
be taken to ensure the development of the family such that it does not separate its
interests from that of society as a whole. Society will regard the family as the smallest
unit of a new society based on honesty, mutual love and respect.
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Kindergartens and day-nurseries will be established in the knowledge that being a mother
and raising children is a social task. The burden of housework will be lifted from the
shoulders of women and will be viewed as a social task. In this way, women will have the
opportunity to participate fully in production.
d- EDUCATION
The revolutionary power of the people will take into account the role of education in the
stabilisation of political and social change and in the development of society. Its
education policy will aim at the further development of the productive forces and the
creation of socialist men and women. For this reason:
The individualistic, reactionary, fascist system of education will be destroyed and a
collective, patriotic, revolutionary education system will be built up, where everyone will
get the opportunity to be educated in their mother tongue.
A campaign will be launched to make the entire people literate. The aim of this campaign
will be not only to teach people to read and write, but also to further the development of
society and to foster the all round education of the people.
Attending school will be compulsory for all children at the primary and secondary levels.
All forms of educational privilege will be ended. Private schools will be closed.
Education will be free everywhere.
Education in rural and urban areas will be based on science. At all schools, from
secondary level education up to universities and colleges, education will be oriented
towards production in order to educate the people in accordance with the needs of the
new society. To achieve this, accelerated programmes will be instituted.
Education will be seen as a whole, comprising mental, physical, psychological and
technical education.
Every young person will be guaranteed the opportunity and the right to university
education. Universities and colleges will be reorganised so that they no longer work for
the exploiting classes but instead for the people.
Children from working class or peasant families will get prior access to universities and
colleges. People's universities will be founded.
e - HEALTH CARE AND SOCIAL SECURITY
The revolutionary power of the people is convinced that health and a secure life is a
human right from birth onwards, and will therefore implement all measures necessary for
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the health and social security of the people. To this end the following measures will be
adopted:
The health of the people, which was seen as a business, will be placed above everything
else. The health service will be free for all people. This will be a basic issue for the
revolutionary power of the people.
A special training programme will be developed to raise awareness about health. Taking
into account the inequalities in medical provision, fully equipped hospitals will be built
all over the country. The first hospitals will be built in regions where they are most
needed. People trained in these hospitals will be stationed in all places as health teams.
The health service will set up preventative medicine centers.
Pharmaceutical production will be nationalised. In addition, medication for the sick will
be free.
Social security will be guaranteed to all working people. People unable to work, the
elderly and the handicapped, will be guaranteed a good standard of life. The
revolutionary power of the people will guarantee the best possible standard of life to
those who have become unable to work through their role in the revolutionary struggle.
Child labour will be banned. The only work children will have to do will be to study. The
revolutionary power of the people will also create special nutritional and health services.
The revolutionary power of the people will strive relentlessly to provide healthy living
conditions for all. All the means at the disposal of the state and the people (real estate,
labour power, finance and machinery and tools) will be utilized in order to be able to
build housing facilities. The shanty towns (gecekondu), which are a reality in our
country, will be remodelled in accordance with a new building plan, or the inhabitants
will be given new flats.
The revolutionary power of the people will confiscate the oligarchy's luxury estates. The
big building companies will be nationalised and reorganised in order to solve the housing
problems of the people.
Transport and communications will be reorganised in accordance with the interests of the
people. The means of communication, as well as the means of transport on land, water
and air will be nationalised.
The revolutionary power of the people recognises that recreation is a right for the people
and will therefore reorganise the existing recreational institutions for the use of the
people in addition to creating new recreation areas.
The construction of factories which pollute the environment and which are harmful to the
people's health, will be forbidden. For existing factories, all measures needed for the
protection of the environment will be adopted. The people's awareness that the
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environment has to be protected will be developed and supported. Special organisations
will be created in order to protect the environment.
Any losses suffered by families or by regions as a result of counter-revolutionary attacks
or unintentionally through the revolutionary war, will be compensated. These families
and regions will be the first to be taken care of in the reconstruction programmes.
f- SPORTS
Mass participation in sports will be developed in order to help raise a healthy and
dynamic people. Sports shall not be regarded as a commodity to be bought and sold, but
as something which should serve the mental and physical welfare of the people, and help
bring up the people in a spirit of collective endeavour and solidarity.
Every member of the people will have access to sports facilities. Professional elite sports
will be abolished and amateur sports will be supported instead. New facilities will be
developed.
Everyone will have the opportunity to practise sports in the productive sphere.
Appropriate measures will be adopted to create a new consciousness so that sports will
not become a new opium for the people.
D - CULTURE
Imperialism and the oligarchy are trying to push through a universal imperialist "culture"
in order to undermine and destroy the national culture and the culture of the workers.
For years there has been a kind of propaganda in Turkey aimed at fostering hostility
between the nations. National hatred in Turkey is stirred up above all against the Greek
and Kurdish nations, along with other national minorities. What the oligarchy calls
"nationalism" is bourgeois chauvinism, which generates hostility between the nations and
has nothing to do with patriotism. The oligarchy's relations with imperialism are not
shaped by patriotism but by subservience. They try everything in order to create a
positive image of imperialism. In international relations, the oligarchy tramples on
national dignity. It pursues a humiliating policy devoid of identity. The oligarchy has
created the space for the immoral cosmopolitan "culture" of imperialism. It tires to shape
the culture of the Turkish people's according to its interests through the TV, radio, and all
other means. The oligarchy also uses religion to this end. It takes advantage of the
various religious cultures and moulds them according to the needs of capitalism. All
manner of reactionary and imperialistic cultures work hand in hand in shaping the people
in a capitalist way. The oligarchy supports religious denominations and opens Koran
training lessons and religious schools as a means of combating the revolutionary struggle.
The people are supposed to be religious, but for the capitalists religious principles are
null and void.
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The oligarchy maintains the old traditions and patriarchal ways in order to maintain its
exploitation. It uses the people's belief in fate in order to render any criticism of the
present system impossible. The people are imbued with the idea that men are not equal,
and therefore that equality is impossible. The oligarchy also falsifies history in order to
serve its fascist propaganda. Class struggles in history are not presented for what they
were, but are portrayed as struggles of one people against another. Any uprising in
Turkish history is presented as barbarism, and its suppression as heroism. The people are
kept silent and are distracted from dealing with their present and future problems through
propaganda about "victories", "heroic deeds" and "the importance of the Turkish nation".
Every institution is used to this end by the oligarchy. From primary education up to
university, this line is drummed into students. This education system poisons the minds
of millions of students.
The revolutionary power of the people is conscious that cultural development and cultural
activities are important preconditions for establishing a humane, productive and
revolutionary society. Culture will be regarded as of major importance for the creation of
productive, creative socialist men and women, who act collectively in accordance with
scientific concepts and methods. The roots of individualism and capitalist culture will be
eradicated through a revolutionary and democratic cultural policy. At the same time the
cultural level of the people will be raised and in this way a new society will be achieved.
The national, revolutionary and democratic elements in the culture of the people will be
developed until a socialist culture is formed.
a- CULTURE AND ART
The revolutionary power of the people will pursue a revolutionary and patriotic cultural
policy. Everyone, from the youngest to the oldest, will be taught revolutionary culture in
education and training programmes. The hegemony of imperialist culture will be brought
to an end.
All cultural institutions promoting racism, chauvinism, colonialism and moral
degeneration will be closed. All forms of such propaganda and activity will be forbidden.
The revolutionary and democratic elements of the national cultures, of the cultural
heritage, which is thousands of years old, of the local folklore and works of art, and of the
land and the architectural treasures on Anatolian land will be protected and will serve the
people. The revolutionary power of the people will also strive relentlessly to secure the
return of historical treasures stolen and plundered by the imperialists. In this way, cultural
treasures will be preserved and recreated instead of losing their importance.
Artistic and cultural activities will no longer be the privilege of a few intellectuals - they
will be accessible to all strata in all parts of the country, and will be united with the
creativity of the people.
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The cultural riches and achievements of the different nations and peoples, the cultural
treasures and works of art that have been created through the efforts of mankind, will be
made accessible for the people. The contacts and understanding developed in this way
will contribute to the creation of a world without war and exploitation.
Cultural understanding between the Turkish and Kurdish peoples have a special
significance in this context. These will increase the unity of the two peoples on the path
to final liberation.
The participation of the masses in cultural activities will be supported.
b - RELIGIOU.S. FREEDOM
The revolutionary power of the people will guarantee the religious freedom of everyone.
It will protect religious sites and take care of the social security of religious officials. It
will treat belief as a private affair.
The revolutionary power of the people will ban all institutions which use religion as a
means to create a conservative, theocratic state.
c - HONOUR OF THE MEN AND WOMEN KILLED IN THE REVOLUTIONARY
STRUGGLE
The revolutionary power of the people will commemorate the men and women killed in
the struggle for the liberation of the workers. Their heritage - their determination and
selflessness, their attachment to the cause and their courage - will live forever in the
consciousness of the people.
Among the people as a whole, especially in the new generations, the memory of those
killed in the struggle against imperialism and the oligarchy will live on.
The revolutionary power of the people will take care of the families and the children of
the fallen. They will be given priority when it comes to the necessities of life and
education.
We say:
The revolutionary power of the people is the only way to create an independent and free
country, where the people can live without being exploited and where they can live in
friendship. Only a people united under the leadership of the DHKP-C will be able to
destroy the state apparatus of imperialism and the collaborationist oligarchy. The
liberation of the people is only possible through the revolutionary power of the people.
Historically and politically, this is the task of the proletariat and its vanguard. We will
successfully fulfil this task. The party of the revolutionary power of the people is fighting
for this goal.
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Long live the revolutionary power of the people!




Devrimci Halk Kurtulu$ Partisi
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party
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